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Abstract  
This thesis concerns itself with issues of minority rights in the context of political 
liberalization and how political liberalization has triggered renewed claims to rights in 
Anglophone Cameroon. This thesis examines how Anglophone Cameroon was 
systematically reduced to a minority status and how the Anglophone elites are contesting 
this position. 
 
The thesis begins with some historical considerations and moves on to discuss the various 
phases of colonialism, using historical material to respond to whether or not the seeds of 
the current conflict are to be found in the way in which colonialism was implemented in 
Cameroon. The colonial experiences of the Cameroons under the Germans, French and 
British have not only been the basis for the entity Cameroon, but have also made 
numerous contributions, negative and positive to the country’s social, economic, 
demographic and political history. 
 
Having considered the historical context, the thesis moves on to discuss the rise of 
Anglophone Nationalism both at home and abroad. The thesis argues that state policies 
between 1990 and 2000 led to the development of Anglophone nationalism and the 
formation of many pressure groups to fight for the autonomy of Anglophone Cameroon. 
However, because of the government’s silence over the Anglophone problem, this thesis 
examines attempts to find a national solution to the Anglophone problem to a shift that 
goes beyond the question of national sovereignty. 
 
In analyzing the virtual imagined communities of Anglophone Cameroon, this thesis 
suggests that cyber nationalism is an effective tool to create networks of resistance to 
government policies and practice. Anglophone virtual communities in cyberspace have 
used the Internet as a means to promote a counter discourse on human rights, economic 
development and democracy in Cameroon. In this regard, the Anglophone online nations 
have gone a long way to create a substantial impact on events in Cameroon by serving as 
an important source of information to the Anglophone people.  
 xvii 
 
As a way of addressing the limits of the discourse on Anglophone nationalism, the thesis 
suggests that a lot has happened between the Anglophones and Francophones in terms of 
intermarriages, investment, migration and common lifestyle that the dichotomy between 
the two has become blurred. 
  1  
Introduction and Background 
Historically, Cameroon is a German creation. The territory was annexed in 1884. In the 
aftermath of World War I and the defeat of the Germans by the Allied Forces, German 
Cameroon was partitioned between Britain and France. France received four fifths of the 
country and Britain two separate areas bordering Nigeria.1 Each colonial power 
proceeded to establish a separate and distinct system of government, a condition hardly 
favourable for later reunification. This division created the foundation of a future 
Anglophone minority and a Francophone majority in the country.2 The British and 
French territories became mandates of the League of Nations until 1946, when their 
status changed to that of Trust Territories of the United Nations.3 The brief period of 
German colonization of Cameroon did not create a national awareness strong enough to 
evoke a sense of nationalism, but it left an indelible legacy and a common German past.4 
The reunification sentiment in Cameroon was built on the desire to return to the status of 
the former German territory before World War I. This sentiment was first noticeable in 
French Cameroon and it gradually found its way into British Cameroon. 
 
Politics in the 1950s in British Cameroons was centred on the question of secession from 
Nigeria and reunification with French Cameroon. John Ngu Foncha5 and his Kamerun 
                                                 
1
 Le Vine, Victor (1964), The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence, California: University of 
California Press, p. 32. 
2
 Awasom, N. F. (2000), “The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an Enthusiastic 
or a Reluctant One?”, Africa Today 47, 2: pp. 91-93. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 John Ngu Foncha founded the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1955 and became Premier 
of the British Cameroons on 1 February 1959. He held that position until 1 October 1961, when the region 
merged into a federation with Francophone Cameroon. From 1 October 1961 to 13 May 1965, Foncha 
served as Prime Minister of West Cameroon and Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. He 
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National Democratic Party (KNDP) favoured reunification with French Cameroon, while 
Emmanuel Mbela Lifafa Endeley6 and the Kamerun National Congress wanted the 
territory to enjoy a modicum of autonomy as a region in the Federation of Nigeria.7 The 
advocates of reunification won the plebiscite that was organized by the UN for British 
Cameroonians to decide either to join Nigeria or French Cameroon. British Cameroons 
went into a union of equal states with French Cameroon. After reunification of the two 
Cameroons, the task was to implement a policy of national integration to accommodate 
the differences existing between West Cameroon (former British Cameroons) and East 
Cameroon (former French Cameroon). 
 
A major challenge facing Cameroon since reunification in 1961 has been to deal with the 
question of national integration. For national integration to succeed it must take 
cognizance of the differences inherited by the two Cameroons from their colonial 
masters. The process should be one of taking the good aspects of both parts and blending 
them. To the less tolerant Francophone8 Cameroonians, integration was synonymous with 
assimilation. The Anglophones were made to bear the burden of integration, as most of 
                                                                                                                                                 
held the latter title until 1970. In 1994, he led a delegation of the secessionist Southern Cameroons National 
Council (SCNC) to the United Nations to request its backing of the movement's drive for greater autonomy 
in Cameroon's two English-speaking provinces.  
6
 Emmanuel Mbela Lifafa Endeley helped form the Cameroon Youth League (CYL) in 1939. In 1944 he 
was a founding member of the Bakweri Improvement Union. He was a founder of the Cameroons National 
Federation (CNF) in 1949 and later served as its president. In 1951 Endeley was elected to the Eastern 
Nigerian Assembly in Enugu. He worked to have Southern Cameroons granted special regional status apart 
from Nigeria; when the Southern Cameroons Regional Assembly was formed, he was one of its first 
members. In 1953, Endeley joined John Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng Muna in breaking from the 
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) to form the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), 
which advocated autonomy for Southern Cameroons. E.M.L. Endeley was the first Prime Minister of the 
British Southern Cameroons from 1954-1959. 
7
 Atanga, Lucien (1994), The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the Alienation of a 
Linguistic Minority, Unpublished MA Thesis, Amadu Bello University, Zaria, p. 71. 
8
 Francophone is used in this thesis to refer to French speaking Cameroonians while Anglophone stands for 
English speaking Cameroonians 
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the institutional changes affected the state of West (British) Cameroon more than it did 
the state of East (French) Cameroon. West and East Cameroon went into a federation on 
the basis of equal status. In 1972 the federation was dismantled and was replaced by a 
unitary state. This process actually reduced the English speaking Cameroonians to a 
minority in the country, contrary to the agreement at the Foumban Conference that laid 
the groundwork for the reunification of the two Cameroons (a point I develop further in 
chapter one). 
 
The wind of change that blew across Africa in the early 1990s saw widespread political 
disturbances across the continent. In 1990 President Paul Biya under considerable 
pressure, introduced a limited degree of political liberalization. This move led to the 
creation of various pressure groups in Anglophone Cameroon, to voice the long-standing 
grievances of the Anglophones. Anglophone movements such as Southern Cameroons 
Peoples’ Organisation (SCAPO), Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), The 
Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) and Free Ambazonia Movement were more 
vocal because of what they perceived to be a failed integration, in which the 
Anglophones according to some of the pressure groups were treated as second class 
citizens. Attempts by such Anglophone movements to dialogue with the government 
failed, partly because the government did not recognize that there was an Anglophone 
problem in Cameroon. Furthermore, some pro-government Anglophone elites, who had 
espoused the views of the government, saw the Anglophone problem as just one of the 
many problems that plagued the country.   
 
  4  
In 2000 the government embarked on a process of decentralization, which it considers to 
be a delicate and complex issue that needs to be implemented gradually. On the contrary 
the leaders of the Anglophone movements saw decentralization as a desperate attempt by 
the government to silence the Anglophones in the face of mounting pressure from the 
Southern Cameroons nationalist movements.  
 
Demographic and socio-economic background 
The Republic of Cameroon lies at an important geographic and demographic crossroads. 
It divides the Niger and Congo river basins and shares the physical characteristic of both, 
with the culture of both regions mingling freely in the country. Cameroon is not only a 
transitional zone between two kinds of African boundary-making but is also the joint 
between West and Central Africa.9Cameroon has been called ‘Africa in miniature.’ It is 
characterized by exceptional social and ethnic diversity. The country has more than 250 
identifiable ethnic groupings.10 In addition, there has been significant migration of people 
from neighboring countries into Cameroon. This has been further complicated by large 
internal migrations in search of better opportunities for economic advancement.  
 
Cameroon is located on the west coast of Africa, with Nigeria to the West, Chad and 
Central African Republic to the east, and Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, and Equatorial 
Guinea to the South. The country is located slightly north of the equator and has an area 
of 475,440 Square kilometers. In 2002, Cameroon had a population of 16,184,748 with 
                                                 
9Le Vine, Victor (1964), The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence, California: University of 
California Press, p. 1  
10
 John Mukum Mbaku (2005) Culture and Customs of Cameroon, London: Greenwood Press, p. 1  
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an average annual growth rate 2.36 percent. The birth rate is 35.66 births per 1,000 
population.11  
 
Cameroon is made of up 250 ethnic groups, which form five major regional-cultural 
groupings: western highland (grassfield), who include the Bamileke, Bamoun, and 
several smaller groups in the north west (estimated to represent 38% of the population); 
(2) Coastal tropical forest peoples, who include, the Bassa, Douala and many smaller 
groups in the south west (12 percent); (3) Southern tropical forest people, who include 
the Beti, Bulu, Fang, and Pygmies (18 percent); (4) Predominantly  Islamic peoples of the 
northern semi-arid regions and central highlands, who include the Fulani (14 percent); (5) 
the Kirdi or Islamic peoples of the northern desert and central highlands (18 percent).12 
Cameroon is not only the meeting place of northern, western, and central geographic 
regions, it is also the confluence of three great African culture-areas: Guinea coast, 
Western Sudanic, and Congo. Represented in Cameroon are branches of people of 
Guinea coast, the Fulani and Arab peoples of the Western Sudan, and the Bantu speaking 
peoples of the Congo basin.13 Extensive group mixing during the last several hundred 
years has made it very difficult to produce an accurate classification of Cameroon’s 
ethnic groups. 
 
Cameroon’s more than 250 ethnic groups speak more than 24 languages, which belong to 
either Chadic group of Afro-Asian stock or one of the many branches of the Congo-
                                                 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Ibid 
13
 Le Vine, Victor (1964), The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence, California: University of 
California Press, p. 6 
  6  
Kordofanian stock. From 1884 to 1916, German was spoken and used widely in 
commerce and trade. The post World War 1 partition of Cameron into French and British 
zones of influence saw the demise of German and the introduction of English and French 
as official languages at reunification. The people who live in the North West and South 
West provinces speak Standard English, Pidgin English and their traditional languages. In 
the Northern Province either French or Fulfulde is widely spoken. In other parts of the 
country, French and local languages such as Douala and Ewondo are spoken.  Pidgin 
English remains an important lingua franca, especially among people in urban centers 
throughout the country. 
 
About two-thirds of Cameroonians live in rural areas, usually in villages or very small 
towns, and are engaged primarily in agriculture. In 1970, 85 percent of Cameroon’s 
labour force worked in agriculture; by 1990, that percentage had fallen to 70. The service 
sector, at a little over 20 percent, is the second largest employer of labour in Cameroon.14 
Most of the food crops are produced by women, while most men produce cash crops for 
export (cocoa, coffee, palm kernel, banana).  Agriculture remains Cameroon’s most 
important economic sector, accounting for 43.5 percent of the GDP in 1999. The most 
important cash crops are cocoa, beans, coffee, and cotton. Cameroon’s industrial sector 
which include mining, manufacturing, construction and power, employed nearly 9 
percent of the country’s labour force in 1990 and in 1999 generated 18.6 percent of its 
GDP.15 
 
                                                 
14
 John Mukum Mbaku (2005) Culture and Customs of Cameroon, London: Greenwood Press, p.19 
15
 Ibid 
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Generally, economic growth and development have not been as rapid as many 
Cameroonians had expected at reunification in 1961. However, many Cameroonians 
remain optimistic and believe that the solution to their economic problem lies in the 
democratization of the country’s political system and the introduction of a market-
centered economic system. 
 
Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this research is to investigate the correlation between minority 
rights and political liberalization. I hope to chart the ways in which liberalization has 
triggered renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon. The complexities of these 
claims reside in the fact that some are articulated around minority rights that can be 
accommodated within the framework of a single state form, while others are articulated 
around the right to self-determination. This study therefore, revolves around three main 
research concerns:  
 
Firstly, in examining the nature of these claims, I will devote specific attention to those 
claims that posit an Anglophone identity based on a distinct colonial history. 
 
The second area of inquiry will deal with the technologies of persuasion and 
dissemination, Anglophone claims in the public sphere and the ways in which Southern 
Cameroonians popularise their demands on the Internet.  
 
The third area of inquiry deals with the limits of the discourse of Anglophone 
nationalism. In particular, I will examine the various ways in which Anglophones and 
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Francophones in Cameroon are similar and share more cultural traits than they can 
acknowledge. 
 
Hypotheses  
This study is framed around the following hypotheses: 
1. During periods of political liberalization, identity claims aim not only at the 
acquisition of political rights, but also at increased access to resources. 
2. In national communities which have undergone different experiences of colonial 
rule but which have nevertheless been brought under the umbrella of a single 
state, there is a strong correlation between minority rights and claims to the right 
to self-determination. 
3. Different kinds of civic identity are the result of different forms of colonialism. 
 
Rationale 
The literature on democratic transitions in Africa has paid little attention to minority 
rights. When minority rights have been addressed, the focus has been on ethnic conflicts. 
Conflicts between ethnic, religious and national groups have always been a major threat 
to the modern state. Throughout the world, minorities and majorities have clashed over 
issues such as language rights, federalism and regional autonomy, political 
representation, religious freedom, education curriculum, land claims, and even national 
symbols such as the choice of national anthem or public holidays.16 In some instances, 
these conflicts have led to outright war. In the Third World and especially in Africa, 
                                                 
16Kymlicka, W. (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, London: 
Clarendon Press, p.1; Kymlicka, W. (ed.) (1995), The Rights of Minority Cultures, London: Oxford 
University Press. 
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attempts to create stable political institutions are often undermined by violent nationalist 
and ethnic conflicts. Since the end of the cold war, ethno-cultural conflicts have been the 
most common source of political violence in Africa. This worldwide crisis has sparked a 
corpus of studies on conflicts between minority and majority, and has attracted 
international attention with the formation of international bodies such as the Minority 
Rights Group, which provides a voice for oppressed minorities at the United Nations 
Human Rights sessions. 
 
Since the end of colonialism minority issues have precipitated violent conflicts all over 
the world: Biafra (Nigeria); Eritrea and Tigre (Ethiopia); Baluchis (Pakistan); Kurds 
(Iraq); Lebanon; the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland.17 In Cameroon, Canada and 
Nigeria in particular, minority issues have gained ground as a subject of academic 
inquiry. They have also been a focus of activist and militant organization nationally and 
trans-nationally. Political liberalization in Cameroon in the early 1990s gave an opening 
to members of the Anglophone part of Cameroon to protest against their perceived 
marginalisation and to lay claims for self-determination and autonomy. The refusal by the 
government to discuss any related constitutional reforms forced some Anglophone 
movements, such as SCNC, SCAPO and SCYL, to adopt a secessionist stand. They 
presented the Anglophone community as an oppressed minority whose territory had been 
annexed by the Francophone-dominated state.18 French is a minority language in Canada. 
Until recently French speakers were the most poorly paid workers and their standards of 
living were the lowest in the country. The French Quebecois felt the only way to gain 
                                                 
17
 Chaliand, G. (ed.) (1989), Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States, London: Pluto Press, p. 87. 
18
 Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (1997), “The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 35, 2: pp. 207-229. 
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control of their destiny was to advocate that Quebec should separate from the rest of 
Canada. In 1990 the Ogoni minority in Nigeria formed the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to fight their economic and environmental exploitation. 
Anger at what they saw as the exploitation of their oil, without benefit to them or 
compensation for the damage done to their land and livelihood, led to a number of 
protests against the policies of the Federal government and the activities of Shell, the oil 
company that produces almost half of Nigeria’s oil.19 These protests triggered violent and 
repressive responses from the Federal government, for which any threat to oil production 
is a threat to the existing political system.  
 
Disciplines such as International Law, International Relations, Refugee Studies and the 
Anthropology of Minority People have dealt with issues concerning minorities. 
International law on minorities contains a number of provisions aimed at protecting 
minorities. The first international provision was put into place following World War I 
within the framework of the League of Nations. The Minorities Treaties empowered the 
League Council to receive petitions, conduct fact-finding investigations, and issue 
directives to those nations not in compliance.20 Five states, Albania (1921), Lithuania 
(1922), Latvia (1923), Estonia (1923), and Iraq (1923) had to submit assurances on 
minority protection as a condition for admission to the League. The League’s main 
failing was that the treaties on minority rights protection never became universal, which 
                                                 
19
 “Movement for the survival of the Ogoni People” 18 March 2004. Accessed at <  
http://www.mosop.net/Archivesfiles/THE%20STRUGGLE%20FOR%20RESOURCE%20CONTROL%20
IN%20PERSPECTIVE.doc 
20
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thus led to discontinuity.21 The formation of the United Nations ushered in a new 
approach centring on individual human rights. The United Nations Charter makes some 
concession to minority groups, by acknowledging that the United Nations cannot remain 
indifferent to the fate of minorities. However, an agreement could not be reached because 
of the difficulty of adopting “a uniform solution to this complex and delicate question, 
which has special aspects in each state in which it arises.”22 The United Nations General 
Assembly requested the UN Economic and Social Council to ask the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the 
Protection of Minorities to carry out a thorough study of the problem of minorities, in 
order that the United Nations would be able to take effective measures for the protection 
of racial, national, religious, or linguistic minorities.23 It may be said that, to this day, the 
study of minority problems continues, while the effective measures for protection of 
minorities are still lacking. 
 
In recent years the Internet has become a platform on which minority people articulate 
their marginalisation. As of now there are still few studies on cyber nationalism, in 
particular the way in which Diasporas link up with their countries of origin in order to 
affect local processes. A notable exception is Benedict Anderson’s “Long Distance 
Nationalism” … The Internet has been used to great success in creating awareness of the 
plight of minority people. Articles and visuals have been made public through the 
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 Ibid. 
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 Capotori, Francesco (1985), “The Protection of Minorities under Multilateral Agreements on Human 
Rights”, in Satish Chandra et al,(eds.) Minorities in National and International Laws, pp. 218, 227 citing 
U.N Doc. A/Res/217 (III) C). 
23
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Internet that would not have been published in some countries. Chapter five of this study, 
explores cyber nationalism in an attempt to show how Anglophone Cameroonians have 
penetrated and exploited cyberspace as an alternative means for their communally based 
identity. 
 
Considering the debate on the problem of minority people in the world today, scholars 
like Lapidoth and Ghai have argued that the question of minorities in the contemporary 
world poses a serious problem: on the one hand, regarding human rights, that of 
discrimination and oppression against minorities as members of a group; on the other 
hand, at the level of the state, whereby it claims it is an internal issue.24 A key issue when 
dealing with minority problems has been to look at the difference between the dominant 
and minority groups. How do minority groups differ from the majority, and by which 
process have the minority groups been subjected to varying degrees of discrimination? 
Interestingly, most studies have followed a sociological pattern, whereby some scholars 
have articulated the nature of minority relationship with the dominant group on the basis 
of the differential treatment of minorities.25  As an innovation to this research, this study 
explores the melting points between the minority Anglophones and the dominant 
Francophone in Cameroon to show that Anglophones and Francophones have more in 
common than they can acknowledge. 
 
                                                 
24
 Lapidoth, R. (1997), Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, Washington DC: United States 
Institutes of Peace Press; Ghai, Y. (ed.) (2000), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in 
Multi-ethnic States, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press 
25
 Dench, G. (1986), Minorities in the Open Society: Prisoners of Ambivalence, London: Routledge; Kegan 
Paul and Kurokawa, M. (ed.) (1970), Minority Response: Comparative Views of Reactions to 
Subordination, New York: Random House; Vander Zanden, J. (1972) American Minority relations, New 
York: The Ronald Press Company 
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Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
What constitutes a minority? 
There are many competing definitions of the term minority. Chaliand argues that only 
“groups who see themselves as different, ethnically, religiously or linguistically, and are 
concerned to preserve their special features should be described as minorities”.26 He 
argues further that demands relating to the status of minorities would be meaningless if 
they were dominant minorities. Dominant minorities are minorities that though, they do 
not have a major demographic weight, nevertheless wield huge economic and political 
power. The white minority under apartheid in South Africa; the minority Sunni Arabs 
under Sadam Hussiem; the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi in Africa constitute such 
examples.  
 
Francesco Capotori defines minority as: 
 
a group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a 
state and in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of 
the population and who, if implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religions or 
language.27  
 
From the premise above, the numerical inferiority of a minority is established by 
comparison to the entire population of a state. Thus, a group would remain a minority 
even though it may constitute the majority in a specific region of the state. Non-
dominance does not only refer to political power, but economic, cultural, or social status. 
The sense of solidarity implies awareness by persons belonging to minority groups of the 
                                                 
26Chaliand, G. (ed.) (1989), Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States, London: Pluto Press, p. 89. 
27
 Lapidoth, R. (1997), Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, p. 10. 
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same ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics that set them apart from the majority, 
and a desire to preserve those characteristics as central to their common identity. This 
definition has undoubtedly contributed to clarifying certain aspects of what constitutes a 
minority. Some international bodies have adopted this definition because it captures some 
of the concerns of minority groups. Such is the case of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on 21 February 1992. 
 
For Jules Deschenes, a minority is “a group of citizens of a state, numerically a minority 
and not dominant in this state, with ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics different 
from those of the majority of the population, bound up with one another, animated, if 
only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and aiming at de facto equality with the 
majority”.28  The above definitions of minorities apply to minorities that want to continue 
to exist and be recognized as such, that feel themselves discriminated against or 
oppressed, and want their protection assured and their rights recognized. 
 
Louis Wirth defines a minority: 
 
…as a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural 
characteristics, are singled out from others in the society in which they 
live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard 
themselves as objects of collective discrimination. The existence of a 
minority in a society implies the existence of a corresponding dominant 
group with higher social status and greater privileges.  Minority status 
carries with it the exclusion from full participation in the life of the 
society.29 
                                                 
28
 Chaliand, G. (ed.) (1989), Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States, p. 7. 
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This definition contains three components: the minority group must be visible to others; it 
must experience differential and pejorative treatment; and its members must be aware of 
themselves as a minority group.  
 
Wagly and Harris note the following concerning minorities: 
 
(1) Minorities are subordinate segments of complex state societies; (2) 
minorities have special or cultural traits which are held in low esteem by 
the dominant segment of the society; (3) minorities are self-conscious 
units bound together by  the special traits which their members share and 
by their special disabilities which these bring; (4) membership in a 
minority is transmitted by a rule of descent which is capable of affiliating 
succeeding generations even in the absence of readily apparent special 
cultural or physical traits; (5) minority people, by choice or necessity, tend 
to marry within the group.30   
 
From this definition it might be inferred that people do not choose to become a minority-
group member and do not work to attain minority status, but rather membership in a 
minority group is ascribed at birth through the society’s rule of descent. Consequently, 
one is a minority group member because one’s parent(s) are a minority group members. 
 
In order to develop a universal definition of minority, Dworkin and Dworkin31 took the 
definitions of Wirth, Young, Wagly and Harris, and added that of Gelfang and Lee on 
“differential power” to get a heuristic meaning of minority. They proposed that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
30
 Wagly and Harris (1976), in Dworkin, Gray and Dworkin, Rosalind (eds.) The Minority Report: An 
Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Relations, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, p. 5. 
31
 Dworkin, Gray and Dworkin, Rosalind (eds.) (1976), The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, 
Ethnic, and Gender Relations, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, p. 15. 
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minority group is a group characterised by four qualities: “identifiability, differential 
power, different and pejorative treatment, and group awareness”.32  
 
Identifiability 
Groups must be readily identifiable in order to ensure that an individual recognizes 
members of his or her own group and members of others. Without identifiability, group 
solidarity and differential treatment become difficult. What is often overlooked in 
minority-group relations is that there are more similarities than differences between 
people within the same society. In America skin colour is the central element of 
identifiability.33 In Cameroon, salient criteria for identifiability between groups include: 
language, dress, food, folklore, cultural festivals, traditional political systems and other 
cultural factors. This research argues that language or even dress and food in Cameroon 
are not enough to distinguish Anglophones from the Francophones. The divide between 
English and French is not hermetic because if one cannot speak either English or French, 
one can nevertheless speak Pidgin English, which is used to divide and, at certain points, 
to unite the people. From a cultural and political point of view, Francophones do not 
identify themselves on the basis of the use of the French language but on the basis of 
ethnic or regional language. For instance, people identify themselves not as Francophone 
but as Bassa, Bulu, Ewondo and Muslims and this is how they articulate their political 
differences. In the days of President Amadou Ahidjo34, if one asked the Southerners 
whom they were competing with, they would obviously say the Northerners. This 
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 Ibid, p. 15. 
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 Amadou Ahidjo was the first president of Cameroon from 1961 to 1982, 
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transcends the issue of language to that of regional groupings, whereby people feel more 
strongly attached to their region than to the language they speak. 
 
Differential Power 
Power is the actual use of resources to influence and control others.35 When the majority 
in power controls resources, it also controls the life chances of the minority (their access 
to resources, jobs, education, wealth  even food and health care). In so doing, the 
minority will remain dependent on the majority in a colonial type of relationship. 
Cameroon is a bilingual country. In principle, all its citizens have equal chances, but in 
practice it is different. The Francophone majority controls all the resources to the 
disadvantage of the Anglophone minority. The French language is used as a powerful 
means of access to cultural capital. In this circumstance, one would need to compare what 
is offered in French and in English with regard to the media and information about 
opportunities. The research further examines the cabinet positions; governments of the 
provinces, generals in the military to determine the percentage of Anglophones in the 
government over a period. The above mentioned points are explored in detail in chapter 
two of this study.  
 
Differential and Pejorative Treatment 
Differential treatment, or discrimination, is what group members actually experience as a 
consequence of their minority status. It is this differential treatment that most directly 
affects the life chances and lifestyles of the individual minority group members and 
becomes the focus of minority protest and movement. Some Anglophone Cameroonians 
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feel that the Cameroon government has treated them unfairly, as they are being looked 
upon as second-class citizens. Because of this subordinate role some Anglophone 
pressure groups such as SCNC, SCAPO, SCYL and Free Ambazonia are today 
advocating for a separate state, where they will be able to control their own destiny.  To 
highlight and understand the pejorative treatement of Anglophones, focuss would be on 
language rights and the language used to interrogate people, language used in the public 
domain which deals with official documents and how often this happens, together with 
job opportunities. 
 
Group Awareness 
Group awareness refers to the perception of common goals that can be achieved only 
through cooperation rather than competition. However, if no individuals in a minority see 
themselves as being a minority and subjected to differential treatment, then minority 
status cannot be said to exist.36 Minority members are aware of something that they have 
in common with others like themselves. The common traits that they share often form the 
basis of an in-group feeling, a sense of belonging distinct from the dominant group.37 
This study hopes to assess the forms of awareness within Anglophones in Cameroon and 
in the Diaspora. The colonial heritage of the English and French speaking Cameroonians 
differs. The legal and educational systems in Anglophone Cameroon are different from 
those of French speaking Cameroonians. All of these differences in institutions create an 
aspect of awareness amongst Anglophones in Cameroon. Arguably there are specific 
institutions like the university, media and associations that are political and apolitical, 
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which help to ignite the feeling of an Anglophone identity which is different from the 
Francophone. 
 
Many people hoped that the end of the Cold War would lead to a more peaceful world; 
“instead, the ideological conflict between capitalism and communism has been replaced 
with an upsurge in conflicts between ethnic, religious and national groups”.38 These 
developments may be related to the swift progress of modernization, urbanization, 
decolonisation, and even democratization. But it might well also be related to the 
processes of globalization and, of universalisation of norms, as evidenced by the global 
discourse on human rights. In the early 1990s, groups of indigenous populations 
increased their demands for recognition of their special rights. The various claims are 
based on four conceptual frameworks in the area of human rights: (1) the right to equality 
and non-discrimination; (2) the right of minorities to preserve and develop their own 
culture, religion and language; (3) the right of indigenous populations to preserve their 
traditions; and (4) the right of people to self-determination.39  
 
The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination 
The primary aim of all individuals, including members of minority groups, is to achieve 
equality and non-discrimination. After World War II, something approaching a consensus 
existed in the international community with regard to the rights of ethnic minorities. 
Their rights were not different from general human rights, which were spelled out in 
detail in some major international legal agreements produced in the post-war era. Some 
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of these agreements include: the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the Racial 
Discrimination Convention of 1965, which had obvious implications for minorities.40 The 
first development in this direction was the provision included in Article 27 of the 1966 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. It reads:  
 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.41 
 
 
There are two setbacks in Article 27 above. First, by employing the word “in those States 
in which ... minorities exist,” this article leaves states the option of declaring that they 
have no minorities, thereby excluding its application to persons within their territory. 
Secondly, the rights in Article 27 are conferred on persons belonging to ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities but what about indigenous group?  Are they entitled to the rights 
it provides? However, although the rights enshrined are fairly limited, it constitutes a 
beginning of sorts.  
 
Minority questions were again discussed in the framework of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe at the meeting of Experts on National Minorities convened in 
Geneva in July 1991. The experts were of the opinion that “issues concerning national 
minorities …. are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not 
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constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective state”.42 Of greater significance 
is the fact that ethnic minorities are aware of their rights and are exerting a lot of pressure 
on national governments in different parts of the world for greater recognition of minority 
rights. 
  
The Right of Minorities to Preserve and Develop their Own Culture, 
Religion and Language 
As mentioned above, general human rights, as listed in the Universal Declaration and 
elaborated upon in other instruments, are individual in nature and can be demanded by 
everyone: by persons belonging to minorities and by persons belonging to indigenous 
peoples. These human rights constitute the foundation of the traditional human rights 
system.  They are based on the two basic principles set out in the Universal Declaration: 
Article 1, declaring that “everyone is born free and equal in dignity and rights”, and 
Article 2, stating that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind”.43  
 
The rights of persons belonging to minorities add to the foundation rights set out in the 
Universal Declaration. The specific rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities include: 
 
the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion; to use their own language in private and in public, to participate 
effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life and to 
participate effectively in decisions on the national, and, where appropriate, 
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regional level, concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions 
in which they live, to establish and maintain their own associations, to 
establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts with other members of 
their group and with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as 
contacts across frontiers with citizens of other states to whom they are 
related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties.44  
 
 
As stated above, these rights may be exercised by persons belonging to minorities 
individually as well as in community with other members of their group, without any 
discrimination.  However, they are always the rights of individuals. 
 
The Right of Indigenous Populations to Preserve their Traditions 
Indigenous peoples are the disadvantaged descendants of those peoples that inhabited a 
territory prior to the formation of a state. The term “indigenous” may be defined “as a 
characteristic relating the identity of a particular people to a particular area and which 
distinguishes them culturally from other people or peoples”.45 When, for example, 
immigrants from Europe settled in the Americas and Oceania, or when new states were 
created after colonialism was abolished in Africa and Asia, certain peoples became 
marginalized and discriminated against because their language, their religion, their 
culture and their whole way of life were different and perceived by the dominant society 
as being inferior.46  
 
Today many indigenous peoples are still excluded from society and are often even 
deprived of their rights as equal citizens of a state. Nevertheless they are determined to 
preserve, develop and pass on to future generations their ancestral territories and their 
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ethnic identity. Self-identification as an indigenous individual and acceptance as such by 
the group is an essential component of indigenous peoples’ sense of identity. Their 
continued existence as peoples is closely connected to the possibility of influencing their 
own fate and to living in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions 
and legal systems.47  
 
The declaration of the right of indigenous peoples to full and effective enjoyment of the 
human rights and fundamental liberties enshrined in the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human Rights, and other 
international human rights instruments do indeed also protect the indigenous population. 
The declaration contained in Article VIII established that: “Indigenous peoples have the 
right to their own languages, philosophy, and concepts as a component of national and 
universal culture, and as such, states shall respect them and facilitate the dissemination 
thereof in consultation with the peoples involved”.48 
 
The Right to Self-Determination 
The principle of self-determination of peoples was embodied as a central purpose of the 
United Nations in its Charter in 1945. One of its aims was “... to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
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peace ...”49 Minority groups have often relied on the principle of self-determination as 
espoused in the UN charter to seek for autonomy. 
The resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, states: “All peoples have 
the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they can freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”50  In 
this light self-determination is therefore tied into aspects of life – political, economic, 
social, and cultural, and is ultimately about how we choose to live, and allow others to 
live together on this planet. On 7 February 1995, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution regarding the “Universal realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination,” in which the General Assembly reaffirms “the importance, for the 
effective guarantee and observance of human rights, of the universal realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination” and welcomes “the progressive exercise of the 
right to self-determination by peoples under colonial, foreign or alien occupation and 
their emergence into sovereign statehood and independence”.51 Interestingly, since 1995 
to present, these issues continue to be highly relevant as many groups of peoples around 
the world strive for the fulfillment of this basic right of self-determination. 
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The Making of Minorities in Africa 
This section focuses on the colonial legacy in Africa as a factor that continues to 
contribute to the perception, and the treatment of minorities. To secure their hold in many 
African territories, colonial administrators devised various models including direct rule. 
In this approach colonialists forged an alliance with particular local groups, and the effect 
of this policy was the deepening of existing social and geopolitical divisions, or the 
creation of new ones.52 Whether or not the divisions occurred by malevolent design, the 
effects are manifold. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi colonial policy engendered a 
habit of ethnicity that has prompted civil wars,53 finally culminating in the genocide in 
1990. Colonial penetration and the administration of the African land involved the 
demarcation of borders, which in itself contributed to a sense of geo-ethnicity.54  During 
the early years of colonial rule, borders were not firm or well policed. This was true 
where territories were adjacent parts of the same colonial empire. The problem of borders 
increased with decolonisation, as colonial administrative lines were transformed into 
international boundaries that separated sovereign African states. Decolonisation was 
accompanied by an emphasis on group identities and solidarities, as individuals and 
groups sought to gain the greatest possible political and economic advantage during the 
transfer of power. In Chad and Sudan this led to a civil war.55 Southern Cameroons was 
part of German Kamerun. When Germany was defeated in World War I and her 
territories divided among the victorious allies, Britain and France, Britain administered 
the Southern Cameroons as a League of Nations mandated territory and later on as a 
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Trustee Territory of the United Nations Organisation. In 1961 the Southern Cameroons 
voted in a plebiscite to join the former French Cameroons that had gained independence 
earlier in 1960 as the Republic of Cameroon. In 1961 the two states formed the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon, which was later changed in 1972 to the United Republic of 
Cameroon, and finally to the Republic of Cameroon in 1982. Throughout this process, the 
Francophones used their numerical strength to undermine the Anglophones. This is how 
the Southern Cameroons minority question came about, and the issue of their unfair 
treatment. This point is developed further in chapter three. 
  
Types of Minorities 
There are different types of minorities in the world. According to Louis Wirth, cited by 
Zanden, minorities can be classified as (1) pluralistic, (2) assimilationist, (3) secessionist, 
and (4) militant.56 
 
Pluralistic Minority 
This is a group that desires to live peacefully side by side with the dominant group; it 
seeks to maintain its cultural identity against dominant group absorption. Switzerland is 
an example of a culturally pluralistic nation. A majority of Swiss speak a variety of 
German; about 20 percent speak French, 6 percent Italian and about 1 percent speaks 
Romansh. Within the various groups, there are differences in costume, dialect, and 
patterns of life, but the Swiss have learned to live harmoniously with their differences.57 
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Assimilationist Minority 
This group expects to be absorbed within an emergent common culture that is the 
blending of divergent racial and ethnic strains. Through this process of fusion of the 
differing racial groups and cultural traditions, a new people and culture emerge.58 A 
practical example of an assimilationist minority is the European immigrant groups within 
the United States. In America one hardly finds European immigrant groupings, whereas 
immigrant groupings from Asia and Latin America are more prevalent. At the early 
stages of reunification in Cameroon, scholars like Bernard Fonlon argued that 
Anglophones and Francophones should meld into a common culture, but the less tolerant 
Francophones wanted to assimilate the Anglophones. Consequently, the Anglophones 
resisted all attempts to lose their colonial heritage. 
 
Secessionist Minority 
The aim of this group is to achieve cultural as well as political independence from the 
dominant group. They want a separate statehood encompassing full political self-
determination. This minority group believes that there can be no satisfactory coexistence 
between majority and minority groups within the context of a single society.59 A strong 
emphasis is placed on the revival of the language, lore, literature and ceremonial 
institutions associated with the group’s prior independence. Examples of such minority 
groups are the Irish, Czech, Polish, Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian and Finnish 
nationalistic movements that culminated in the establishment of independent nations at 
the end of World War I.60 This study argues that in the Southern Cameroons one finds 
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organizations like SCNC, SCAPO, SCYL and Free Ambazonia advocating a secessionist 
strategy by fighting for a geographically distinct state for Southern Cameroons. The same 
situation applies to the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance and the Basque 
Party in Spain which have been advocating territorial independence from Senegal and 
Spain respectively. 
 
Militant Minority 
This group goes far beyond the demand for equality, or even cultural and political 
autonomy, and insists upon reversing the status quo. Domination over others is set as its 
goal, and this group is convinced of its own superiority. For example, the Sudeten 
Germans, aided by the Nazis, made claims upon the Czechoslovakian Republic.61  
 
Minority Problems 
In order to understand the nature and significance of minorities, one needs to look at their 
objective as well as their subjective positions. Minorities objectively occupy a 
disadvantaged position in society when contrasted with the dominant group. Minorities 
are excluded from certain opportunities: economic, social, and political. The members of 
minority groups are held in lower esteem and may be the object of contempt, hatred, 
ridicule, and violence. Their subordinate position manifests itself in their unequal access 
to educational opportunities and professional advancement.62 They are not free, as other 
members of the society to join the voluntary associations that express their interests. Like 
other minority groups around the world, some Anglophone Cameroonians claim that they 
have been marginalized economically, socially and politically. Economically the 
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government of Cameroon has liquidated enterprises of importance to Southern 
Cameroons like POWERCAM, Cameroon Bank, and the Produce Marketing Board. The 
liquidation of these enterprises is to ensure the continued dependence of Anglophones on 
the majority-led government. Politically, the government has mobilised to crush any 
protest by Anglophone Cameroon movements. Activists of the Southern Cameroons 
National Council, Southern Cameroons People’s Organisation and the Southern 
Cameroons Youth League have been arrested, detained and tortured, and others are in 
voluntary exile.63 
  
Minority Reaction to Dominance 
This section explores how minority group members think and feel about their subordinate 
status. Confronted with discriminatory treatment by those in power, minority group 
members show various patterns of response to their condition. Some are eager to 
assimilate in order to lose their stigma, others seek equality with separation, and still 
others accept the status of inequality.64 There are three patterns of minority reaction to 
dominance, namely: acceptance, aggression and assimilation. 
 
Acceptance 
Minority group members may come to accept their disadvantaged and subordinate status. 
Some minority group members feel that it is better to accept what cannot be changed or 
avoided. Others accept their fate out of a feeling that there is nothing else to do. Some 
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accept the existing order, neither questioning it nor doing anything about it.65 Southern 
Cameroonians for the past three decades accepted their subordinate position in the union 
with East Cameroon. The wind of change across Africa in the early 1990s ushered in 
some political openings to stand up against the unfairness and to demand their rights. 
 
Aggression 
Minority group members may respond to dominance by engaging in hostile acts against 
the system that is stifling them. In some circumstances this response leads to outright war 
with the minority fighting for self-determination.66 In 1982 the Movement of Democratic 
Forces of Casamance demanded that the government of Senegal grant independence to 
the Casamance region. The refusal of the government to accede to the demand of the 
Casamancais sparked a two-decade-long conflict that led to killings, disappearances and 
torture of many people. In Spain the struggle of the Basque people to realise their right to 
self-determination has often sparked hostility towards Madrid. The raison d’être of 
Basque nationalism has always been separatist, and its expression has always been 
through violence.   
 
Assimilation  
Minority group members may attempt to become socially and culturally fused with the 
dominant group. Zanden argues that some minority group members may come to accept a 
large number of dominant group values by virtue of making the dominant group their 
reference group. That is, the group that provides them with their standards for evaluating 
behaviour. Since belonging to the minority group may produce disadvantages in meeting 
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various social needs, some individuals attempt to disaffiliate themselves from the 
minority and move outward to the dominant society.67 Attempts by the government of 
Cameroon to assimilate the Anglophones have often been met with bitter reaction from 
Southern Cameroons. Ghai notes that “more than any previous age, ours is marked by 
ethnic conflicts. Responses to ethnic conflicts have ranged from oppression and ethnic 
cleansing to accommodation of ethnic claims through affirmative policies, special forms 
of representation, power sharing, and the integration of minorities”.68 
 
Literature on Political Liberalization  
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 symbolised the collapse of one-party 
communist regime in Eastern Europe.69 The collapse of communism had serious 
repercussions in East-Central Europe, Africa and Latin America. As the demands for 
democracy swept across Africa in the early 1990s, drastic changes affected states in sub-
Saharan Africa. Frustrated by declining economies and the failure of incumbent 
governments to solve basic problems of socio-economic and political development, 
people from different social strata called for an end to authoritarian rule.70 Ottaway 
argues that “if the strongest, best organized totalitarian systems could collapse 
completely, certainly Africa’s petty tyrants, presiding over weak states and fragile 
institutions had little hope for survival”.71  
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The early 1990s saw widespread political disturbances across the African continent. 
Transitions away from one-party and military regimes started with political protest, 
proceeded through liberalization reforms to competitive elections, and usually ended with 
the installation of new forms of regimes.72 Following a number of protests in Benin 
against long delayed scholarships and civil servants going for months without salaries, 
the government responded to the mass street protests by making some political 
concessions. The President of Benin, Mathieu Kerekou, announced a broad amnesty for 
political prisoners and released some 200 of them. The protesters demanded more by 
asking for an end to the ill-treatment of political detainees and a clampdown on 
corruption. In order to recapture the political initiative, the President accepted a return to 
multiparty politics and created a commission to prepare a national reconciliation 
conference, to which political and trade union organizations, religious associations and 
Beninois living abroad would be invited to discuss the country’s future.73 The Benin 
National Conference lasted 10 days. The conference was declared sovereign, the 
constitution suspended, the national assembly dissolved and plans for multiparty 
elections were adopted. A year later Benin held its first multiparty elections in 17 years 
and Kerekou was defeated in the elections. The lessons of the Benins’ conference was not 
lost as Robinson commented that: 
  
Between March of 1990 and August 1991, the rulers of Gabon, Congo 
Mali, Togo, Niger and Zaire faced the demands of pro-democracy forces 
and convened national conferences. During this same period, opposition 
groups in the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Madagascar, Burkina 
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Faso, Mauritania and Chad began mobilizing campaigns to press their 
demands for national conferences. Outcomes have varied. In some cases 
the incumbent retained control by manipulating the conference 
proceedings, or by rigging multiparty elections. In other cases the 
opposition prevailed in the short run.74  
 
Although the national conference has been instrumental in the transition towards 
democracy, Ottaway argues that the conditions in Africa were not favourable for 
democracy as there was no strong opposition and civil society in existence.75 
 
In Cameroon, in 1990 President Paul Biya, under considerable internal and external 
pressure introduced a limited degree of political liberalization. He announced the advent 
of multipartyism, as well as a certain degree of mass communication and freedom of 
association, including the holding of public meetings and demonstrations.76 As a result, 
several political parties, pressure groups and private newspapers were established in 
Cameroon, which began to express and represent Anglophone interest. This gave some 
impetus to the Anglophones to begin voicing their long-standing grievances by openly 
criticizing the Francophone domination of Anglophones. The first opposition political 
party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), appeared in Anglophone Cameroon during the 
growing economic and political crisis and soon became the major opposition party in 
Cameroon. The leaders of the SDF turned the Anglophone region into a strong 
opposition. The impact of this on the Anglophone community was the development of 
Anglophone consciousness and action. Several Anglophone pressure groups were created 
by Anglophone elites to defend the interests of the Anglophones. These included, Free 
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West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), Free Ambazonia Movement, Cameroon 
Anglophone Movement (CAM), Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), The 
Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) and Southern Cameroons Peoples’ 
Organisation (SCAPO). All these pressure groups are fighting a common cause, that of 
defending the interests of the Anglophones in a Francophone-dominated state. 
 
In Brazil political liberalization began as “regime initiated liberalization”.77 In 1973 when 
the process of Brazilian liberalization began, there was no significant political opposition, 
no economic crisis, and no collapse of the coercive apparatus due to the defeat of war. 
Bolivar Lamounier argues that “it would be naïve to gloss over the tensions inherent in 
these changes, as if the actors were simply following a previously conceived blueprint”.78 
According to him, the government and the opposition found enough space to redefine 
their respective roles through several stages, since each perceived what it stood to gain 
from the continuity of the process. He stresses that: 
 
The opposition was capable of extracting important concessions while at 
the same time organizing itself as a powerful electoral force. The 
government also benefited in many ways. Most importantly, it saw a 
gradual reduction in the costs of coercion … In short the government 
could capitalize on the political benefits of an atmosphere of progressive 
“normalcy,” as if exchanging losses of legitimacy arising from discontent 
with its past for gains based on the increasing credibility of its intentions 
as to the future.79  
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It is important to understand that what gave the Brazilian transition its special character 
was the fact that both the government and the opposition stood to gain from the 
liberalization. Alfred Stepan argues that “though the leaders of the military government 
may voluntarily begin a process of liberalization, the process cannot cross the threshold 
of redemocratization without the additional support of societal push or corporate pull”.80  
According to him the idea of government-led liberalization became greatly complicated 
as the people wanted a change. The government had hoped to carry out a gradual and 
carefully controlled liberalization but when its very legitimacy was challenged. The 
government and opposition were at loggerheads over human rights issues, the release of 
political prisoners, and insistence that the government should account for those that had 
disappeared.81 This led the government to embark on a series of arbitrary arrests and the 
torture of detainees.  
 
In most processes of political liberalization, churches, lawyers’ associations, human 
rights organizations and the middle class do play a pivotal role in mobilizing the people. 
Political liberalization usually starts with the demands for respect of certain rights such as 
human rights and freedom of association, before it moves to a full-blown call for regime 
change. These demands by the people often lead to repression by the government, which 
can have an opposite effect. In some situations where the government reacts with harsh 
and repressive measures it provides the force to mobilize protests and, in some instances, 
repression can help to kill the protest. Having established an analytical framework on 
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minority rights and political liberalization, focuss would be on the case study: The 
Anglophone Cameroon Minority. 
 
The Anglophone Minority in Cameroon 
The modern territory known today as Cameroon is a colonial invention by Germany.  In 
1884, Germany colonized Cameroon and carved out its boundaries, which extended far 
beyond its present territory, at that time encompassing northern Nigeria, part of Chad and 
The Central African Republic. The Germans were active colonizers, building schools, 
railways and plantations. During the period of German colonization there was no 
Anglophone state. 
 
The divide in the Cameroon state can be dated from early 1916, when Germany was 
defeated in World War I. The Allied powers (Britain and France) reached an agreement 
on the division of Cameroon between them. France received four-fifths of the country 
and Britain received two separate areas bordering on Nigeria.82 As a result, a single 
nation was divided into three parts governed by two colonial powers–hardly a situation 
conducive to later reunification. This division created the foundation of a future 
Anglophone minority and a Francophone majority in the region.83  
 
In a United Nation’s supervised plebiscite, British Northern Cameroon opted to join the 
independent Federation of Nigeria, and British Southern Cameroon decided to form a 
union with The Republic of Cameroon on 1 October 1961, called the Federal Republic of 
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Cameroon. By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone political 
elite had hoped to enter into a loose federal union as a way of protecting their territory’s 
minority status and cultural heritage. In such a union, each composite unit would be 
allowed to (a) retain its own institutions; (b) manage its own resources; and (c) maximize 
its values.  
 
Unfortunately, many constraints were to make it impossible for such a federation to 
become a reality (points developed in chapter two). Instead, it soon became evident that 
the Francophone political elite preferred a highly centralized, unitary state as a means of 
promoting national unity and economic development. While the Francophone elite 
received strong support from the French during constitutional negotiations, the 
Anglophone elite was virtually abandoned by the British, who resented the Southern 
Cameroons option for reunification with Francophone Cameroon.84 During the 
constitutional talks at Foumban in July 1961, the Francophone elite were only prepared to 
accept a highly centralized federation, regarding it as merely a transitional phase to a 
unitary state. Such a federation demanded relatively few amendments to the 1960 
constitution of the Republic of Cameroon.  
 
In 1972, when President Amadou Ahidjo created a unitary state in blatant disregard of 
constitutional provisions, there was in reality little left of the federation, except perhaps 
in name.85  To reduce the danger of any future united Anglophone action, Ahidjo then 
decided to divide Southern Cameroons into two provinces, albeit well aware of the 
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internal differences within the Anglophone community, between the coastal-forest people 
of South West Province and the grass field people of the North West Province.86  What 
many regarded as one of the last visible symbols of the 1961 union was removed in 1984 
when President Paul Biya abolished the appellation “United Republic of Cameroon” and 
replaced it with “Republic of Cameroon”, which was, significantly, the name of the 
Francophone part of the country when it became independent in 1960.87  
 
Southern Cameroonians saw the move of the government as an attempt to wipe out their 
identity as English speaking Cameroonians. However, this union failed to meet the 
aspirations of most Anglophones as they continued to feel increasingly marginalized in 
most sectors of the economy in the country. The grievances of the Anglophones against 
the Cameroon government are many. They range from the complaints against the 
violation of the unification agreements, through resentment towards annexation, to 
complaints of territorial neglect and the marginalization of Anglophones. Anglophone 
Cameroonians make up about 30% of the Cameroonian population, but their participation 
in government has never been more than 15%.88 Worst of all some Anglophone 
Cameroonians feel that they are being treated as second class citizens in their own 
country. The state’s attitudes towards Southern Cameroons have resulted in the relative 
underdevelopment of the Anglophone region, which has not benefited substantially from 
its rich resources, particularly oil. Gradually, this has created an Anglophone 
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consciousness: the feeling of being recolonised and marginalized in all spheres of public 
life in their own country.89 
 
The minority English-speaking Cameroonians feel that they have been marginalized by 
the French speaking majority and wish to exert more control over their own affairs in the 
west of the country. The mainly French speaking authorities have long ignored the call 
for independence. It is this call for independence that led to the creation of the Southern 
Cameroon National Council – a pressure group that represents the aspirations of the 
Southern Cameroonians. Many English speaking Cameroonians suspected of belonging 
to the Southern Cameroon National Council and engaging in the organization’s activities 
have been arrested.90 
 
Methodology   
This research is more qualitative than quantitative. Qualitative research does not reduce 
people’s words and acts to statistical data in the way that quantitative research does.91 
Qualitative research pays attention to what subjects say, write and do. It attempts to 
assess their words and behaviour carefully, and pays attention to individual statements in 
order to carry out a more detailed interpretation and analysis.92 While statistical data is 
important in giving a bigger picture of a larger population, qualitative data will help 
explain more about the practices and behaviour of the population. A central feature of 
qualitative research is trying to experience the reality that others experience. “Qualitative 
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researchers empathise with the people they study in order to understand how they see 
things and to learn from them, qualitative researchers try to see with the eyes of the 
researched and walk in their shoes”.93 This research also seeks to understand how the 
Anglophones came to be constituted as a minority and the various means that they have 
been using to articulate their claims. In this research multiple methods of data collection 
are used to arrive at a deeper understanding of the ways in which Anglophones feel 
marginalized, and also of the melting points between Anglophones and Francophones. 
 
RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
The subjects for this study include Anglophone elites of different political affiliations, 
ethnic groups, social class, sexes and ages in Cameroon and in the Diaspora. I 
interviewed 15 Anglophone elites spearheading the Anglophone cause, 4 pro-government 
Anglophone elites and 3 Francophones. Besides semi-structured interviews, I collected 4 
life histories of some Anglophone elites to show how their civic identities were 
developed under the British colonial rule in Cameroon. About 435 students in four state 
universities were asked to answer the questionnaires. The questionnaires were used to 
investigate the melting points between Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon.              
 
Forms of Data Collection 
Primary and Secondary Materials 
To meet the demand of the research questions and hypothesis, the data collection 
techniques included archival library search, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews 
and observation. The study made extensive use of secondary sources: books, 
monographs; journal articles and magazines; official circulars and publications by 
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relevant players in the Anglophone struggle and governments’ written responses to the 
struggle. Internet searches also constituted a huge invaluable source of data for this study.  
 
Questionnaires 
 Both open-ended and closed questions were used to collect data for this research. 
Questionnaires are advantageous for this kind of research in that they save time, 
especially where there are many respondents.94 The number of respondents who can be 
reached is quite high as compared to interviews.95 Questionnaires are less expensive and 
require less skill to administer than an interview. Questionnaires can simply be handed to 
respondents with a minimum of explanation. Further, questionnaires can often be 
administered to large numbers of individuals simultaneously.  It is usually possible to 
cover a wider geographical area and to obtain information from more people by means of 
questionnaires than by personally interviewing each respondent.96 
 
Open-ended and closed questions were prepared and administered to students at the 
following state universities: Dschang, Buea, Douala and Yaoundé I and II. The 
questionnaire was conceptualised around two central issues: lifestyle and the Anglophone 
problem in Cameroon. The questionnaire was divided into four major sections. Section 
one was aimed at obtaining data on the type of music and food that they like and about 
football in general. Section two focussed on the influence of Western culture on the 
youths. Section three dealt with language and the media and finally, Section four 
investigated their knowledge of the Anglophone question. Questionnaires were relevant 
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to this research because they allowed the collection of some important data on aspects of 
Cameroonian response to the melting point between Anglophone and Francophone. The 
questions were also designed to provide information relating to the research questions of 
this project. A sample of the questionnaire is found in appendix one of this thesis. 
 
A total of 435 questionnaires were administered in four state universities. However, the 
number of those returned was 368, thus making the percentage of total returns 93%. The 
questionnaires comprised 38 questions and all the questionnaires were delivered and 
collected personally by the researcher. It is regarded as distinctly advantageous to give 
questionnaires personally to subjects because the purpose of the study can be explained, 
and in some cases the questionnaires can be completed on the spot. This personal contact 
is considered significant in building better co-operation between the researcher and the 
respondent.97 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
These are generally regarded by experts as the best form of interviews because the 
researcher can move beyond the prepared interview questions to spark off more informal 
discussion.98 Semi-structured interviews provide “more opportunities for asking and 
probing” and the rate of return is good, as opposed to questionnaires where some (or even 
most) may not be returned. Another advantage of the interview is its greater flexibility 
because, in a questionnaire, if the subject misinterprets a question, there is usually little 
that can be done to remedy the situation. In an interview there is the possibility of 
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repeating or rephrasing the questions to make sure that they are understood. “The 
interview is a more appropriate technique for revealing information about complex, 
emotionally laden subjects or for probing the sentiments that may underlie an expressed 
opinion”.99 The kind of interview used in this research goes far beyond that of the semi-
structured interview because the researcher also used life testimonies to develop a deeper 
understanding of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. (See appendix three and four for 
interviews and life history questionnaires). 
 
Observation 
Direct observation made for this research started in June 2005. The process involved 
spending some time around the university vicinity, in restaurants, in market places, in 
church and in nightclubs observing the interaction, activities and experience of 
Anglophones and Francophones living together. Visiting these places, taking down notes 
proved useful to the researcher in providing relevant information needed for this research. 
 
The need to show whether Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon have more in 
common than they can acknowledge was one research aim, which this research seeks to 
answer. This necessitated the use of direct observation techniques on youths in 
Cameroon, taking into consideration the type of music they like, their dressing style and 
to see if they are being influenced by any Western culture. Directly observing the youths 
in the vicinity of the four state universities shed some light on how they are being 
influenced by the American culture of hip-hop and Rap.  
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Qualitative research is regarded as being “multimodal in focus”100 in that it uses a number 
of methods to gather data. The use of many methods is an attempt to get an in-depth 
understanding of what is being researched. The use of questionnaires, interviews and 
observation in this study is an attempt to “see” from different perspectives in order to 
make more informed comparisons, contrasts and generalizations about the aims and 
objectives of this research.  
 
Analysis of Data  
Archival library search consisted of sourcing data from books, journals, newspapers, 
magazines, communiqués, and material from the National Archive in Buea (NAB). 
Relevant literature from these sources was reviewed and analyzed with particular 
reference to what we are told about the Anglophone minority in Cameroon. How did the 
Anglophones come to be constituted as a minority? The research also looked at the 
processes by which the Anglophones have been subjected to varying degrees of 
discrimination and the radical demands made by the Anglophones for political autonomy. 
The primary and secondary materials used in the literature were useful in providing an 
historical context in chapter one and information about the development of Anglophone 
nationalism in chapter three.  
 
The Internet provided an invaluable source of information and data required for this 
research, especially when examining how Anglophone Cameroonians have built virtual 
communities in cyberspace to propagate their nationalism. Finally, Internet sources were 
used to a large extent looking at how the Anglophone problem became internationalized. 
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I relied heavily on the Internet sources because nothing has been published regarding the 
above issues raised. However, some Internet sources were used to reinforce the data in 
the other chapters of this research.   
 
The data collected from the questionnaires, interviews and observations were grouped 
according to the different themes of the research. Placing the raw data under various 
themes made the analysis of the data very simple. 
 
Problem Encountered while Collecting the Data for this Research 
I experienced some difficulties both with the questionnaires and the interviews. As 
concerns the questionnaires, they were initially designed in English, but while on the 
field I realized that respondents were both French and English. This prompted me to get a 
translator to translate the questionnaires for the French respondents (see appendix two for 
questionnaires in French). Furthermore, since the questionnaires were distributed 
randomly, some students whose first language was English tried to answer in French and 
vice versa, thereby making the data transcription a very cumbersome exercise. In some 
cases I discarded the questionnaires because of poor language and illegible writing.  
Another major setback was the fact that the way the Francophones write is quite different 
form the Anglophones; as such I had difficulties in trying to read what some of the 
students had written in response to the questions. 
 
As far as interviews were concerned, I had to go through all types of scrutiny before 
interviewing some persons. A letter from my supervisor introducing me as a Wits 
student, who has been allocated some funding to complete a fieldwork research in 
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Cameroon was produced each time I approached a person to request an interview. Prior 
to my fieldwork research, I was cautioned by my supervisor to keep a low profile because 
the area I am researching in is a very sensitive issue. No doubt, the reaction I got from a 
couple of high profile personalities in government proved him right. In Bamenda, which 
is the capital of the North West province of Cameroon, I had no major problems speaking 
to people I had selected for interviews. Some of them took time off from their busy 
schedules, and granted me interviews. In the South West province, the story was 
different, as my requests to interview Dorothy Njeuma, the then Vice Chancellor of the 
University of Buea; Peter Mafamy Musonge, former Prime Minister and Dion Ngute, 
Minister Delegate in charge of Common Wealth at the Ministry of External Relations 
were all turned down. These people would have given me the government’s perspective 
on the Anglophone problem in Cameroon.  
 
Ethical Issues 
Before embarking on the questionnaires and the interviews I explained to the participants 
the nature and the importance of my research. On this basis, I made it clear to the 
participants that they did not have to take part if they were unwilling and that the 
information obtained would be safeguarded and their identities protected, in the sense 
that their names would not be used when answering the questionnaires. The tapes used in 
recording the interviews were not labelled with names but rather with special codes to 
conceal identities. The questionnaires and the interviews contained both open-ended and 
closed questions to give the respondents the opportunity to freely explore their 
experiences to satisfy the aims and objectives of my research.  
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Establishing trust with respondents was a problem as respondents were often wary of 
discussing issues that could create trouble for them. Some of the people who granted 
interviews to me were extremely concerned that their names should not be mentioned in 
the research. Some people spoke to me and afterwards they were not quite sure of my 
intentions, and they kept seeking reassurance that this would not land them in trouble. I 
assured them that whatever information they had divulged would be used without 
mentioning their names.  
 
Chapter Summary 
The aim of the research is to understand how Anglophone Cameroon came to be 
constituted as a minority in the world and how it is being treated as a minority. It is 
important to examine the relevant literature on minority rights asking, what constitutes a 
minority? Various definitions of minority rights and their protection in international law 
are examined. Literature on political liberalization is examined to support the claim that 
liberalization ushered in renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon. The 
introduction also covers the methodology used in this research to satisfy the aims and the 
hypotheses of this research. 
 
Chapter one explores the historical development in Cameroon form pre-colonial, 
colonial, mandate and trusteeship systems, finally culminating in the reunification of the 
two Cameroons. This chapter uses historical material to respond to the question whether 
the seeds of the current conflict in Cameroon can be found in the way in which colonial 
rule was implemented.  
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Chapter two traces the ways in which the new state has dealt with the question of national 
integration during the period of federation and how it deals with it currently in the unitary 
state. It ask what tools the government has been using and with what success? First, it 
examines integration in the following fields: economy and transport, institutions, legal 
systems, education and the promotion of bilingualism in general; secondly, it attempts to 
show that there were some visible cracks at the beginning as the government tried to 
carry out its policy of national integration of the two Cameroons. Southern Cameroons 
had to bear the burden of the institutional changes because they were the minority. 
Thirdly, the chapter also examines integration in the unitary state and goes further to 
show that under the unitary state there are continuities with few changes to the 
government’s policy of national integration. Today, Anglophone Cameroonians are 
clamouring for political autonomy because of a failed policy of national integration. 
 
Chapter three explores the emergence of Southern Cameroons nationalism. The first 
section traces the development of Anglophone movements in order to demonstrate that a 
lively political organization had come into being by 1945 largely due to British colonial 
policies in the territory.  The second part of the chapter explores nationalism after 
independence and after political liberalization. The rest of the chapter explores the 
impetus and setbacks of the Anglophone movement from the early 1990s to the present 
day. And finally, it is argued that a certain dynamic of action and reaction took place as 
the state pursued more discriminatory and repressive policies against the Anglophones, 
and that the directions of the later Anglophone movements were critically conditioned by 
the policies of the state. 
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Chapter four examines the different ways in which the Anglophone problem became 
internationalized. The first part, explores the mechanism through which the Anglophone 
movements tried to enter into dialogue with the Cameroon government. The 
government’s unwillingness to dialogue with the leaders of the Anglophone movement 
compelled the Anglophone political elite to seek other avenues to compel the government 
to act on the Anglophone question. The second part of the chapter focuses on the 
responses from the government and lastly, it examines the shift in an attempt to find a 
national solution to the Anglophone problem to a shift that goes beyond the question of 
national sovereignty. 
 
Chapter five presents an in-depth discussion of the various virtual communities of 
Anglophone Cameroon found in cyberspace. The chapter begins with the reasons why 
Anglophones had to resort to this new technology as an instrumental tool to articulate 
their nationalism, as opposed to the older form of nationalism that requires proximity. 
The second section of this chapter explores the content of advocacy websites that 
propagate the ideal of political autonomy for Anglophone Cameroon. The final section of 
the chapter discusses a number of websites on Anglophone Cameroon that only provide 
information on the Anglophone struggle. 
 
Chapter six focuses on the limits of the discourse of Anglophone nationalism, by showing 
that Anglophones and Francophones have more in common than they can acknowledge. 
Focus is on lifestyle issues such as Cameroon music, media, food, dress and fashion, 
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language and sports and finally Anglophone and Francophone views on the Anglophone 
question.  
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion summarizes the major arguments and findings of the thesis. It addresses 
the Anglophone problem within some broader issues regarding minority rights and 
political liberalization. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In order to gain an insight into contemporary politics in Cameroon today regarding the 
Anglophone problem, it is critical to examine the various claims made by the government 
and the Anglophone movements based on colonial history. These claims can be 
understood only with a proper grasp of the colonial history of Cameroon and its cultural, 
ethnic, economic and political diversities. The reunification of the two Cameroons 
brought together peoples whose separate colonial experiences provided clear contrasts in 
language, law, administration, education and political style. The question one will 
attempt to answer is “what were the underlying reasons for such a union?” In the 
analysis, one needs to go back to the various phases of the colonial experience under the 
Germans, British and the French in the Cameroons and historical material will be used to 
ascertain whether or not the seeds of the current conflict are to be found in the way in 
which colonial rule was implemented in this area. The colonial experiences of Cameroon 
under the Germans, French and British have not only been the basis for the entity 
Cameroon, but have also made numerous contributions, negative and positive, to the 
country’s social, economic, demographic, and political history.101 
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This chapter focuses on the following historical considerations: pre-colonial 
developments in the territory; the colonial period, including the German protectorate, the 
mandate system, and the trusteeship period, and nationalism and reunification and lastly 
the Foumban Conference that finalized the reunification of the two Cameroons. 
 
1.2 Pre-Colonial Period 
This part of the study seeks to account for some form of political and socio-economic 
cooperation that existed in pre-colonial Cameroon. Of interest would be the nature of 
political cooperation for people of Cameroon stateless system during this period. If some 
members of Cameroon stateless system did manage to establish substantial political 
communities, were they positively motivated to do so or simply compelled by 
circumstances? Scholars have written much about pre-industrial societies, according to 
Hobbes, life in pre-industrial societies was a war of all against all.102  Some studies 
emphasized the difficulty of defining leadership roles and the scope of political 
organization in pre-colonial societies.103 But in a case where a community is threatened 
by another, it is obvious that it would shift form dispersed settlement into defensible 
settlements. Under such circumstances, several factors may encourage acceptance of 
chiefly authority, including the need for more effective mechanisms of conflict resolution 
and the necessity of organizing for a common defence.104  
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Claude Meillassoux a neo-Marxists used a model of ‘self sustaining agricultural society’ 
to understand the elaborate stateless system of pre-colonial Africa by focusing upon 
effective structures of control within the kinship system. He attempts to understand these 
by portraying a local farming community as a highly competitive system in which elders 
base their dominant power upon control of economic resources and nubile women, as 
well as on alliance with peers in neighboring groups. According to Meillassoux, elders in 
pre-colonial African societies naturally tend to supervise both production and the family 
granaries in which the harvest is stored. This permits them to consolidate control over 
resources on a day-to-day basis. The elders also have monopoly over marriageable 
women. In case of war threats from neighboring communities, the elders would mobilize 
the people to fight back and ancestor worship helps to legitimate the powers of the elders. 
 
As discuss above the aim is to dispel European argument that pre-colonial Africa 
stateless societies was a dark territory that its people were benighted and living in a state 
of anarchy and primitive barbarity before they were introduced to the light of civilization 
which colonialism brought. Before the coming of the Europeans there was no Cameroon 
as it is know today. What was known of the country was limited to the coastal region. 
The Arabs from North of Africa knew only the northern region of the country. On the eve 
of colonization there were basically two types of political organization operating in 
Cameroon. One was a centralized political organization in which there was a recognized 
ruler, this system of hierarchical chiefdom was found among the ethnic communities of 
the Bamileke and Bamum in the Western Province, the Tikar and Chamba fondoms of 
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the North West Province.105 This chiefdoms were ruled by sacred rulers usually know as 
Fons to whom it members pay allegiance. The Fon presided over village gatherings and 
made final decisions in matter of war and peace. The welfare of the fondom depended on 
him and he was also responsible for and accountable to his people. In Adamawa, North 
and Kotoko exist a well established Islamic society ruled by the lamido who was a 
political and a religious leader.106  
 
The other was an uncentralised political organization with no one holding strong power at 
the centre. This system was found among the Beti, the Bassa-Bakoko and the coastal 
Bantu. The political and judicial control of these local lineage-base communities in some 
cases was in the hands of village head, officers of the clans, associations, secret societies 
and village council to whom political authority accrued as a consequence of those 
positions. The village or clan head was expected to organize law and order in the clan. 
His authority was never absolute and he acted only when there was a consensus of 
opinion on an issue.107 
 
Cameroon’s economy on the eve of independence was largely subsistence. Cameroonians 
earned their living from the land. Agriculture was dominant and all other economic 
activities were centre around it. Animal husbandry was practice in the north of the 
country. Livestock were kept for their meat, milk, cheese, butter and manure.  Sheep 
were also kept for wool, Poultry were raised for food. Pigs were bred on a large scale in 
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the forest region. Hunting and fishing were also important economic activities in the 
forest and coastal regions. The market-place was an economic as well as a social centre 
for the people. It was important not only as a place of buying and selling or exchange of 
goods, but also as a meeting place for relative, friends and traditional authorities.108 
 
Before Christianity and Islam was introduced in Cameroon. The people believe in several 
minor gods, good and evil spirits and powers such as ghost and ancestor, occupying the 
space between the divine creator and Man. It was strongly believe that ancestors were 
part of the living society and that they continue to maintain interest in the welfare of their 
descendants. The living communities used sacrifices as paths of communication and 
sharing between them and their ancestors. 
 
The Cameroons entered modern history around the fifteenth century with the Portuguese 
exploitation of its Coastal region. In 1472, the Portuguese arrived on the island that was 
subsequently named Fernando Po.  As they sailed into the Wouri estuary, they found a 
variety of prawns; they called the river Rio dos Cameroes (River of Prawns). It was by 
that name that Cameroon appeared on the first Portuguese map of the region.109 As such, 
the Portuguese became active traders along the coast of Cameroon in ivory and gold and 
they did not undertake any extensive exploration of the Cameroons hinterland because of 
the hostility of the coastal tribes and prevalence of insect-borne diseases.110  
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1.3 The Colonization of Cameroon 
The motive for the scramble for Africa appeared to be the acquisition of African 
territories as a means of acquiring national prestige, wealth and power. The lucrative 
slave trade to the Americas and the need for raw materials for the industrial revolution in 
Europe contributed to the struggle for and the establishment of Cameroon as a German 
colony in 1884.111 Cameroon’s geographical position was strategically important for the 
slave trade. With the slave trade boom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
Dutch, Portuguese, French, English, Swedish, and Danish were active slave traders on the 
Cameroon coast.112 It appears that the European traders made little effort to establish 
permanent footholds on Cameroon as most of them remained aboard their ships, just 
dealing with the coastal tribes that served as middlemen.113  The Calabar chiefs or the 
Bimbia and Douala merchants were typical examples of such middlemen. The earliest 
slaves to be exported were probably local criminals, but as the demand increased, people 
living on or near the coast began to penetrate further into the interior for deliberate or 
forceful capture of innocent people for sale as slaves.114 
 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Britain spearheaded the abolition of the slave 
trade. In 1827 it opened a garrison at Fernando Po to control the shipping of slaves from 
the Bights of Biafra and Benin.115 Britain used this advantage to encourage many British 
trading firms to set up trading posts on the Cameroon coast. It is during this period that 
the use of Pidgin English as a lingua franca along the West African coast began to 
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spread.116  British influence and activities increased due to English missionary societies 
establishing missions on the Cameroon coast. By late 1844, the missionaries had 
purchased and established a church on a piece of land at Bimbia.117 In 1858, Alfred Saker 
purchased a piece of land from the King of Bimbia and established the Victoria 
Settlement,118 believed to be the first permanent settlement on the Cameroons coast. In 
1842 the British consul, Hewett signed a treaty with two native kings on the Cameroons 
coast to encourage the legitimate trade in palm oil and ivory, on condition that slave trade 
stopped.119 With trade booming on the Cameroons coast, British and German traders 
cooperated well, but with the Germans acknowledging British supremacy on the 
Cameroons coast. However, the British saw in the French their principal rival because, by 
1870, the French had established trading posts along the Cameroons coast from Malimba, 
Big Batanga and Campo.120 This marked the scramble for the Cameroons proper. 
 
Between 1877 and 1884, local chiefs along the coast of Cameroons showed their marked 
preference for the British by directing a number of requests for protection and annexation 
to the British government, either directly to London or to Consul Hewett in the Gulf of 
Guinea.121 The British were slow in reacting to the coastal chief’s request for British 
protection. It was only in 1882 that Edward Hewett was instructed from London to 
prepare a report on the Cameroons about the kings, the people, and the trade in the 
territory. This was to enable the government to give the question of annexation full 
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consideration.122 Hewett, in his report, recommended that treaties be made with the 
coastal chiefs, given the heavy French presence in the coastal areas. In late November 
1883, Hewett’s report was approved and in 1884 Hewett was dispatched with treaty 
forms for the native chiefs to sign, under instruction to keep the entire affair completely 
secret until the last of the treaties had been signed.123 According to the British plan, 
Hewett was to proceed along the Nigeria coast with his treaty forms and Captain Brook, 
senior officer of the West African Fleet was to go to Big Batanga to have the pro-English 
kings there sign one of the treaties. While Brook was at Big Batanga he learned that a 
German gunboat, the Mowe was going to the Cameroons River and he immediately 
dispatched Lieutenant Moore on the Goshawk to Douala to ask the native kings not to 
sign any treaties until Hewett showed up.124 
 
Germans on their part had been preparing for the effective occupation of the Cameroons. 
German traders with interest in the Cameroons had succeeded in convincing the local 
kings that the “British were not to be trusted in word or deed and that their future lay with 
Germany”.125 On 20 June 1884, the German agents in Cameroon of the Hamburg firm of 
Woermann received instructions to inform the native chiefs that Germany wanted to 
annex their territory.126 Dr Gustav Nachtigal, a well known German explorer and the 
German Consul General in Tunis arrived in Douala on 14 July 1884 and made treaties 
with the chiefs. Meanwhile, Hewett heard of the arrival of the Germans and immediately 
set sail for the Cameroons. But he arrived too late, on 19 July 1884, only to learn that the 
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Germans had signed treaties of annexation with kings Bell and Akwa on July 14.127 
Hewett’s arrival on 19 July 1884 was not only greeted by the German flag flying in 
Douala but also with the installation of Dr Buchner as the imperial representative. The 
last obstacle to German control of the Cameroons was eliminated in 1887 when the 
British Missionary colony in Victoria, (the Baptist Missionary society), sold its holdings 
to the Basel mission after two years of negotiation. 
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1.4 The German Protectorate 
The Cameroons became a German protectorate in 1884. Negotiations between Germany 
on the one hand and Britain and France on the other from 1884 to 1894 resulted in the 
formal creation of German Kamerun. In March 1894 Germany and France signed a treaty 
that gave the Cameroons its form and size until 1911.128 Before the 1894 treaty was 
signed, “the only officially defined boundary between French and German territory was 
the Cameroons Southern one, running up the Campo River and ending at 15 degrees east 
longitude”.129 However, there was still no precise definition of boundaries as the 
boundary was unmarked and it often caused confusion to trade and government. In a 
treaty between Germany and France in 1911, Germany agreed to give up its rights in 
Morocco to France and, in return, Germany obtained from France considerable territory 
in the French Congo. This increased the total area of the German Cameroons to 292,000 
square miles with an estimated total population of about 2,650,000 people.130 According 
to Rudin, after the 1911 treaty with France, “the colony spread out like a fan toward the 
east, touching the Tchad in the north-east and branches of the Congo in the South-east, 
and giving the impression of being not immovably into the African continent”.131 This 
1911 treaty expanded German’s territory in the area by fifty percent. 
 
German rule in Cameroon lasted only thirty years, from 1884 to 1914, and the name of 
the country under the German colonial rule was spelt Kamerun. Historical analysts like 
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Edwin Ardener, describe this period between 1884 and 1914 as the “Golden Period”.132 
This is because, under the Germans, the country was united, not as yet partitioned 
between the French and the British. Since then this partition has been a threat to national 
unity in present day Cameroon.133 During German colonial rule, the country’s 
international boundaries were fixed, the foundations of its modern economic structures 
were laid, and most of its towns were established. This was manifested in basic 
transportation such as “the wharves and docks at Douala, Campo, Victoria and Kribi, a 
good number of bridges, roads and well constructed public and private buildings, many 
of which are still in use today by the Cameroon government”.134 
 
1.4.1 German Administration in the Cameroons 
The German administration in the Cameroons was established by the German Colonial 
Constitution of 1886 - 1888. A system of government was introduced by the Germans in 
Cameroon which made the people dependent on the colonial powers for authority. The 
colonial administration was headed by a Governor who was responsible to the Colonial 
Office. According to the German Colonial Constitution, he had the right to legislate for 
the country, to collect and levy taxes and to administer the courts and the military 
forces.135 He also had control over the courts of the colony and acted in person as the 
court of highest appeal in the Cameroons. Due to the size of the territory, the governor 
delegated some of his powers to local administrators for effective administration. The 
natives played a fairly large part in the administration of local affairs, for instance, the 
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collection of taxes was in the hands of chieftains, who received a percentage of the 
amount collected.136 In some matters native chiefs had the right to adjudicate disputes in 
native courts according to customary laws. German administrative duties included the 
establishment and maintenance of good relations with local chiefs in the area. They also 
“supervised work in the area of roads, health, education and missions, and also promoted 
trade and agriculture, including the study of climatic conditions”.137  
 
1.4.1a Courts 
Courts were among the main institutions established by the German Colonial rule in 
Cameroon. Two sets of courts were established in the colony, one for whites and one for 
natives, in which German civil and criminal law and procedure was applied.138 For the 
whites the court of first instance was the court of the administrative district presided over 
by a judge aided by two or four lay assistants.  Punishment for whites in the Cameroons 
for the violation of law was rare. Whites sentenced to more than six months would serve 
their sentence in Germany, but in most cases they were asked to pay fines. For the Native 
Courts matters were handled by German officials assisted by interpreters. The use of 
interpreters was not just for the sake of translation, but also an attempt to respect native 
custom and law of the land. The penalties inflicted on blacks differed from those of 
whites. Whipping and other forms of corporal punishment, largely disliked by the local 
people were the common form of punishment for natives.139  
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1.4.1b German Economic Exploitation of the Cameroons 
The economic exploitation of the Cameroons was effected through trade and by 
plantation. Earlier trade was by barter, natives bringing products to the ships for 
exchange with the Europeans Cloths, trinkets, firearms, gunpowder, and liquor were the 
commodities they liked best. In exchange, they gave palm oil, ivory and palm kernels.140 
In 1907 the German government introduced money standard into the colony. It was only 
through this standard that natives could pay taxes, though the government often accepted 
ivory from natives in payment of taxes. The most productive source of colonial income 
came from levies on trade, chiefly from the tariffs imposed on imported goods. 
Exemptions from tariff payments were permitted on some goods such as those brought in 
by missionaries, machines needed on the plantations and in the construction of buildings, 
bridges, roads, and medical supplies.141 
 
The Germans’ focus on plantation in Cameroon was to make the colony produce 
commodities like cacao, tobacco, cotton and palm oil to meet German needs. The 
Germans also felt that the commodities obtained from natives by barter could be 
improved by plantations. The first plantation was set up in 1890 and by 1900 the number 
of planters grew rapidly. Palm oil and palm kernels were high export products of the 
Cameroons. In Germany, they were used in the manufacture of soap and candles. The 
Germans also made special efforts to produce cacao on a large scale to reduce the 
importation of cacao from Central and South America. In the period of German 
occupation of the Cameroons, rubber was the most important product of export from the 
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colony. The German government sought to maintain the continuous export of rubber 
from Cameroon by instructing the natives on how to open rubber plantations and how to 
tap rubber trees for latex without destroying them. Roads were also constructed to speed 
up the transportation of rubber to the coast.142  
 
The economic policy of the German colonial administration in Cameroon was determined 
largely by the economic interests of the German market. Germans invested in the opening 
up of plantations around Buea and Victoria; and the growth of these plantations led to 
improved transportation facilities. Though the plantation owners constructed some 
private roads, responsibility for building and maintenance of the public roads rested with 
the villages and tribes through which they ran.143 The German government provided loan 
facilities for the construction of a railway to serve the private interests of the plantations. 
In 1906, a 160 kilometre privately owned off-rail track was constructed from Bonaberi to 
Nkongsamba. The government also constructed another railway intended to run from 
Douala to the Nyong River town.144 This rail provided the basis for the country’s inland 
transport. All these economic activities, such as trade, plantations and the development of 
transport, went a long way to develop the Cameroon’s economy. Today, Cameroon’s 
agricultural export comes from the plantations that were established by the Germans. The 
Germans stand accused of forcefully expropriating the indigenous lands of the Bakweri 
ethnic group for purposes of large-scale plantation agriculture without duly compensating 
the people. When the Cameroon government took over control of the plantations from the 
colonial masters, it became government land. So the indigenes of the land have taken the 
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government to court so that the government will compensate them for their land. (This 
section is further developed in chapter four). 
 
1.4.1c Health 
Health conditions during the German colonial rule were appalling, especially in the 
plantations. In spite of attempts made by the German government to fight diseases such 
as malaria, leprosy, smallpox, sleeping sickness and dysentery, the death rate of indigenes 
from these diseases was alarming.145 By 1912 there were about twenty-nine German 
doctors in Cameroon; fifteen were attached to the military and nine to the civil 
administration. The remaining five were assigned specifically to deal with sleeping 
sickness.146  
 
1.4.1d Education 
Education under German rule was largely controlled by the Christian missions but was 
closely supervised by the government. The government made sure that German was 
taught as a first foreign language. Some initiative was also carried out by the government 
in establishing a number of agricultural schools at Victoria, Dschang, and Yaoundé. The 
government also succeeded in operating four schools, in Douala, Victoria, Yaoundé and 
Garoua. On the other hand the missions operated 631 schools with some 40,000 pupils. In 
assisting the government in educating the indigenes, financial subventions were provided 
by the government to the missions to expand the German language and culture.147  
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1.5 Cameroon and World War I 
With the advent of the First World War in Europe in 1914 between the Allies and the 
Central powers, a German attempt to exempt European African colonies from the war 
failed. In August 1914 Britain and France decided to jointly attack the German colony of 
Cameroon following their joint success in Togoland. In September 1914, the Allied 
forces captured Douala and the Germans were forced to retreat inland to Yaoundé where 
they established their capital.148  To take complete control of Cameroon, the French 
proposed that Britain and France should establish a condominium (joint Anglo-French 
administration) in Cameroon. Both Britain and France agreed to establish a condominium 
by January 1915. The proposed condominium was never implemented because of 
fundamental differences between the British and the French regarding modalities of 
application and execution. Accordingly, the differences persisted as the war progressed 
and in 1916 the Germans surrendered and left the territory without the British and French 
having effectively established a condominium in the territory.149 Shortly after the 
Germans were defeated, the Allied powers reached an agreement on the division of 
Cameroon between them. France received four fifths of the territory and Britain two 
separate areas bordering on Nigeria.150 Each country proceeded to establish a system of 
government, which they had been operating in their colonies. The Versailles Peace 
Conference of 1919 established a new system of mandate to deal with conquered 
colonies. By 1922, Britain and France agreed to undertake the administration of their part 
of Cameroon as a mandate from the League of Nations.151 
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1.6 The League of Nations Mandate System 
When Germany was defeated in War World I, its colonies were seized and distributed 
among the allied and associated powers. It was said that “Germany badly administered its 
colonies and brutally repressed the revolts of the colonized peoples”.152 But the former 
German possessions were not to be annexed by the states that succeeded Germany. The 
League of Nations was to supervise the administration of the mandate territories. The 
“mandatory” powers reported annually on the results of their administration to the 
League. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations officialized the system of 
mandates.153 Class A mandates were peoples capable of administering themselves on 
their own (these were mainly provinces of the former Ottoman Empire); they had to 
become independent. Class B mandates were mostly German colonies in Africa; they 
were to be administered by mandatory powers with full powers of legislation and 
administration. (The territory of Cameroon fell under the Class B mandates). Class C 
mandates consisted of Southwest Africa and German colonies in the Pacific.154 These 
areas were sparsely populated and the mandatory powers were to apply their own laws, as 
if they were parts of their own territory.   
 
1.6.1 Cameroons under British Mandate 1922 - 1939 
British colonial policy in Africa was not different from that in British Cameroons. The 
primary objective of the British colonial policy was to maintain a long period of external 
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control over its possessions at a minimal cost to the crown.155 Britain justified this policy 
by alleging that “the ultimate aim of British colonialism was self-government for the 
colonized territories”.156 This self-government was to be instituted through a gradual 
process of increasing the degree of participation by the natives in the political decision-
making process set up by the colonial administration.157 What were the instruments for 
carrying out these policies? The British saw in Africa traditional institutions that suited 
their purpose158 and where such institutions did not exist, they always tried to create 
them. The creation of warrant chiefs and legislative councils all stemmed from the 
concept of indirect rule. This was in pursuit of the British notion of recognizing and 
supporting the customary authorities in African societies, the chiefs and elders.159  
 
1.6.1a Indirect Rule 
The Principles of Indirect Rule were most clearly presented by one of Britain’s greatest 
colonial administrators, Lord Lugard.160 According to Lugard, the two most important 
administrative principles to employ when ruling alien peoples were ‘decentralization’ and 
                                                 
155
 Crowder, Michael (1970), “Indirect Rule French and British Style” in Markovitz (ed.), African Politics 
and Society: Basic Issues and Problems of Government and Development, New York: The Free Press, p. 
59. 
156
 Ibid. 
157
 Ibid, p. 60. 
158
 Atanga, Lucien (1994), The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the Alienation of a 
Linguistic Minority, p. 51. 
159
 Crowder, Michael (1970), “Indirect Rule French and British Style”, p. 61. 
160
 Sir Frederick Lord Lugard was Governor General of the Colony of Nigeria from 1912 to 1919. He is 
the author of The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, which regards indirect rule in colonial Africa. 
In this work, Lugard outlines the reasons and methods that should be employed in the colonization of 
Africa by Britain. Some of his justifications included spreading Christianity and ending barbarism. Lugard 
pushed for native rule in African colonies. He reasoned that black Africans were very different from white 
Europeans. Therefore, natives should act as a sort of middle manager in colonial governance. This would 
avoid revolt because, as Lugard believed, the people of Africa would be more likely to follow someone 
who looked like them, spoke their languages, and shared their customs. The technique was employed 
successfully by European colonial leaders. 
 
  71  
‘continuity’.161 Thus the role of the British officers in the colonies, except in such critical 
areas as taxation, military force and alienation of land, was to advise and not demand. 
The officers did not only have to use the indigenous institutions, which were foreign to 
them, they were expected to improve them by educating the chiefs without 
simultaneously destroying the authority of the traditional ruler.162 By making use of 
indigenous institutions and the authorities, the British officials could preserve continuity 
with the past, while at the same time laying the foundation for the progressive 
improvement of the indigenous society. On the contrary, “indirect rule with all its faults 
was not a system based on humanitarian motives; it was an administrative structure to 
perpetuate imperialism, instituted not because it was good for the people, but because it 
was cheap and practical”.163   
 
For administrative convenience, the British administered the two small separate areas 
they acquired after World War I in Cameroon as an integral part of Nigeria. Nigerian 
laws were applied in these areas. Northern Cameroons was divided administratively 
among the three Northern Nigerian provinces of Benue, Adamawa and Bornu, while the 
Southern part of Cameroons was administered as part of the Southern Province of 
Nigeria.164 Throughout the mandate, the history of British Cameroons was intimately 
linked to that of Nigeria. Ruled as an appendage of Nigeria, British Cameroons did not 
receive the direct attention of the British administering authorities. Consequently, the 
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economy of British Southern Cameroons remained centred on the plantations which the 
Germans had developed.165 There was little government expenditure, either on social 
service or public works.  
There were no roads linking British Cameroons and Nigeria. It took 
Cameroonians who had to go and attend secondary school in Nigeria 
eleven days to travel by sea from Mamfe to Calabar. It was a frightful 
experience for people from the grass field where there were no sea and 
canoe to undertake such a journey. Travelling from Eko (a border town 
with Nigeria) to Bamenda was also a difficult task as it took several days 
before one could get to Bamenda and the Nigerians who ran the transport 
system in those days were extortionist as they duped British Cameroonians 
travelling on that road. Besides, given the overwhelming presence of the 
Nigerians and their dominance in the administrative, economic, and social 
life of the territory created some problems between Cameroonians and 
Nigerians.166 
 
Administratively, British Southern Cameroons was placed under the authority of the 
Lieutenant Governor of the Southern Province of Nigeria, and a Senior Resident ran the 
affairs of the Cameroon province from Buea; there were four administrative divisions 
namely Buea, Victoria, Mamfe and Bamenda.167 In line with its policy of indirect rule, a 
number of different local authorities were established based on traditional chiefs or on 
councils composed of village elders, and in some cases village chiefs were appointed in 
the administrative unit.168 These local authorities were responsible for various aspects of 
local government under the supervision of district officers. They were in charge of 
operating courts, collecting taxes, and dealing with issues such as health and sanitation 
and roads.169 
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The British colonial administration did not establish many schools in the British Southern 
Cameroons. Elementary education was in the hands of the Government Native 
Authorities and the missions.170 Education in British Southern Cameroon was dictated by 
the British education policy for Nigeria. In 1926, the Nigerian Education Department 
regulations were officially implemented in Southern Cameroons.171 In 1927, vernacular 
was used as a medium of instruction in the first stages of elementary education. English 
language was to be used in intermediate, secondary and technical schools. All schools in 
Southern Cameroons were classified as elementary schools and the government was 
responsible for the general direction of all educational policy and supervised all 
institutions.172 The curriculum of the elementary schools included the teaching of 
Hygiene, Agriculture, Reading, Writing, Arithmetic and Religious Instruction. 
 
1.6.2 Cameroon under French Mandate 1922 - 1939 
French policy in Cameroon was identical to the system of administration they applied in 
the French colonies of Equatorial Africa in spite of its “mandated” status. Such policies 
included paternalism, assimilation and association, which were all products of direct rule. 
French rule in Cameroon during the mandate period can better be understood by looking 
at the French policies of assimilation, association and paternalism. Assimilation was a 
policy meant to “propagate among the natives the language, the methods of work and 
progressively the spirit and civilization of France”.173 This policy aimed at assimilating 
France’s colonial subjects to the point where they would actually be Frenchmen 
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linguistically, culturally, politically and legally.174 Paternalism was a policy advocated by 
critics of assimilation who wanted France to relate as a father to her African colonies.175 
They believed that “Africans did not have the equal capacity with Europeans to learn and 
progress”.176  As such, France had the responsibility to provide Africans with an 
administration run entirely by French officials. It is said that in matters of administration, 
“the French officials need not seek the opinion of the Africans of the territory they were 
administering because the Africans could not know what was best for them”.177 Under the 
policy of association Africans were to develop within the context of their environment 
and society. The French would maintain their control by ruling indirectly through the 
traditional authorities. Like the indirect rule practice by the British, association was 
practical, economical and effective.178  The bases of these policies were that French 
colonies were part of France, and that French civilization was superior to African 
civilization.179  
 
1.6.2a Direct Rule 
The French policy of assimilation as practised in Cameroon during the mandate was not 
different from the policy practised in the other African territories acquired after World 
War I. A major obstacle to implementing a full policy of assimilation in these new 
territories was that, for decades these territories had not had contact with the French or 
with French civilization. Besides, France lacked the financial resources to establish an 
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educational system to fully implement the policy of assimilation among the African 
masses.180 In view of these circumstances, the assimilationists decided that “France 
should try to create in each colony Gallicized élite181 which would help to spread French 
civilization among their people and would some day be able to participate in the 
administration of their territory”.182 As the members of these élite acquired a certain level 
of French culture, they might individually apply for French citizenship. In practice, only a 
few individuals in each territory achieved the cultural level which qualified them for 
French citizenship and many chose not to apply. As such, assimilation was preserved as a 
constitutional fiction, and no serious attempt was ever made to undertake the massive 
work of social transformation which could make it a reality.183 Thus the policy of 
assimilation was pursued on a very limited scale in Cameroon. However, difficulties in 
the implementation of this policy led to the development of the policy of association. 
Association, unlike assimilation, “sought the formation of a Gallicized élite who, as 
leaders of their people would remain within the framework of an African society and 
serve as a link between the French officials and their people”.184 The distinction between 
the French policies of assimilation and association was blurred. By confusing the two 
doctrines, it was possible to combine those features of each which contributed to the 
perpetuation of French rule.185  
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Paternalism as practised in Cameroon during the mandate, like on other French African 
subjects in neighbouring colonies, was subjected to a system of summary punishment 
administered by the French sub-district officer. This system of punishment was known as 
‘indigénat’. It permitted the “authorities to impose penalties on subjects without having to 
justify their action before any court of law”.186 The indigénat was used in French 
Cameroons to punish natives who failed to work on the railway, to pay their taxes within 
the three months of its levy, who had not kept an appointment with the local district 
officer or who had come late to work on a public project.187 The use of these measures 
during the mandate helped in the construction of roads and railways, but it also led to 
some abuses by the French authorities. The long hours of work, sometimes unpaid, and 
under injurious conditions, led to some resentment amongst French Cameroonians.188  
 
Throughout French Africa, the legal system distinguished between Africans, referring to 
those subject to native law and customs as ‘subject’ and those Africans assimilated into 
French culture as ‘citizens’. The citizens possessed the civil, political and judicial rights 
of persons of French origin, while the subjects had only their traditional rights. They 
could become citizens by showing evidence of having become Europeanized through 
education and through employment of a ‘European Character’.189 This meant that the 
system of dual status found expression in the courts and the legal system, as the citizens 
and the subjects were subjected to two different legal systems. For the citizen in French 
Cameroon a set of French civil, commercial and penal code laws were applicable. For the 
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subjects there was a tribunal which followed procedures prescribed by local custom and 
“applied customary laws as long as they were not in conflict with the principle of French 
civilization”.190 
 
The most outstanding achievement of French colonial rule in French Cameroon was 
probably in the area of education. The main educational objective of the French colonial 
authorities was to spread the French language, culture and civilization.191 This objective 
led to a very extensive development of fundamental education in the territory. A highly 
centralized and rigidly controlled system of education was set up in Cameroon in which 
every aspect of the curricula, examinations and educational administration was modelled 
after the French system.192 Private education was controlled through regular supervision 
and inspection. Subventions were also given to mission and private schools aimed at 
bringing private education in line with public education and under the firm control of the 
French colonial administration.193 
 
1.7 The Trusteeship System 
With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the mandate system under which 
the Cameroons was administered during the mandate came to an abrupt end. However, 
the League of Nations and the mandate were not officially replaced until the end of the 
war and the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and its trusteeship 
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system in 1945.194 Both the UN Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements laid down basic 
guidelines for the post-war administrative, political, economic and social development in 
the trust territories. The UN was determined to stop colonialism, and this was seen in the 
articles that established the trusteeship system. Article 76 of the Charter provided for “the 
progressive development of the inhabitants of the trust territory towards self-government 
or independence”.195  
 
1.7.1 Cameroon under French Rule: The Trusteeship Period 1946 - 1959 
France continued with its policy of assimilation and paternalism during the trusteeship 
period. Though France was reluctant to place French Cameroon under the trusteeship 
system, it finally did so in 1946. But the French government submitted to the United 
Nations General Assembly an agreement of trusteeship on 30 September 1946, which 
permitted “France to administer Cameroon as an integral part of French territory”.196 
Hence Cameroon became an associate state, as was enshrined in the French constitution 
of 1946. The French National Assembly, with few representatives from Cameroon, 
determined the management of affairs in Cameroon.197 
 
1.7.1a The Emergence of Party Politics 
The French constitution of 1946 encouraged the formation of political parties in the 
colonies. The first indigenous party in French Cameroon, Union des populations du 
Cameroun (UPC), was formed in Douala in April 1948. The UPC called for “the 
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unification of the two Cameroons and complete independence under the terms of the 
United Nations Charter”.198 The UPC soon appeared in the eyes of the administration as a 
party of agitators intent on disturbing the peace of the territory.199 In 1955, the UPC was 
banned, following a bloody uprising in Douala and Yaoundé. In a move to address some 
of the problems raised by the UPC, the French National Assembly passed a law in 1956 
which provided for “institutional reforms by decrees, the acceptance of political 
developments in French Cameroon and single Electoral College election to all assemblies 
in French Cameroon”.200 
 
1.7.1b Education 
Secondary school education facilities became available in French Cameroon during the 
trusteeship period. Technical and vocational school facilities were still not adequate to 
accommodate the growing number of people wanting to attend these schools. The French 
administration made no provision for the training of secondary school teachers. This 
situation resulted in total dependence on obtaining secondary school teachers from 
France.201 Nevertheless, the most spectacular achievement of the French colonial 
administration in its part of Cameroon was in the field of education. 
 
1.7.2 Cameroon under the British Trusteeship: 1946 - 1961 
In the greater part of the British Trusteeship period in Cameroon, Britain continued with 
its policy of indirect rule. British Cameroons continued to be administered as an integral 
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part of Nigeria. This meant that all political and administrative arrangements introduced 
in Nigeria directly or indirectly influenced developments in Cameroon. It was also during 
the trusteeship period that British Cameroons witnessed some significant political and 
administrative changes, changing from its status as a province of the Eastern region of 
Nigeria to a separate entity within Nigeria.202 British Cameroons was accorded some 
form of regional status only after 1954 when it acquired some legislative, administrative 
and budgetary autonomy from the Nigerian and British governments. Even then Northern 
Cameroons continued to be administered as an integral part of the three Northern Nigeria 
Provinces of Bornu, Adamawa and Benue.203  
 
1.7.2a Constitutional developments in British Cameroons  
Constitutional development in British Cameroon appears to have contributed its fair share 
to the country’s present day situation. In 1946, the Richard’s Constitution204 replaced the 
Clifford’s Constitution of 1922. The Richard’s Constitution fell short of granting a 
regional and budgetary autonomy for British Cameroons. After some criticism from 
British Cameroons and Nigeria, the Richard’s Constitution was amended to provide for 
thirteen elected members of the Eastern Regional House, two of whom were to come 
from Southern Cameroons.205 In 1948, Sir John MacPherson had taken over from Sir 
Arthur Richardson as governor of Nigeria. He immediately introduced some reforms 
which increased political activities in Nigeria and Southern Cameroons. MacPherson’s 
                                                 
202
 Fanso, V.G. (1989), Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges: The Colonial and Post 
Colonial Periods, p. 125. 
203
 Ibid. 
204
 Sir Arthur Richards ruled as Governor of Nigeria from 1943 to 1947, constitutional changes that he 
introduced in the colony were named after him.  
205
 Ngoh, Victor (1990), Constitutional Development in Southern Cameroons, 1946-1961: From 
Trusteeship to Independence, Yaoundé: CEPER, p. 86. 
  81  
Constitution206 gave some hope to Southern Cameroonian nationalist struggles by 
increasing its representation in the Eastern Regional House.207 This constitution provided 
for thirteen members from Southern Cameroons. Although the MacPherson Constitution 
granted more seats to Southern Cameroons, it had major weaknesses: indirect Rule was 
still in existence and traditional rulers were still very powerful. The constitution granted 
neither regional nor budgetary autonomy to Southern Cameroons, which was still ruled as 
an integral part of Nigeria.208 
 
1.7 The Emergence of Political Parties in British Cameroon 
The trusteeship period in British Cameroons witnessed a great deal of political activity 
and the formation of political parties. Prior to the creation of political parties in British 
Cameroons, pressure groups such as the Cameroons Welfare Union (CWU), the 
Cameroons Youth League (CYL) and the Cameroons National Federation (CNF) were 
already in existence, spearheading the political agenda of the territory. It was only in June 
1953 that the first real political party in British Cameroons, the Kamerun National 
Congress (KNC) was formed. On 1 October 1954 British Cameroons became a quasi-
territory with its own Executive Council and a House of Assembly. Endeley was elected 
leader of government business.209 Another party, the Kamerun People’s Party (KPP), was 
also formed in 1953 by N.N. Mbile. In 1955, John Ngu Foncha and Augustine Ngom Jua, 
and some members of the KNC resigned from the party because the party was no longer 
advocating secession from Nigeria. They eventually formed the third political party in 
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Southern Cameroon known as the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP). Other 
parties in Southern Cameroons worthy of mention were the One Kamerun (OK) and the 
Kamerun United Party (KUP). 
 
1.6.8 Education 
Britain did not do much in terms of education during the Trusteeship period. It opened 
only five government-sponsored primary schools in the entire territory.210 As part of the 
tactics of the British colonial government to limit its direct involvement in education in 
the territory, it encouraged the opening and running of primary schools by what became 
known as Native Authority schools. As a result, the development of education in 
Southern Cameroons during the forty years of British administration did not go beyond 
the primary school level, except for teacher training institutions. On the eve of 
independence and reunification, there were only three mission secondary grammar 
schools and one government trade centre in British Cameroon.211 Britain’s neglect of its 
territory and failure to open enough schools to accommodate British Cameroonians 
willing to study accounted for the sparcity of educated British Cameroonians, who at the 
eve of independence had acquired their education either from Nigeria or Britain. 
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1.7 Nationalism and Reunification 
Nationalist sentiments were both evident in French and British Cameroons. The first 
noticeable sign was in French Cameroon and it gradually found its way into British 
Cameroons as it became a tool for political activism in French Cameroon.212 First steps 
towards the call in French Cameroon for unification of the two Cameroons started in 
1948, with the formation of the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), a political 
party opposed to French colonial rule. The UPC called for the “immediate reunification 
of the two Cameroons and rapid progress towards complete independence under the 
terms of the United Nations Charter”.213  In 1955 the UPC was banned because of its 
allegedly violent political agenda. Most of its leaders were forced to flee into exile. Some 
of them found safe heaven in British Southern Cameroons, and established their 
headquarters in Kumba where they continued with their party activities.214 They soon ran 
into trouble with the Southern Cameroons government. In 1957 the UPC was banned by 
the British colonial administration and its leaders deported from Southern Cameroons. 
After the UPC was banned, a new party, One Kamerun (OK) was formed in Southern 
Cameroons by Nde Ntumazah, a former member of the banned UPC. The aim of this 
party was to continue the political agenda of the UPC. Support for the One Kamerun 
party came from the banned UPC members, because it favoured independence and 
reunification for Cameroon.215 The government of Southern Cameroons banned OK not 
long after its formation.  
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In British Southern Cameroons some efforts were formed as early as 1939 to voice the 
dissatisfaction of the people because of the British neglect of their territory. These early 
nationalistic tendencies led to the founding of a number of pressure groups that finally led 
to the creation of political parties. The presence of the UPC in British Southern 
Cameroons invigorated the struggle for independence. In May 1949, a political 
conference of both French and English Cameroons was organized in Mamfe (British 
Cameroons). At the conference, the British were criticized for the lack of economic and 
educational growth in Southern Cameroons compared to that in French Cameroon, and 
demands were made for the transfer of the British territory to the French trusteeship.216  
 
It appears that the political conference of both British and French Cameroon elites ignited 
some nationalist feelings for unity between the two Cameroons. As a consequence, 
politics from the 1950s in British Cameroons was dominated by the question of seceding 
from Nigeria and reunifying with French Cameroon. Foncha and his KNDP favoured 
reunification with French Cameroon, while Endeley and the KNC - KPP alliance wanted 
the territory to gain its independence as a region in the Federation of Nigeria.217 The 
differences between the Southern Cameroons leaders were carried to the United Nations 
when they had to present their case about the future of the Trust Territory. Due to the 
failure by both leaders to reach a consensus, the UN General Assembly finally decided 
that a separate plebiscite should be held in each part of British Cameroons. The UN 
decided that the plebiscite for Southern Cameroons would be held on 11 February 1961. 
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Foncha and his party began to campaign vigorously against joining Nigeria, by playing 
on local fears of Ibo domination from Nigeria–because the Ibos had come to pose an 
economic threat to indigenous Southern Cameroonians.218 Endeley, the leader of CPNC 
on his part, undertook to convince the electorate by promising the people good 
administration and development. He also used the fact of terrorism in French Cameroon 
to scare voters. The advocates of unification won in the South and lost in the North. The 
results in the Northern Cameroons went in favour of union with Nigeria: 146,296 votes 
and only 97,659 voted in favour of the Cameroon Republic. In Southern Cameroons, 
233,571 voted for union with Cameroon Republic and 97,741 went for union with 
Nigeria.219 On the basis of the outcome of the plebiscite, delegates from Southern 
Cameroons finally met in Foumban in July 1961 to discuss the framework of the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon. These meetings eventually became know as the Foumban 
Conference. 
 
1.8 The Foumban Conference    
The Foumban constitutional conference was scheduled for 17–21 July 1961. In 
preparation for this conference political leaders from Southern Cameroons, Native 
Authority Councils, as well as traditional rulers held a convention in Bamenda in June. In 
their deliberations a common position was adopted for negotiations with the Republic of 
Cameroon. They agreed amongst other things to a “loose federation and a clear 
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distinction to be made between the rights of the state and that of the federation in order to 
preserve the local autonomy of the state and its power”.220 
 
At the Foumban Conference, there were 25 delegates from the Southern Cameroons and 
12 from the Republic of Cameroon. The delegates from the Republic of Cameroon 
presented the Southern Cameroons delegation with a constitution not different in 
character from the provisions of the Fifth French Republic of 1958, for deliberation. 
Southern Cameroons delegates “emphasized constitutional conceptions derived from the 
United States, Canada and Britain”.221 Due to the poor bargaining position of the 
Southern Cameroons delegates, most of the proposals of the Bamenda Conference were 
simply ignored. Ahidjo, the then president of the Republic of Cameroon accepted those 
suggestions he could from the Southern Cameroons delegates and rejected those that 
were not in line with his preferred policy of establishing a strong central government. 
 
Delegates from Southern Cameroons came out as loser, and were disappointed with the 
Foumban Constitutional talks because their request for “a quota of ministerial portfolios 
for Southern Cameroons and the bi-camera legislature which would have safeguarded 
regional interests in the federation was rejected by Ahidjo”.222 Thus the constitution that 
was produced at Foumban did not take into account the aspirations of the people of 
Southern Cameroons. It created a highly centralized federal system with very limited 
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power being given to the states. The outcome therefore was an unbalanced union between 
the two Cameroons which weighed in favour of French Cameroon. 
 
1.9.1 The French and British Approach to Colonialism Compared 
Looking at the French and British colonial policies in the administration of their 
mandated and trust territories of the Cameroons, it appears the differences far outweighed 
the similarities. This accounts for the fact that, in spite of the reunification of the two 
Cameroons, both territories are still following their various colonial heritages. The 
question one would like to ask is how British and French colonial practices engineered 
such a deep penetration of attitudes and lifestyles in their former colonial possessions, to 
the point where attitudes still survive forty years after independence.  To understand such 
attitudes in British and French Cameroon, the following section will examine some of the 
differences and similarities in their colonial practices. 
 
1.9.2 The Role of Traditional Chiefs 
The biggest difference between British and French colonial experience came in the 
treatment of the native population and in self-government of colonial possession. This 
can be seen clearly in the way in which the British emphasized the advisory role of 
British officials, while respecting the powers of the traditional authorities and the 
institutions by which they ruled.223 In British Southern Cameroons, the British met 
powerful local institutions headed by Fons and Chiefs and, where there were no chiefs, 
they created them. These local chiefs were used to implement colonial policies. Chiefs 
appointed as Native Authorities were empowered to collect tax revenue within their 
                                                 
223
 Jua, B. Nantang, “Indirect Rule in the Post Colonial State” 6 December 2005. Accessed at 
<http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/Chilver/Paideuma/paideuma-Conclus-2.html> Accessed 2006/12/6 
  88  
jurisdictions for expenditure by the colonial Administrators on their advice.224 On the 
other hand, the French regarded the chiefs as petty officials in the colonial administration 
that had been retained for convenience rather than from any regard for their traditional 
authority and institutions of governing.225 This implies that the chiefs were subordinate to 
the French administrators. The chiefs in French Cameroon were agents of the 
administration and they did not administer an area which corresponded to a village or 
chiefdom.226 The French divided the area into logical administrative areas which often 
cut across traditional political boundaries. 
 
The French system of administration reduced traditional chiefs to auxiliaries, and 
elevated Africans who learned French and accepted the French culture to an élite status. 
In the British territories the chiefs remained powerful figures, dispensing decisions and 
justice while the educated Africans were relegated by British officials to petty positions 
in the bureaucracy or were excluded from government. 
 
1.9.3 Education as a Tool for Cultural Assimilation and Progress 
Education was used as a powerful tool to transmit European culture to Africans. A further 
difference between the French and British is seen in the nature and role of education and 
language in their colonies. The French considered their language as the gateway to the 
French culture. In East Cameroon, the French discouraged the use of vernaculars in 
schools and French was imposed as the sole medium of instruction in all levels of 
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education.227 The main educational objective of the French colonial authorities was the 
diffusion of the French language, culture and civilization. This objective led to a very 
extensive development of fundamental education in the territory. The French impact on 
the cultural values of Cameroonians was far greater than in other African territories they 
colonized, given the comparatively more extensive spread of formal education in 
Cameroon. As at the time of independence in 1960, Cameroonians were among the most 
numerous African student groups in French universities, and the attachment to, and 
competence in, French language and culture was greater among this group.228  
 
Educational activities in British Southern Cameroon were largely neglected by the 
colonial government. English became the official language, in spite of the fact that the 
government encouraged the use of vernaculars in schools. Lord Lugard wrote “The object 
which education in Africa must have in view, must be to fit the ordinary individual to fill 
a useful part in his environment … and to ensure that the exceptional individual shall use 
his abilities for the advancement of the community”.229 But Britain did not assume full 
responsibility of improving the educational facilities of its territory to equip the Southern 
Cameroonians. Instead, the colonial authorities resorted to a policy of local financing 
through taxation, school fees and education rating, all of which became too onerous for 
parents to bear.230 The British colonial administration could afford to open only five 
government-sponsored primary schools in the whole territory. More than ninety-five 
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percent of all educational institutions in the territory were in the hands of the Christian 
mission and, to an extent, the native administration.231 Consequently, the development of 
education in Southern Cameroons during the forty years of British administration did not 
go beyond the primary school level. Higher education was available for Southern 
Cameroonians in Nigeria and was restricted numerically. Studies in Britain were possible 
only for a handful of scholarship holders.232 This accounted for the scarcity of educated 
Southern Cameroonian elites at the time of independence, and this impacted negatively 
on their ability to negotiate the terms of the reunification agreement. As a result, they 
were manoeuvred by the delegates from French Cameroon into signing the reunification 
treaty without understanding its consequences. 
 
1.9.4 Similarities between French and British rule 
The French policy of association and the British policy of indirect rule were similar in 
that both maintained control by ruling indirectly through the traditional authorities.  
Under the French policy of association, Africans were to develop within the context of 
their environment and society. Association emphasized cooperation between the rulers 
and ruled and it respected the social and political institutions of the Africans. The British 
system of indirect rule was based on the system of letting the natives alone to develop in 
their own ways, and it rested on the recognition that people and their institutions were 
different and that these differences should be respected. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that under the Germans there was no distinction in Cameroon. It 
was only after the Germans were defeated in the First World War that Cameroon was 
arbitrarily divided into two unequal parts: The French Cameroons and the British 
Southern Cameroons. This division meant that the territory lost whatever unity it had 
achieved during the German protectorate. The two Cameroons under separate 
administration moved in different directions. This led to the development of two 
distinctly different Cameroons in culture, social, economic and political traditions. 
 
The citizens of the two Cameroons had no choice but to imbibe the divergent French and 
British cultures and administrations that emerged. The British policy of indirect rule in 
Southern Cameroons, for all its faults, was much more preferred by the natives than any 
form of direct rule would have been. Politically, the British colonial administration 
provided a secured administrative and geographical framework within which the 
indigenous inhabitants were able to develop the sense of a common identity. The British 
also encouraged the participation of the people in local government and in councils, and 
prepared them for self-government. The British are also credited with implanting in the 
people of Southern Cameroons, through their policy of indirect rule, principles of 
personal dignity, integrity, self-reliance and self-confidence. Eventually, Southern 
Cameroonians imbibed the British way of life and administration, which they continue to 
appreciate to date. The French came to Africa on a civilizing mission and their aim was 
to make French Cameroon a part of France. They did not prepare their territory for self-
government, as they pursued a policy of direct rule. The consequence of the French 
system of direct rule was the over reliance of the people of French Cameroon on France, 
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because they were never taught to do things for themselves. The French system worked 
well in French Cameroon as progress was made in education and health. Educational 
standards in French Cameroon were higher than in any other French colony in Africa, 
and some towns, like Yaoundé, Douala, Edea, Nkongsamba and Foumban, became 
rapidly urbanized. The difference between French and British attitudes towards the 
administration of their mandate and trust territories and the later reunification of the two 
Cameroons brought about a confrontation between the two different policies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
NATIONAL INTEGRATION UNDER FEDERALISM AND 
THE UNITARY STATE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one covered the historical events that led to the Foumban constitutional talks and 
ultimately the reunification of the two Cameroons. The Foumban Conference laid the 
groundwork for the two Cameroons to go into a union of two states of equal status in a 
federation233 because of the differences in their political traditions and cultures. While 
Southern Cameroons hoped for the establishment of a loose federation with more power 
to the states and less power to the central government, French Cameroons favoured the 
establishment of a highly centralized federation for a reunified Cameroon.234 In spite of 
the disparities in the political values of the two systems, the constitution adopted at the 
Foumban Conference of 17 - 21 July 1961 by the delegations from the Republic of 
Cameroon and the Southern Cameroons, established a federation between the two 
territories. Article One of the federal constitution stated that “With effect from the 1st of 
October 1961, the Federal Republic of Cameroon shall be constituted from the territory 
of the Republic of Cameroon, hereafter to be styled East Cameroon, and the territory of 
the Southern Cameroons, formerly under British trusteeship, hereafter to be styled West 
Cameroon.”235 Thus, the Foumban Constitution established a federation that embraced 
two different political and cultural systems, one English and the other French. Taking this 
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view into consideration, it is not surprising that the operation of the federal system in East 
and West Cameroon was different. 
 
The implementation of the federal constitution had far greater implications for the 
political process in West Cameroon than it did in East Cameroon. This was essentially 
because, at reunification, the inferior constitutional position of the Southern Cameroons 
placed it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Republic of Cameroon. As an independent state, 
the Republic of Cameroon made only minor institutional adjustments to absorb the 
Southern Cameroons, as the line between the institutions of the state of East Cameroon 
and those of the federation was quite blurred.236  For this reason this chapter assesses the 
various ways in which the Cameroon state has dealt with the question of national 
integration during the period of federalism and after so-called unification. The chapter 
looks at what tools the government has been using, and with what effect? 
 
2.2 National Integration 
Victor Le vine has written extensively on national integration in Cameroon.237 According 
to him, national integration is “most commonly understood either as a goal or as a 
process. As a process, its most important component is growth or development or 
both”.238  He argued further that the term national integration “applies most specifically 
to societies with considerable, politically salient diversities, be they ethnic, religious, or 
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cultural”.239 This explains the reason why the political leaders of Cameroon supported a 
policy of national integration because of the specific historical forces underlying the 
emergence of the Cameroonian Nation-state. 
 
Bernard Fonlon is another scholar who has written about national integration in 
Cameroon.240 His study emphasized the semantic aspect of the word integration. He 
traced the origin of the word “integration” to the Latin adjective, ‘integer, integra, 
integrum’ meaning ‘whole’. Applying this to the Cameroon context, this wholeness or 
oneness implies the exclusion of division within the new Cameroon state.241 This means 
putting parts–that is the Francophone and the Anglophone parts–together to form a 
whole. To him, Cameroonian integration is the oneness of a whole composed of parts. 
Fonlon made more sense in defining what integration meant for Cameroon than any other 
scholar who examined the concept: 
 
Integration therefore means completeness, the absence of deficiency, it 
means oneness, the absence of division; it means harmony, the absence of 
conflict; its means health, the absence of diseases; it means vigor, the 
absence of languor, it means purity, the absence of corruption. Integration 
is a process of renewal, rebirth, and a new creation.242 
 
According to Fonlon, Anglophones and Francophones should meld into a common new 
culture where there will be no cultural differences between them. Fonlon sought  an 
emergence of  a new culture , “For the union of a people  is not complete until they have 
forged for themselves a soul, that principle  of life and continuity, that unity of thought 
                                                 
239
 Ibid, pp. 271-272. 
240
 Fonlon, Bernard, (1969), “The Language Problem in Cameroon: An Historical Perspective”, Victoria: 
Cameroon Times Press, pp. 25-49. 
241
 Ibid. 
242
 Ibid, p. 27. 
  97  
and feeling that only a common culture can give.”243 The one way to achieve this, he 
said, “is to create a new culture thoughtfully, methodically, diligently, from those which 
are met on the continent today”.244  Fonlon’s notion of a common culture never 
materialized because of the domination of Francophone over their Anglophone brothers. 
 
Historically, Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon were two separate 
entities before reunification. During the forty six years of British and French colonial 
administration, the two states developed different patterns of communication within each 
area. Each maintained a seaport with considerable facilities at Douala and Victoria 
respectively. There were no roads linking both areas. Telephone and telegraph 
communications between the two areas were treated as international operations, which 
meant routing via London and Paris. Another major difference was seen in terms of the 
“currency and trading allegiance of the two states, which in turn required the existence of 
customs barriers; and the need for passports to travel across international frontiers”.245 
Besides, the real obstacle to communication resulted from the use of different languages 
in government, administration and economic life. 
 
France and Britain left their Cameroonian territories with well organized and relatively 
well-functioning systems of government. In both Cameroons, full-fledged administrative 
structures were created at both territorial and local levels, one following the British 
system and the other the French system of bureaucracy, making them separate entities.246 
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It was the task of bringing the two systems together during reunification that caused 
federalism and integration to be thought the best policies to follow. 
 
In looking at the ways in which the new Cameroon state dealt with the question of 
integration, the first part of this chapter focuses on national integration in key areas like 
the economic institutions, legal system, education, political integration and bilingualism. 
The second part deals with the unitary state and assesses whether there were continuities 
or ruptures in the policies of the unitary government in forging ahead with national 
integration. 
 
2.2.1 National Integration during Federalism 
2.2.1a Integration of Economic and Transport Sector 
The first steps in the integration process were relatively minor efforts at standardization 
in the economic and transportation spheres, as a prelude to more far reaching changes. In 
1962 the CFA franc was introduced as the federation’s currency, replacing the Nigerian 
pound in West Cameroon. The CFA franc was made legal tender and was to be 
exchanged for the Nigerian pound at a rate of 692 francs to the pound.247 Despite some 
initial difficulties with the currency and the exchange rate, conversion of the currency 
was an extremely important feature of the integration of the two states as it united them 
into a single market.248  As for transportation, traffic was made to travel on the right hand 
side of the road throughout the country.  Surveys were made for railways and roads 
linking East and West Cameroon. In April 1969 the Tiko-Douala road was inaugurated; 
this undoubtedly produced the first genuine feeling among East and West Cameroonians 
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that they were at last within easy reach of one another.249 Economically, the effect of the 
new road was felt as well. The movement of goods between Douala, the country’s main 
commercial centre, and Victoria and Tiko became easy as customs barriers had already 
been lifted between the two federated states.250 
 
2.2.1b Institutional Integration 
The integration of the administrative systems of East and West Cameroon was done by 
reorganizing the territorial administrative system throughout the Federal Republic. The 
federal territory was divided into six administrative regions namely: Central-South, 
North, West, East, Littoral and West Cameroon. These were headed by federal Inspectors 
who represented the President of the Federal Republic in the respective regions.251 The 
creation of these regions coincided with specific geographical areas with a view to 
promoting economic and social development.252 The innovations introduced by the 
division of the territory into administrative regions restricted the powers of local officials 
for initiative and independent action in the federated states. The influence of the federal 
inspectorate and the federal government came to be felt increasingly after reunification. 
The federal inspectors of administration not only supervised, but coordinated the work of 
all federal officials and departments within the region: 
 
They could establish their own rules and regulations within the framework 
provided by general executive powers and jurisdiction. They were charged 
with the maintenance of order, application of federal laws, and 
coordination and control of the activity of federal services. They could 
initiate an investigation into the activities of federal officials in their area. 
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They could carry out their task forcibly, if need be, with the help of the 
police and the armed forces. They became the liaison between local 
federal officials and federal ministries and bureaus. All correspondence 
from or to these officials was to be copied and sent to the inspector.253 
 
The federal inspectors became a menace to the West Cameroon state. The difficulties 
which surrounded the introduction of federal control were felt to a far greater extent by 
the members of the West Cameroon government and the civil service than those of the 
East. In fact, state officials in West Cameroon found themselves in an increasingly 
embarrassing position as their services became more and more federalized.254 Many of 
them came to realize with dismay that they devoted more time to federal than to state 
affairs and this brought into question the autonomy of their state. This necessitated some 
protest from the West Cameroonians regarding the operation of the federal inspectors. In 
a secret memorandum to Ahidjo, the Buea government requested that the Prime Minister 
of West Cameroon be the sole representative of the President in the territory, and be 
empowered to oversee federal and state departments in West Cameroon.255 In effect, the 
Buea government wanted the post of federal inspector to be scrapped in West Cameroon. 
They decried the practice whereby Francophones who were ignorant of the political 
tradition of West Cameroon were the only advisers to federal ministers and that the 
federal inspector was always a man from East Cameroon. The government of West 
Cameroon was in a way exposing the difficulties inherent in the running of the Cameroon 
federation.  
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2.2.1c Integration in the Legal System 
In trying to harmonise the legal systems of the two states, “federal laws were passed that 
covered procedures for the Supreme Court of the Federation”.256 In each area, the federal 
system incorporated some element of the systems formerly operative in the two states, 
but this did not really integrate the two systems. There were some profound differences 
that continued to exist between the courts in the two states. West Cameroon remained 
attached to the wigs and gowns they inherited from the British. More important, the entire 
law of West Cameroon was still based on English Common Law principles.257 There was 
a marked difference in the Criminal procedure, as West Cameroon emphasized the 
innocence of an accused until he was proven guilty, while East Cameroon held that an 
accused was guilty until he was proven innocent. Another area of difference was in the 
recruitment of court staff. Judges in West Cameroon were either British or British 
trained, and judges in East Cameroon were either French or they were trained in France. 
The task of rationally constructing a new Cameroonian legal system out of the material of 
the previous ones remained French with relatively few innovations for the legal system in 
East Cameroon.258 The differences in the legal system in Cameroon existed until 2005 
when a common penal code was adopted.  
 
2.2.1d Integration in Education 
The two Cameroons came to unification with different systems of education. West 
Cameroon came with a system based on the British system and East Cameroon with one 
based on the French model. Integration of the two systems meant education was a federal 
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responsibility. The federal constitution stipulated that secondary, technical and higher 
education were the responsibility of the federal government, while primary education 
remained under state control.259 Reforms were enforced from the centre and the first steps 
were made to harmonise the two systems by introducing a common timetable for a six 
year primary cycle. Before harmonization the standard West Cameroon primary 
education was eight years and that of the East six years. This was followed by the 
standardization of the entrance examination to the first cycle of secondary school 
throughout the federation. The examinations were alike in content, but administered in 
either French or English. This common qualifying examination for secondary schools 
increased pressure for full standardization of primary and secondary school programs.260 
The second step was the harmonization of the secondary school syllabuses for languages, 
mathematics, history and geography. In spite of the fact that notable progress was made 
towards establishing a truly integrated system of education for the whole country, 
examinations and certificates continued to follow their colonial models. Today, not much 
has changed in the educational system, as the Anglophones and Francophones still write 
separate examinations from primary to high school. 
 
Similar imbalances exist in higher education. In 1962, a Federal University was created 
in Yaoundé. The university was seen as a bilingual institution which would bring together 
and promote bilingualism in the new Cameroon State. Little was done to make the 
university bi-cultural as well as bilingual, as it remained substantially mono-cultural.261 
The language of instruction and the members of staff were mostly French, with the 
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exception of the English Department in the Faculty of Letters. A few courses were taught 
on the West Cameroon legal system in the Law Faculty.262 No attempt was made to teach 
in English and examinations were almost entirely in French, to the disadvantage of 
students from West Cameroon. The result was that a small number of West Cameroonian 
students alone became bilingual and neither students nor staff from East Cameroon 
bothered to learn or use English. Today the situation is different, as more Francophones 
have come to realize the importance of English and many of them have embarked on 
studying in English. 
 
2.2.1e Bilingualism 
The constitution of September 1961, which brought about the federation, stated that 
French and English were the official languages in the new state. French for the federated 
State of East Cameroon, English for that of West Cameroon, and both for such federal 
institutions as the federal government and its ministerial services, such as the Federal 
Assembly, the Federal Courts of Justice, the Federal University and the secondary 
schools.263 The federal government succeeded in creating a bilingual state, but the 
citizens were not bilingual due to the deep attachment of the two states to their colonial 
languages and cultures. Besides, the commitment of East Cameroonians to the French 
language ran deep because most of them were well trained in French. On the contrary, 
West Cameroonians had a less perfect knowledge of English because of the extent to 
which Pidgin English interfered with the acquisition of Standard English.264 Because of 
the numerical superiority of East Cameroon over West Cameroon, “many Francophones 
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made no effort to hide their own conviction that general knowledge of standard English 
in the West Cameroon was so rudimentary and the number who knew it well so small 
that, in effect, West Cameroon citizens would have to achieve monolingualism before the 
country could preserve bilingualism”.265 The stance of the Eastern Cameroonian on 
bilingualism was further supported by the then Prime Minister Charles Assale who is 
alleged to have thought it preferable to rebuild the whole educational system of West 
Cameroon along the lines of the one in the East, since so few schools would be involved, 
than to try and harmonize the system.266 Reacting to the French influence and attitude 
towards the English language and their domination in the federation, Fonlon wrote: 
 
Therefore, unless the East Cameroon leader and intellectuals, in whose 
hands cultural initiative lies, is prepared to share this authority with his 
brother from West of the Mungo, unless he is prepared to make the giant 
effort necessary to break loose from the strait-jacket of his French 
education, unless he will show proof of his intellectual probity and admit 
candidly that there are things in the Anglo-Saxon way of life that can do 
this country good, there is little chance of survival, neither for English 
influence, nor even for African values in the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon.267 
 
Fonlon argued that in the Cameroon federation these two cultures are equal and that each 
of them stands to benefit from the other. But the attitude of the French Cameroonians 
towards the English language raised fears that West Cameroon would lose its cultural 
identity by being assimilated by the majority Francophones. Consequently, the behaviour 
of Francophones slowed the growth of bilingualism because the Anglophones feared 
being assimilated by the less tolerant Francophones. 
                                                 
265
 Johnson, Willard (1970), The Cameroon Federation, p. 292. 
266
 Ibid. 
267
 Fonlon, Bernard (1964), “Will we Make or Mar?”, in Abbia, No. 5 cited by Williard, Johnson (1970), 
The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society, p. 292.
  105  
 
In trying to make its citizens bilingual, the federal government gave some degree of 
encouragement by permitting civil servants to take courses in a second language. 
Facilities for bilingual teaching were provided by UNESCO in Yaoundé and Buea to 
train bilingual personnel. The federal government also gave salary bonuses to those 
officials who had proficiency in the two languages.268 Some development did result from 
these moves, but bilingualism was far more in evidence among officials of West 
Cameroon than those of the East Cameroon or Federal governments.269 A major move 
towards making its citizens bilingual, particularly teachers, was the creation in 1963 of 
the Federal Bilingual Grammar School in Man-o-War Bay near Victoria in West 
Cameroon.270 A second was created a couple of years later in Yaoundé. The aim of these 
bilingual grammar schools was to produce Cameroonians evenly fluent and efficient in 
the use of both languages. But these bilingual schools did not succeed in creating 
bilingual Cameroonians because they lacked the resources to implement the policy 
fully.271 
 
2.2.2 Political Integration 
The circumstances which led to the establishment of a single party at the federal level in 
Cameroon were influenced by the different trends of political developments in each state. 
Ahidjo’s pronouncements on a single party do not differ greatly in this respect from those 
of many African leaders in the early sixties, “who justify the emergence of one-party 
states on the allegedly wasteful and disruptive effects of having too many parties within 
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the body politic of an emerging state”.272 When Ahidjo decided on the establishment of a 
single party, he did not desire to move immediately to a complete union of the two ruling 
parties (Union Camerounnaise in the East, and Kamerun National Democratic Party in 
West Cameroon). But he embarked on a gradual process by first emphasizing that the 
process of the realization of the goal of the single party should commence with the union 
of all parties in each state.273  
 
2.2.2a Towards a Single Party System for East Cameroon 
At the time of reunification and the declaration of federation in October 1961, Ahidjo’s 
Union Camerounaise was already the majority party in East Cameroon. After having 
established and consolidated a political base in the north, Ahidjo was determined to 
increase his power and that of his party, the UC in the South. To achieve his aim, “he 
used a combination of tactics including intimidation, accommodation, coalitions, force, 
and divide and rule”.274 The goal of these strategies was to weaken the opposition forces 
as he used one southern opposition leader against the other; he acquired more power to 
face yet another Southern leader.275 Ahidjo’s influence and that of his party increased in 
the South as a result of the decision of two parties to join it. The first was Charles 
Assale’s Mouvement d’Action Nationale (MANC), and Assale was appointed Prime 
Minister of the state. The next party to follow was the Front Pour l’Unite et la Paix. 
Several party bigwigs were co-opted into the UC when their parties dissolved. Pierre 
Ninyim Kandem, a formal rebel leader, was made Minister of Health, and Victor Kanga 
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was appointed Minister of National Economy.276 It was not only the politicians who 
crossed the carpet to the UC but voters’ preference as well. This was evident in a number 
of UC successes in the by-elections of June 1961 in Kribi. 
 
The UC successes encouraged and gave the party leader a new confidence and 
determination. He was now prepared to assert the claim of the UC to be the only ‘national 
party’ in East Cameroun. From then on he was to use much tougher methods to secure 
the disappearance of other parties from the political scene. The first indication that 
Ahidjo was prepared to achieve his goal by every available means was witnessed in 
Yaoundé. In January 1962 the police forcefully dispersed UPC delegates before they 
were able to adopt a final resolution by the Commission of Inquiry on the death of Um 
Nyobe, and the election of their Secretary General.277 But this did not signal the end of 
the UPC or the demise of the rest of the opposition. The opposition leaders were united 
by the growing fear that Ahidjo was determined to eliminate them politically. As a result 
they joined together in April to form their own Front National Unifie, and in June issued 
an open letter attacking Ahidjo and alleging that he was intent on creating a dictatorship 
through the establishment of a one-party state.278 Their proposals were rejected by the UC 
on the grounds that they would only encourage the status quo; that is a multiplicity of 
political parties and, consequently, inefficiency and a negation of all actions.279  
Opposition leaders were arrested and tried on charges that arms and ammunition had 
been found in their possession. On 11 July 1962, they were convicted of “inciting hatred 
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against the government and public authority, inciting conflict between ethnic and 
religious communities and disseminating news prejudicial to public authorities”.280 They 
were sentenced to the loss of their political rights, fined and imprisoned for three years. 
By the end of July 1962, Ahidjo had succeeded in planting a de facto one-party regime in 
East Cameroon. In 1965, the opposition in East Cameroon was so weak that it could not 
stand in the election for the East Cameroon Legislative Assembly. Thus, in less than four 
years, the single party was achieved for East Cameroon, by a process of intimidation and 
elimination. The stage was set for Ahidjo to pursue his goal of a unified national party for 
the entire federation and his attention was now on the political developments in West 
Cameroon. 
 
2.2.2b Towards a Single Party System in West Cameroon 
The West Cameroon party system disintegrated due to the fact that West Cameroonian 
politicians were power hungry and tried to outmanoeuvre each other in urging the 
implementation of a single party for West Cameroon. Each of the major political parties 
in West Cameroon did at one time or other oppose or support the idea of a single national 
party, depending on how it was going to affect their political fortunes. Moreover, the 
general political dissatisfaction in West Cameroon created conditions for Ahidjo to 
intervene in its internal politics.281 
 
At independence, Foncha’s Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) enjoyed a 
majority in the West Cameroon legislature over the Cameroon People’s National 
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Convention (CPNC) led by E.M.L. Endeley. To ensure continuity Foncha, after 
reunification, retained the office of the Prime Minister of West Cameroon while 
assuming the federal vice presidency. In 1962, Ahidjo and Foncha signed an agreement 
that neither the UC nor the KNDP would be active in the other’s territory, and this 
created a formal alliance between the parties at the federal level. It appears that the 
KNDP was bent on dominating the West Cameroon political stage as Ahidjo had done in 
the East; that is, establish a single party regime in West Cameroon before embarking with 
the UC on the negotiation for a national party for the federation. The KNDP Secretary 
General remarked that: 
 
The KNDP must dispel any illusions nursed and entertained by any 
persons that they will carry other groups of parties to meet the UC to 
discuss the formation of a National Party or that the KNDP will meet the 
UC bringing with them groups of other parties to discuss the subject.282 
 
 
From this premise it was clear that Foncha did not want to unite the two parties, claiming 
that the only possible basis for such a merger was for the CPNC to dissolve and join the 
KNDP. The bickering continued between the KNDP and CPNC, but nothing fruitful 
came of it. The CPNC lost some support through the defection of some of its members in 
the House of Assembly, and the KNDP gained an overwhelming majority, securing all 
the seats in the election of the ten federal National Assembly seats.283 With the 
weakening of the political power of the CPNC, its leaders realized that they could revive 
their political fortunes only through championing the course of a single national party. In 
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the process the CPNC became the principal advocate in West Cameroon of the idea of a 
single party for the nation.284 
 
The need to find a successor for Foncha as Prime Minister of the State of West Cameroon 
orchestrated the disappearance of party politics in West Cameroon, when his 
constitutional right to hold both federal and state office ended in 1965. In 1963 Foncha 
had apparently indicated that his future lay with the federal government as Vice President 
of the federation, the second most prestigious position in the federation. His decision 
produced a major contest for the vice presidency of the KNDP. Solomon Tangie Muna 
and Augustine Ngom Jua became the main contenders for the post of the vice president, 
while E.T. Egbe and Nzo Ekhah-Ngaky announced their intention to run for the 
Secretary-General position which had remained vacant since the death of Zachariah A. 
Abendong in July 1963. Foncha supported Muna and Egbe, but Jua and Ekhah-Ngaky 
won by a landslide. Consequently, Jua became the Vice President and Nzo Ekhah-Ngaky 
the Secretary-General respectively.285 
 
The ambitions of Jua and Muna led to a split in the KNDP into two camps. The issue of 
who to succeed Foncha as Prime Minister was settled when Jua’s camp amended the 
KNDP constitution so that the Vice President of the party became the party’s candidate 
for the Prime Ministership following the president’s departure from the House of 
Assembly. A fierce debate increased the gap between the two camps in the KNDP. To 
test the popularity of Jua’s decision to amend the constitution, Foncha conducted a poll 
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amongst the delegates and the result showed that twenty-three KNDP parliamentarians 
supported Jua, while Foncha and six federal parliamentarians supported Muna.286 
Accordingly, Foncha declined to submit Muna’s name to the President and called on him 
to accept the party’s decision. When Muna refused to do so, Foncha accused him of 
trying to split the party, and ultimately suspended him and seven of his supporters from 
membership of the party.287 After serious consultations with members of the West 
Cameroon House of Assembly, the House of Chiefs, all Secretaries of State, Federal 
Parliamentarians and Foncha himself, Ahidjo named Jua as the Prime Minister of West 
Cameroon.288 Meanwhile Muna and Egbe immediately formed another political party the 
Cameroon United Congress (CUC). 
 
With the formation of the CUC, there were three political parties in West Cameroon at 
the time when there were talks of the formation of a single national party. Foncha’s 
strategy of forming a single party in West Cameroon had failed. Jua started cooperation 
talks between his government and the opposition CPNC for the benefit of the West 
Cameroon electorate.289 After the formation of a coalition, the two leading political 
parties, the KNDP and CPNC, on 19 August 1965 pledged “… to work for the 
preservation of the existing parliamentary system and political institutions in West 
Cameroon”.290 The CUC, after the formation of the coalition government became the 
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principal advocate of a single national party in West Cameroon.291 Their propaganda was 
aimed at winning favour from the UC. 
 
The inability of West Cameroon political leaders to settle their differences gave some 
impetus to Ahidjo to take the initiative himself, and he did so in 1966 by summoning the 
leaders of the three West Cameroon parties to a meeting with the Prime Minister of East 
Cameroun and himself in Yaoundé. At the meeting Ahidjo decried the futility of the 
continuance of multiparty politics in a young nation like Cameroon. He revealed that it 
was his conviction that the Cameroonian nation and its people could better be served, and 
its limited human resources more effectively utilized, if the leaders agreed to work under 
the banner of a “parti Unifie”.292 Within two days, Ahidjo secured the consent of the 
political leaders to dissolve all existing political parties in the two states and the creation 
of a new one to be known as the Cameroon National Union (CNU). 
 
With the formation of a single national party, it was only a matter of time before the 
federal arrangement was discarded. The elimination of the West Cameroon political party 
system marked an end to political pluralism in Cameroon for decades to come. It was 
only with the new wave of democratic changes blowing across Africa that, against 
government opposition, a new political party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was 
launched in Bamenda in May 1990, to reopen a space for political pluralism. 
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2.3 National Integration in the Unitary State 
The Federal Republic of Cameroon was dismantled in May 1972 and replaced by the 
United Republic of Cameroon. On the constitutional level, a unitary state replaced a 
federal one. The unitary constitution abolished the office of Vice President of the 
Republic; one unitary government replaced the three governments and one national 
assembly replaced the four assemblies.293  The unitary constitution established a 
centralized administration and retained a strong presidential system. The regions that 
were created in October 1961 were abolished and seven provinces were created, headed 
by governors. West Cameroon was split into two provinces namely, North West and 
South West.294 The unitary constitution brought to an end the separate identities of 
territories with widely differing political, social, administrative and cultural traditions.295 
Under the unitary system, the successes of political integration continued in more or less 
the same pattern under the reign of then President Ahidjo, with some areas yet to be 
marched. This continued to present a challenge under the Biya’s regime. The apparent 
failure of the highly centralized unitary state to achieve economic and national integration 
gave rise to renewed demands for the reintroduction of a federal system in Cameroon.296 
 
Twelve years after the dismantling of the federation, President Paul Biya who had 
succeeded Ahmadu Ahidjo as president of the United Republic of Cameroon in 
November 1982, unilaterally and unconstitutionally decreed the change of the Country’s 
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name from “The United Republic of Cameroon” to “The Republic of Cameroon” in 
February 1984.297 President Paul Biya’s vision for the future Cameroon Republic is found 
in his description of communal liberalism as: 
  
The dream of a united mankind, the establishment of a new political 
society, the promotion of an economy at the service of man, the 
emergence of a national culture sustained by ethnic cultures, the 
implementation of social justice and the development of the humane in 
Man are the many legitimate ambitions on which I based my action at the 
helm of the Cameroonian state. 298 
 
 
President Paul Biya’s vision for the future Cameroon society was to show that 
Cameroonians are one people with minor cultural differences and that a national cultural 
amalgamation would be built from the contributions of  local cultures. To move towards 
this new cultural identity, he encouraged internal migration of Cameroonians in order to 
mix people. To achieve his aim, he used his powers of appointment to station bureaucrats 
outside of their places of origin.299 President Paul Biya had very lofty ideas for his future 
Cameroon society, but the practicality of his vision would prove him wrong, as most of 
his ideas did not succeed as he expected. The analysis below will show how Paul Biya 
tried to deal with the question of national integration in the unitary state. 
 
2.3.1a Education 
The unitary government under President Paul Biya continued to strive to harmonize the 
educational system. In 1983, barely a year after Paul Biya came to power, his government 
attempted to harmonise the Anglophone General Certificate of Education (GCE) 
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Ordinary and Advanced levels with the Francophone Baccalaureate (BAC). The minister 
of National Education proposed a new group certificate GCE, saying that the group 
certificate would make the GCE look a little more like the BAC and this would help the 
Anglophones to gain admission into higher institutions of learning in Cameroon.300 When 
the news reached Anglophone university students, it immediately sparked a major riot. 
Anglophone students were determined to save the GCE from the assimilationist 
tendencies of the Francophone. There was some rioting in the two Anglophone provinces, 
demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the minister’s decision. Some students even lost 
their lives in confrontation with the security officers.301  The students decided to boycott 
classes and organized daily demonstrations until the proposed educational reforms were 
suspended by the government. In spite the fact that the government suspended the 
educational reforms it did not abandon its intention of assimilating the GCE. In 1989, 
Professor George Ngango, the then minister of National Education, attempted to 
introduce a new GCE reform scheme that would impose on Anglophones the 
Francophone structure of four years for the first cycle and three years for the second 
cycle. Fierce opposition and widespread demonstrations by Anglophone students and 
parents forced the government to stop the scheme. This new attempt to destroy the GCE 
made the Anglophones to lose confidence in the Biya regime.302 
 
Besides, the fact that the government had made some attempts to model the GCE 
examination along Francophone lines without succeeding, it continued to manage the 
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GCE examinations poorly, leading to many irregularities in the conduct of the 
examination. Such irregularities included complaints about poor translation of 
examination questions, poor distribution of examination materials, frequent fiddling with 
the examination timetable and the non-payment of marking fees.303 In 1991, Anglophone 
parents and teachers gathered under the umbrella of the Teachers’ Association of 
Cameroon (TAC) and threatened to boycott the marking of examination scripts if 
government failed to approve the creation of the GCE Examination Board. However, the 
government tricked the protesting teachers into marking the scripts. In March 1993, TAC 
made it clear that the June 1993 scripts would not be marked before the creation of a 
functional examination board as demanded. In response to the government’s negligence, 
TAC went ahead and created an examination board in Buea in April 1993. The Minister 
of National Education quickly declared the board illegal.304 The teachers continued their 
protest until the GCE board was created on 19 October 1993, and its officials installed in 
Buea on 25 October 1993. This was a victory for the Anglophone community as a whole, 
and for the triumph of Anglo-Saxon culture in Cameroon, in particular. Granting the long 
sought after GCE Board for Anglophones was a way of President Paul Biya’s 
government managing the differences between Anglophones and Francophones in the 
unitary state. But it would not be long before the government took total control of the 
GCE Board. 
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2.3.1b The University of Yaoundé 
With the scrapping of the federal structures, the Federal University, created in 1962, 
became the University of Yaoundé. The university was originally designed to 
accommodate about 10, 000 students. However, the student population grew rapidly and 
the university soon became overcrowded and lacked the basic infrastructure needed to 
cope with the massive student population.305 Consequently, there was a fall in the 
academic standards and corruption was rife on campus. A student had to be rich or 
beautiful to get through successfully.306 Anglophone students in the university 
experienced many hardships as the university clearly remained a Francophone institution. 
Out of frustration, many of them abandoned their education. Some Anglophone students 
had to change their Faculty in a desperate attempt to graduate with a degree. For instance, 
some Anglophone students admitted to the Faculty of Science changed to Letters, to read 
English, because it was the only department where English was the medium of 
instruction.307 By the beginning of the 1990s, with the winds of change blowing over 
Africa, Anglophone students at the University of Yaoundé were the first to voice their 
long-standing grievances.308 The stage was thus set for the violent explosion that was to 
occur later. The University of Yaoundé barely functioned from 1990 to 1993, with the 
university being repeatedly paralysed by student protests and unprecedented violent 
confrontations with the security forces. Pressure was brought to bear on the government 
to take action before the situation escalated. In 1993 the government yielded and 
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introduced some university reforms in which five universities were created with an 
Anglo-Saxon university for Anglophones in Buea. By creating a university for the 
Anglophones Paul Biya was trying to appease them. This can be interpreted in the light of 
Paul Biya managing the differences that exist between Anglophones and Francophones. 
 
2.4.1 Bilingualism in the Unitary State 
The Cameroon government continued with its bilingual policy in the unitary state by 
creating many “bilingual secondary and high schools” to cater for the bilingual needs of 
young Cameroonians. However, these were not bilingual in the tradition of the Federal 
Bilingual Grammar Schools of the 1960s. They were mostly two separate institutions – 
French and English using the same facilities, but not mixing. This did not solve the 
bilingual problem because the bilingual policy in Cameroon was implemented as 
individual bilingualism rather than state bilingualism. As such, many Cameroonians 
chose to be monolingual. This has deprived many Cameroonians of the liberty of 
expression in offices, courts, meetings and schools. This points to the fact that language 
planning in Cameroon has so far been inappropriate. 
 
Language experts like Professor Bernard Fonlon recommended a bilingual policy for 
Cameroonians that would start from primary and proceed through secondary and high 
school to university. According to him, English and French should be taught at various 
levels in such a way that, after high school studies, the students should be able to follow 
courses in English and French at the University level.309 But the lack of political will on 
the part of the majority Francophones to foster bilingualism as recommended by Fonlon, 
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led to inappropriate language policy in higher education, and over the years Anglophones 
have carried the burden of that policy.  
 
The educational programs in higher institutions of learning to create bilingual 
Cameroonians have so far produced limited results because language has been a thorn in 
the flesh of students in higher education in Cameroon. As yet, no solution has been found 
to the problem.310  In the University of Yaoundé, for example, there is a bilingual 
program intended to teach English to Francophones and French to Anglophones. The 
failure rate is so high that one can only wonder if the students have passed through a 
system which was allegedly meant to render them bilingual and prepare them for 
university studies in English and French.311 The answer here is simple: French and 
English are compulsory in all secondary and higher institutions in Cameroon, but 
students do not have the enthusiasm to learn the languages. Some students usually stay 
away during English and French lessons. They discover the consequence of not learning 
either official language only when they are confronted with the reality of bilingualism in 
the society at large. 
 
Research conducted in higher education in Cameroon indicated that there is a problem 
with the language of instruction. Most of the students were dissatisfied with the use of 
their second official language (SOL) as a medium of instruction.312 The research also 
revealed that it rendered the acquisition of knowledge strenuous in the various subjects, 
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thereby leading to poor performance in examinations. This problem is compounded by 
the fact that students face difficulties in note-taking and translating from the SOL to the 
first official language (FOL). Most students complained that they did not understand 
lectures and ended up being frustrated by the system. The research points out that the 
lecturers also strained to make sense of the scripts of students who answered questions in 
the lecturer’s SOL. Consequently, there can be no objective marking under such 
circumstances.313   
 
According to David Laitin, Anglophone students in most institutions of higher learning in 
Cameroon have lost their human rights in the freedom to choose the language through 
which to acquire vital knowledge. Anglophone students suffer unfairly by virtue of not 
knowing how to speak the dominant or politically preferred French language.314  
Research conducted by Dora Yila on the topic “The Translation of Some Public 
Examination Questions in Cameroon”315 discovered many wrongly translated questions, 
leading to the failure of Anglophone candidates who sat the exams. 
  
1. a). French: Sur un mécanisme, on a relevé les indications suivantes sur piéces 
     b) English: They have picked up from a mechanism the following indications  
           on the pieces. 
      c). Accepted version: The following instructions were found on parts of an  
            appliance.  
2. a). French: Les adjuvants: definition, mode d’action, condition d’emploi 
b) English: adjuvants: definition, methods of action, use conditions. 
c) Accepted Version: Define a catalyst. How does it work? When is it used? 
 
3. a). French: Quelle est la nature de la semence—fruit ou graine? Et vous  le  
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     mode de dissemination. 
b). English: What is the nature of seed? Is it a fruit? How is it scattered? 
c). Accepted Version: What type of seed is it? A fruit or a grain? How is it  
 planted?316  
 
Faced with this type of dilemma, Anglophone candidates are bound to fail because of the 
poor translation of the examination questions. Besides, the examination are marked by 
Francophones who do not know English really well. One can argue that in these 
situations, at least the examination questions had been translated, although in a bizarre 
manner. In other circumstances no translations were offered and the candidates were 
obliged to read the questions in French and answer in English. In an article in the Herald 
Newspaper (No 679) of Wednesday, 28-29 October 1998, titled “ENS Not for 
Anglophone Science Students,” the author accuses the government of doing everything to 
prevent Anglophones from gaining admission into the Department of Science in the 
Yaoundé School of Education. He was infuriated because no Anglophone had been 
admitted into the Department of Science in October 1998 entrance examination. He 
wrote: 
 
If this is not a deliberate plot, why is that all the questions in the exams 
came in French? Yes, “Cameroon is bilingual” they would sing. Have the 
questions ever come exclusively in English? And when the unfortunate 
Anglophone candidate dared to plead even for some verbal translations, 
they were told in no uncertain terms to keep quiet. 
 
A bilingual country? Any real Anglophone who still believes in that is 
living in a cloud cuckoo land. Bilingualism is a euphemism for 
Francophonising and impoverishing Anglophones. A clear one way traffic.  
 
What makes the situation even more vexing is the fact that the 
Francophone hegemony just ploughs on, ignoring the long standing 
problem that faced generations of intelligent Anglophone students. 
Anglophone science students would have strings of A grades at the A-
                                                 
316
 Ibid. 
  122  
Levels and not be able to grope through the “Faculté des Sciences” 
Unequivocally illogical!317 
 
The bitterness in this article reflects the state of mind and feelings of most Anglophones 
in Cameroon who have encountered language or communication problems as a result of 
the national bilingual policy. It is not only in the institutions of learning that Anglophones 
experience linguistic injustice, it also exists in the society at large. 
 
In the public sphere French has become the most dominant and preferred language to 
English. This raises the issue of fairness because what becomes of Anglophone citizens 
who cannot speak French? Within the administration, French is the everyday working 
language of the state. Presidential decrees are always published in French; French takes 
precedence over English in administrative documents such as identity cards, birth, and 
death and marriage certificates and in most official documents. 
 
In government offices in the capital many Anglophones face communication problems, 
especially the people who have never had any opportunity to learn French. For example, 
an Anglophone said he entered an office in Yaoundé and tried to obtain information from 
a government officer. When he spoke in English the officer replied in French. He told the 
officer that he could not speak French and the officer replied in French that “Puisque tu 
ne parles pas le Français et je ne parle pas l’aglais, c’est match nul” (Since you do not 
speak French and I don’t speak English, it is draw).318 The Anglophone said he left the 
office confused and frustrated. Another Anglophone who came to Yaoundé to “follow up 
his papers” at the ministry of Territorial Administration said he entered an office and 
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spoke in English, and a Francophone gestured to another employee and shouted “Viola 
votre fréré Anglo” (that is your Anglophone brother). This implies that had the 
Anglophone not been working in that office, he would not have been attended to. This 
experience reflects those of other monolingual Anglophones in government offices 
occupied by monolingual Francophones. On the contrary, when a Francophone 
encounters an Anglophone officer, the Anglophone will try, no matter how imperfect his 
French, to satisfy the Francophone. This indicates that Anglophones are more willing to 
learn French than Francophones are willing to learn English. 
 
2.4.1a The Armed Forces 
The linguistic dissatisfaction is also being felt in other areas of public life. French is the 
unique command language of the armed forces in Cameroon. As a result, all English-
speaking conscripts into the army, the police and the gendarmerie are, therefore, required 
to learn French. The result of this policy is that Francophone conscripts in the armed 
forces have little or no knowledge of the English language, even though they are called to 
serve all over the country, including the English-speaking provinces.319 The imposition of 
French as the unique language of command in the armed forces has also created a strange 
situation whereby English-speaking conscripts, after undergoing their basic training come 
out wishing to speak only French even to their close relatives. The result is that the armed 
forces do not consider themselves to be bound by the constitutional provision of 
bilingualism. French seems to have become the language of harassment and bullying. In 
Bamenda, the capital of the North West Province, a taxi driver stopped in a non-stopping 
zone to pick up passengers and a policewoman walked up to him and spoke in French and 
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the driver responded in English. The officer became infuriated and shouted at the driver 
that “Je ne comprends pas votre anglais la”, (I do not understand your English). In a 
stalled situation like this, one does not expect a taxi driver, who had no formal schooling, 
to speak French, but it should be obligatory for the officer, who is educated and 
employed by the state to at least speak English. However, since the provisions of the 
language of command do not require government security officers to speak English, they 
do not.  
 
2.4.1b Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation (CRTV) 
In the state owned media, efforts were made with varying degrees of success, to reach 
both French and English speaking Cameroonians. With the advent of television some 
efforts were made to disseminate the news simultaneously in English and French through 
the use of two anchor persons, one English-speaking and one French-speaking. This 
eventually gave way to two news programmes that came at different times lots, one for 
the English audience and the other for the French audience. With regard to total 
transmission time on Cameroon Television, about 80% of the programmes are presented 
in the French language and 20% in the English language. This is so because it is 
presumed that French has a bigger audience than English. As concerns the distribution of 
airtime on the national radio, 70% is allocated for French and 30% for English.320 The 
situation is different with the provincial radio stations, as 80% of the programmes in the 
Anglophone provinces are in English and 20% in French. 321  The recent liberalization of 
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the media industry in Cameroon has seen an up shoot of many private radio and 
television stations all over the country, and competition is intense among the stations. In 
the North West province alone there are about five private radio and two television 
stations, and in the South West province there are about four private radio stations and 
one television station. In all, there are nine private radio stations and four private 
television stations in Anglophone Cameroon alone. In a recent survey carried out by 
CRETES, an NGO based in Yaoundé, the private stations have a larger audience than the 
national stations.322 Turning their backs on the national stations demonstrates that 
Anglophones have not been happy with the treatment of English programmes by the 
CRTV. 
 
2.4.1c Cameroon Tribune 
In the 1980s, in an attempt to manage the language differences in the official print media, 
the French Cameroon Tribune was published five times a week, while the English 
version was published once a week. The Anglophones felt cheated, because they could 
read the official tribune only once a week. The English language version was eventually 
upgraded to a bi-weekly as a concession to the English-speaking population. To bring 
about a full bilingual official newspaper, Cameroon Tribune was transformed into a 
bilingual daily newspaper. It is structured into five sections namely: politics, social, 
economy, culture and sports, with editorial assigned to each column. Government policy 
says that publication in the Cameroon Tribune should be 50% French and 50% 
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English.323 But the difference in the size of the population between Francophones and 
Anglophones is reflected in the Cameroon Tribune. In terms of staff strength, more 
Francophones are employed than Anglophones. As a result, this makes it difficult to have 
proportional reporting. Besides, not much is published in the Cameroon Tribune about 
Anglophones; for instance, in a week less than twenty stories are published in English.324 
Anglophone journalists working in Anglophone provinces are unhappy because they are 
not getting any job satisfaction as journalists. Most of them complain that their stories are 
not being published because the central editorial desk says their stories are not timely or 
they are stale.325 For instance, Cameroon Tribune No 83491 of Monday 16 June 2005 
published three stories in English, and one was a translation from French to English. The 
English stories put together cannot cover a page in the newspaper. This accounts for the 
reason why most Anglophones do not read the Cameroon Tribune. 
 
2.5 Government Appointments 
Some Anglophones argue that the strength of President Paul Biya’s regime is that it has 
made Anglophones to cling more tenaciously to their identity as Anglophones. According 
to Bate Bissong an Anglophone writer, the CPDM government has helped Anglophones 
to realise that they have no future in Cameroon.326 As such, Anglophones have gone 
through the process of education, knowing that they are being treated as second class 
citizens. The government’s doctrine of national unity and integration has not been 
implemented, if one looks at the political appointments in terms of quality and quantity. 
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The appointment of ministers, director generals, and provincial administrators such as 
Governors, Prefects and Sub-prefects, has always been to the disadvantage of the 
Anglophones. An Anglophone has never been appointed to head a strategic ministry such 
as Territorial Administration, Defence, External Relations, Education, Economy and 
Finance, or to the post of Secretary General at the presidency.327 
 
Similarly, Anglophones have never been appointed to head lucrative corporations like the 
National Oil Refinery (SONARA), the National Hydrocarbons Corporation (NHC) or the 
Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation (CRTV). In the diplomatic service, 
Anglophones are rarely appointed as ambassadors or high commissioners, even to 
English-speaking countries like Nigeria, Great Britain or United States of America.328  In 
government appointments Anglophones are seen only as possible assistants to the 
Francophones. For instance, out of 32 ministers in Cameroon, only 2 are Anglophones; 
there are 2 secretaries general in 32 ministries; there are 4 general managers of 50 public 
corporations; there are 2 army generals out of 25; there are 3 ambassadors out of 31; 6 
senior divisional officers out of 58 and 12 divisional officers out of 268.329 From the 
above information it is evident that Anglophones are under-represented in the 
government. This accounts for the marginalization of Anglophones. But some 
Anglophone elites do not believe in political appointment as a measuring rod for 
Anglophone marginalization. To them, the lack of economic development and good road 
infrastructure in the Anglophone sector is more concrete evidence to marginalization. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Today, Anglophone nationalist movements are fighting for autonomy of the Anglophone 
provinces because of a failed integration process. Southern Cameroons chose of its own 
volition, to join East Cameroon in a union as equal partners. This implied that 
Anglophones and Francophones would be treated equally in the new state. However, the 
national government’s policy of national integration and approach to managing 
differences between Anglophones and Francophones still presents a great challenge to the 
Cameroon state. This chapter has shown that the government succeeded in harmonizing 
the currency by replacing the pound in Southern Cameroons with the CFA and switching 
traffic from right to left in Anglophone Cameroon. But it failed to harmonize the 
educational system as the Anglophones resisted such attempts. The government has also 
failed in its policy of bilingualism because of its penchant for French. 
 
Furthermore, in forging ahead with integration, the bilingual nature of the country poses a 
major threat to the existence of the unitary state. According to the Cameroon 
Constitution, the two official languages (English and French) have equal status, but 
Francophone policymakers have, over the years, undermined the English language and 
given the French language a dominant position. In spite of government efforts at 
promoting bilingualism, many Francophones still behave as though English is not an 
official language. The head of state himself has failed to demonstrate exemplary 
bilingualism because, in twenty five years of his rule, he has failed to address the nation 
even once in the English language. One can rightly argue that bilingualism in Cameroon 
is a window dressing policy. Most official documents concerning matters of state are 
issued only in French, leaving English speakers who do not master the French language 
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to grapple with language barriers. In Yaoundé, some government officials treat people 
with scorn when they express themselves in English, and any report to a minister in 
Yaoundé which is not written in French will not be attended to.330 So Anglophones are 
forced to write in French if they want a minister to attend to them. All presidential 
decrees appear only in French; little wonder that breaking news on CRTV is presented in 
French newscast. Thus, it appears some Anglophone Cameroonians are clamouring today 
for secession because of a failed integration. 
 
Looking at the reunification of the two Cameroons from independence to the time when 
the federation was dismantled, one realizes that, in spite of the continuous growth in the 
influence of French Cameroonians in most spheres in the new state, Anglophone 
Cameroonians have succeeded in retaining a separate identity which has not been 
assimilated. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOPHONE NATIONALISM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Literature on Cameroon before the First World War portrays that political development 
among Cameroonians was almost non-existent. The reason is that under the stern rule of 
the Germans since 1884, Cameroonians were denied the opportunity to develop a firm 
sense of national identity because of the repressive policies applied by the Germans. In 
spite of the harsh German rule in Kamerun, they maintained a colonial administration in 
the Kamerun that compared favourably with any other in Africa at the time.331 When the 
Germans were defeated in World War I and, following their departure from Kamerun 
after it fell to the allies on 26 September 1914, Kamerun was partitioned between France 
and Britain. France obtained four-fifths of the total area and Britain obtained two 
disconnected pieces bordering on Nigeria. The departure of the Germans meant that the 
occupying forces were to provide the territory with a completely new administration to 
replace Germans.332  
 
The partitioning of the territory into English and French spheres had some significant 
consequences for future political developments and a lasting effect on the construction of 
Anglophone and Francophone identities. The British and the French administrations 
pursued different policies of investment. French Cameroon for example, received 
substantial funds from France, resulting in a higher level of socio-economic development 
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of the area.333 The Southern Cameroons under Britain, in contrast, were neglected and 
continued to be backward compared to their French counterpart. 
 
The first section of this chapter traces the development of Anglophone political 
movements in order to demonstrate that a lively political organization had come into 
being by 1945, largely due to British colonial policies in the territory.  The second part 
looks at nationalism after independence and after political liberalization. The rest of the 
chapter explores the impetus and setbacks to the Anglophone movement from the early 
1990 to present. It will be argued that a certain dynamic of action and reaction took place 
as the state pursued more discriminatory and repressive policies against the Anglophones 
and that the direction of the later Anglophone movements was critically conditioned by 
the policies of the state. However, the sudden intensification of the Anglophone 
movement in the early 1990s cannot be explained as being simply a response to state 
policies. 
 
To better understand the events of the political upheavals in Cameroon in the 1990s, one 
must take into account global events happening at the time. For instance, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in November 1989 symbolised the collapse of one-party communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe.334 The collapse of communism had a serious repercussion in East-
Central Europe, Africa and Latin America. As the demand for democracy swept across 
Africa in the early 1990s, drastic changes affected states in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Frustrated by declining economies and the failure of incumbent governments in solving 
basic socio-economic and political problems, people from different social strata called for 
an end to authoritarian rule.335 Cameroon was no exception as President Paul Biya was 
forced to yield to multiparty democracy. Ottaway argues that “if the strongest, best 
organized totalitarian systems could collapse completely, certainly Africa’s petty tyrants, 
presiding over weak states and fragile institutions had little hope for survival”.336 It is 
against this background that President Paul Biya of Cameroon introduced a limited 
degree of political liberalization. This saw the creation of many Anglophone pressure 
groups that began to voice the grievances of the Anglophones. 
 
3.2 Background: Southern Cameroons Nationalism under Colonialism 
When the British took over their own portion of Cameroon,337 it was attached to Nigeria 
in an administrative union. The British concentrated their interests more in Nigeria than 
on Southern Cameroons. This led to the gross neglect of the British Cameroons.338 The 
pace of social advancement in British Cameroons was slow. In the field of education, the 
British established few primary and Native Authority schools, which fell short of meeting 
the educational demand of the territory. Between 1917 and 1922 the number of 
government schools in the British Cameroons ranged between 5 and 10 and the number 
of teachers ranged between 11 and 15.339 As a result few British Cameroonians were 
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educated during the British colonial period. Below is the statistics of government schools 
and teachers in Southern Cameroons between 1917 and 1922. 
 
Educational Statistics in Southern Cameroons 
Year No. of Government Schools in 
Southern Cameroons 
Average 
Attendance 
No. of 
Teachers 
1917 6 279 11 
1918 5 598 23 
1919 10 614 19 
1920 10 657 18 
1921 7 465 18 
1922 7 363 25 
Table 1, Source: NAB, report to the League of Nations, 1926 
 
Given the size of the territory, the number of schools was insufficient and the people of 
Southern Cameroons expected the British to do more in terms of creating more schools 
and training more teachers to accommodate the growing population willing to study. 
Between 1916 and 1926 the number of teachers ranged from 7 to 21 and most of these 
were pupil teachers. For instance, the whole of Mamfe Division with a population of 
63,241 by 1926 had only one Native Authority School at Boja, with no good 
infrastructure and two inexperienced teaching staff. There was only one government 
school in Bamenda covering the entire region.340 The result of the limited number of 
schools was the high illiteracy rate amongst British Southern Cameroonians compared to 
French Cameroon. 
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Besides education, health was another sector that suffered British neglect in Southern 
Cameroons. In 1927, the entire region of Southern Cameroons had only four medical 
officers, stationed in Kumba, Mamfe, Victoria and Bamenda.341 The government native 
hospital was quite inadequate to handle the vast number of patients who went there for 
treatment. For instance, the medical officer for Victoria, Dr Sharp was also in charge of 
the Buea hospital, and by the end of 1927, he had single-handedly treated 958 patients 
and 8,761 out-patients.342 The ratio of doctors to patients was very high and this led to 
high mortality rates in the mid 1920s. In the Bamenda Division there was only one 
medical officer, one dispensary and four nurses. Some areas like the entire Metta-
Menemo and Bafut had neither a health centre, maternity facility nor a hospital, resulting 
in a high rate of infant mortality. According to the Metta-Menemo report of 1939, sixty 
percent of the total number of children born in 1924 died. Thirty two percent died at birth 
and 28% at early childhood.343  The table below indicates the doctor patient ratio in the 
year 1938 and 1939.344 
Health Statistics in Southern Cameroons 1939 
Area Medical 
Centre 
Medical 
Officers 
Number of 
Treated 
Patients 
   1938 1939 
Victoria 2 1 23,350 18,492 
Kumba 6 1 95,342 1,136,714 
Mamfe 2 1 8,754 10,605 
Bamenda 3 1 28,942 33,100 
Table 2, Source: NAB Departmental Annual Reports and notes (1939) 
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The statistics indicate clearly the extent to which the British administration neglected the 
health sector in Southern Cameroons. The health situation of the plantation workers was 
horrible and many of them died as a result of dysentery, pneumonia, typhoid and malaria, 
but the British administration did nothing to ameliorate the situation. This worsening 
health situation led the people to clamour for the social advancement of their territory. 
 
Furthermore, the precarious economic situation of the Southern Cameroons before 1939 
affected the living standards of the people. The economy of the region declined at an 
alarming rate, and Southern Cameroonians often complained that the British were 
generally not willing to invest significantly in the mandate.345 It was only in 1927 that an 
agricultural officer was sent to the territory to foster cocoa production in Kumba, to fuel 
British industries. The refusal by the British to initiate an industrialization program and 
their attachment only to agricultural development led many to accuse them of seeking to 
reduce Southern Cameroons to a permanent plantation colony, supplying the British 
industries with raw materials.346 Today, the majority of the people in the territory still 
depend on those plantations and rely heavily on agriculture for their livelihood. 
 
Furthermore, between 1916 and 1939, the British made very little effort to build roads.347 
The road system in Southern Cameroons was deplorable. There were a few graded roads, 
often disconnected by streams with bad bridges. Travelling in Southern Cameroons was a 
nightmare, as most of the distance was covered on foot. Travelling from Buea to 
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Bamenda usually took 14 days, and 10 days from Buea to Mamfe. The economic legacy 
of the British rule in the inter-war years was poverty and underdevelopment. The result 
was disillusionment on the part of Southern Cameroons, making the comparison with 
French Cameroons, that was well-developed by the French colonizers. 
 
The political situation of Southern Cameroons before 1939 was not different from the 
British neglect of the educational and economic policies in the territory. According to the 
Council of the League of Nations report 1937/5, British administrative policies reflected 
a lack of interest in Southern Cameroons. Since the territory was granted to Britain as a 
League of Nations Mandate, Southern Cameroons was administered as an appendage of 
Nigeria.348 The region, therefore, became a colony within Nigeria, governed by less 
experienced British officers. Consequently, Nigerian laws and customs were enforced in 
the territory without any regard for local or indigenous practice.349  
 
The Nigerian Legislative Council (LEGCO), which was established in 1922 by the 
British Order in Council, came into operation in 1923. There were no representatives 
from Southern Cameroons in the Council because membership qualification was based 
on the fact that one needed a yearly income of 100 pounds sterling. Southern 
Cameroonians were poor and none met the financial qualification for membership. Thus, 
Southern Cameroons before 1939 was not represented in the LEGCO.350  Consequently, 
foreigners took decisions about the territory, and it had no budgetary autonomy. Before 
1939, Southern Cameroons seemed trapped in a political and constitutional quagmire, 
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and the few educated elites mobilized to intervene in the situation by educating the 
masses about their situation. 
 
The level of political consciousness in Southern Cameroons was very low, largely 
because of the inadequate education provided by the British administration. Political 
activities remained restricted to a small group of literate individuals, and necessitated the 
formation of associations and groups by Southern Cameroonians to act as voices for the 
people. Pressure groups were formed to demand political, social and economic 
emancipation of the territory 
   
There was some agitation against British colonial policies in Southern Cameroons and in 
the light of these agitations;351 the Cameroon Youth League (CYL) was formed in Lagos 
on 27 March 1940 with its motto “Unity and Co-operation”.352 Its founders were P.M. 
Kale and E.M.L. Endeley. It was modelled after the Nigerian Youth Movement. CYL 
was organized for the express purpose of promoting the interests of Southern 
Cameroonian solidarity. It was seen by many as the genesis of Southern Cameroons’ 
politics.353   
 
The aim of the CYL was to uplift the territory politically, socially, economically and 
educationally. The CYL had the task of developing national consciousness in Southern 
Cameroons. To achieve this, its leaders used the political and socio-economic grievances 
of the people as crucial factors in awakening political awareness and national 
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consciousness. Through the maximum use of the print medium,354 the founders of the 
CYL were politically nurtured in Nigeria and so derived the idea of using printed 
materials from Nnamdi Azikiwe.355 The CYL monthly newsletter generated some 
nationalist activity in Southern Cameroons. The newsletter helped to ignite the flame of 
nationalism and political consciousness of the need for a recognized status for the 
territory. The newsletter exposed the socio-economic and political neglect of Southern 
Cameroons by the British. They were also critical of indirect rule and the Native 
Authority system in which the British used non-literate native rulers in administration 
instead of the educated elites.356 
 
In order to make its activities more effective and to involve the people, branches of the 
league were set up in key centres of both Southern Cameroons and Nigeria. Each of these 
branches had an executive to run its affairs. The executive was to report all its activities 
to the main body in Lagos. Members contributed money to enable the League to cope 
with its work. The branches helped to create a spirit of national unity and instil a sense of 
national consciousness in the hitherto politically dormant region.357 Between 1940 and 
1942, the CYL leaders in Lagos met with the British colonial administrators to request a 
Cameroonian representation in the Legislative Council in Lagos or a separate Legislative 
Council for Southern Cameroons. Britain’s refusal only fanned more agitation in the 
League. In 1942, as a result of the continuous agitation from Southern Cameroons, the 
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colonial administration reluctantly allowed Southern Cameroons to have one seat in the 
Legislative Council.358 
 
In 1944, Endeley and Kalle, together with L.M. Namme and Namaso N. Mbile took an 
active part in the formation of Azikiwe’s National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons 
(NCNC).359 Out of this participation grew the first Southern Cameroonian interest in 
developing political organizations with an orientation peculiar to Southern Cameroons. 
The NCNC thus became an organized political group for agitations against the British 
colonial administration. Within the NCNC political framework, Southern Cameroons 
leadership played a significant role in pointing out specific issues affecting their Trust 
Territory. 
 
Although the CYL had fought for a separate region and a budgetary autonomy for 
Southern Cameroons, it was never granted in the Richard’s Constitution which had 
replaced the Clifford Constitution in 1946. The CYL leaders joined Azikiwe’s political 
party NCNC, in a visit to London in 1947, aimed at criticizing the Richard’s 
Constitution.360 As a result of their criticism, the constitution was amended to provide for 
thirteen elected members of the Eastern Regional House, two of whom were to come 
from Southern Cameroons. Thus, through their agitation within the NCNC party, 
Southern Cameroons succeeded in increasing their representation from one to two seats. 
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This new representation was elective and it gave the opportunity for Southern 
Cameroonians to vote for the first time.361 
 
In 1948 Sir John Macpherson took over from Sir Arthur Richardson as governor of 
Nigeria. He immediately introduced some reforms which increased political activities in 
Nigeria and Southern Cameroons. Macpherson’s Constitution gave some hope to 
Southern Cameroonian nationalist by increasing its representation in the Eastern Regional 
House.362 The constitution made provisions for thirteen members from Southern 
Cameroons. Although the Macpherson Constitution granted thirteen seats to Southern 
Cameroons, it had four major weaknesses: indirect rule was still in existence; traditional 
rulers were still very powerful; the constitution granted neither regional nor budgetary 
autonomy to Southern Cameroons; and the region was still ruled as an integral part of 
Nigeria.363 
 
3.2.1 The Emergence of Party politics in Southern Cameroons 
In 1949 Endeley, Mbile and Kale founded the Cameroon National Federation (CNF) in 
Kumba, from Improvement Unions Associations (IUA) existing in large urban towns like 
Victoria, Kumba and Bamenda. Among its objectives were: 
to assert the separate identity of Southern Cameroonians, unification in 
principle, removal of all frontier restrictions and regulations, teaching of 
English and French in schools in both Cameroons, and the constitution of 
an assembly which will enable the unity of all sections of the Trust 
Territory.364 
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This was the first national organization which made an open appeal for the wider national 
issue of unification of North and Southern Cameroons. In this way the CNF gave new 
dimension to Cameroonian political agitation by making unification and reunification 
their central platform.365  
 
In 1949, just six months after CNF was formed, a United Nations Visiting Mission 
arrived in Cameroon. The UN Trusteeship Council was organized in such a way that 
Visiting Missions were sent to the territory (Trust Territory) to get first-hand and on the 
spot information about the Trusteeship Territories.366 The CNF immediately made several 
petitions to the visiting Mission, among which were: 
… a statement condemning the administration of Southern Cameroons as 
an appendage of Nigeria which was not in the interest of Southern 
Cameroons. It also demanded that the two Cameroons, French and English 
be united as they were before 1914 and that the Southern and Northern 
British Cameroons be united as a distinct region of Nigeria under its own 
High Commissioner in Buea responsible to the Governor in Lagos. 
Alternative demands called for full independence from Nigeria, or direct 
United Nations Control of British Cameroons. They also made demands 
for the building of secondary schools and the expansion of trade and 
vocational schools in the Trust Territory.367  
 
From the petitions made by CNF, it was clear that they did not have a clear program for 
Southern Cameroons. At one point they wanted to unite with French Cameroon, and at 
the same time they wanted full independence from Nigeria or United Nations control 
over British Cameroons. The response from the Visiting Mission reflected this confused 
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situation as the mission emphasized the need for a careful examination before considering 
any measures of socio-economic and political autonomy for the Trust Territory.368 
 
This confused position of the CNF leadership led to a split in the organization in 1951. 
Endeley’s anti-reunification sentiment alienated pro-reunification members like R.J.K 
Dibonge, J.N. Foncha and N.N. Mbile, who subsequently formed the Kamerun United 
National Congress (KUNC). Besides its main objective of reunification, KUNC also 
advocated the abolition of customs barriers between the two Cameroons and an 
independent United Cameroon.369 The KUNC became a strong rival group to the CNF.370 
The CNF began to decline because of the wider appeal of the KUNC with its motto of 
“Towards self-government or independence for a united Cameroon” for the Southern 
Cameroons. The year 1951 was significant in the Southern Cameroons nationalist 
struggle because main political issues such as reunification or joining Nigeria were first 
brought to light through the objectives of the CNF and KUNC. The year 1952 saw the 
second UN Visiting Mission and it was during this mission that the sharp political 
differences between the CNF and KUNC came out clearly. While KUNC asked for an 
independent, reunified greater Cameroon, the CNF asked for regional autonomy for 
Southern Cameroons within the Federation of Nigeria.371 In spite of the confused 
situation in Southern Cameroons nationalism, reunification would later prove to be the 
most decisive element in the territory. 
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3.2.2 Development of Southern Cameroons Politics, 1950 - 1960 
One can argue that enough ground had been prepared for the formation and development 
of political parties in the Trust Territory to push ahead for the independence of Southern 
Cameroons. A number of political parties were formed and the first of these parties was 
the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) which was an amalgamation of KUNC and CNF 
with Endeley as its president.372 Its motto was “Towards self-government or 
independence for a united Cameroon”, with the objectives of pressing for early 
reunification of the two Cameroons and to see the revision and amendments of the 
Trusteeship Agreement.373 The KNC enjoyed a lot of support all over the Trust Territory 
until, the leadership under Endeley wanted to incorporate some of the ideas of the defunct 
CNF into the party’s program. This led to some contradictions and controversies over the 
party’s strategy. In 1953, N.N. Mbile created the Kamerun Peoples Party (KPP) and 
invited P.M. Kale to head the party. According to Kale, he had broken away from the 
KNC because he was a lover of parliamentary democracy, and he saw the existence of 
KNC in Southern Cameroons as incompatible with democratic principles.374 The main 
aim of the KPP was regional autonomy for Southern Cameroons and secession from 
Nigeria.375 The KPP was opposed to the reunification stand of the KNC.  
 
John Ngu Foncha, a member of KNC, found it difficult to cope with Endeley’s policies, 
particularly that on the future of Southern Cameroons. He decided to break away and 
formed his own party, the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1955.376  The 
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objective of the KNDP was reunification of the two Cameroons.377  In 1955 the question 
of unification emerged as the main nationalist goal in the Southern Cameroons for two 
reasons. First was the formation of the KNDP with a program of complete secession from 
Nigeria and unification with French Cameroon. Second was the appearance of members 
of Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) in Southern Cameroons, following the 
party’s abortive revolt in French Cameroon.378 Because the UPC had the same political 
ideologies as the KNDP, its presence in Southern Cameroons was a boost to the 
KNDP.379  
 
Although the KNDP and UPC had similar political ideologies, they disagreed strongly on 
strategies for achieving reunification and independence for Cameroon. UPC wanted 
immediate reunification and independence, while the KNDP wanted a gradual approach 
in order to give enough time for the two Cameroons to study and adopt a concrete plan 
for such a landmark political shift.380  In 1957, the UPC was banned in Southern 
Cameroons by Endeley’s government and its leaders were deported. Immediately after 
the disappearance of UPC, Ndeh Ntumazah, a Southern Cameroonian and a former high 
ranking member of the banned UPC formed a new party called One Kamerun (OK).381 
The aim of OK was to continue the activities of the UPC, and Endeley’s government 
banned it not long after its formation. 
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Elections conducted in March 1957 for the thirteen elective seats in the Southern 
Cameroons House of Assembly showed that KNC had lost much of its support to the 
KNDP. The elections resulted in a narrow loss for Foncha (KNDP 5 seats, KNC 6 seats 
and KPP 2 seats). In order to put a strong force against the KNDP, the KNC and KPP 
decided to merge and form a new party called the Cameroon People’s National Party 
(CPNC) in 1957.  In January 1959, the KNDP won fourteen seats in the enlarged House 
of Assembly, while the CPNC took twelve. The stage was now set for the 1959 dialogue, 
conducted both at home and in the UN, to decide the ultimate fate of the entire British 
Trust Territory.382 
 
After the January 1959 elections which brought the KNDP to power, the CPNC and 
KNDP appeared before the UN to present their case about the future of the Trust 
Territory. Prime Minister Foncha, on the platform of the ruling KNDP, called for the 
separation of the territory from the Federation of Nigeria before its independence. He also 
requested a short “post-plebiscite period during which Southern Cameroons would work 
towards “complete independence,” and during which the possibility of reunification, in 
the form of federation would be explored by the governments concerned”.383 The CPNC 
under Endeley made a request that Southern Cameroons should continue association with 
Nigeria as a fully autonomous region of the Nigerian federation.384 Due to failure by both 
leaders to reach a consensus, the UN General Assembly decided that a separate plebiscite 
should be held in each part of the British Cameroons. 
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The UN issued a final communiqué stating that the plebiscite in Northern and Southern 
Cameroons was to be held on 11 February 1961. The questions to be put at the Plebiscite 
were: (a) “Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation 
of Nigeria?” (b) “Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent 
Republic of Cameroon?”385 Having laid the groundwork for the election, polling stations 
were created, registration of voters was carried out and plebiscite officials were 
appointed. Foncha and his party began to campaign vigorously against joining Nigeria by 
playing on local fears of Ibo domination, because the Ibos had come to pose an economic 
threat to indigenous Southern Cameroonians. Endeley on his part undertook to convince 
the electorate by promising the people good administration and development. The CPNC 
also spoke about terrorism in French Cameroon, to scare voters. The advocates of 
unification won in the South and lost in the North.386 On the basis of the plebiscite 
results, delegates from Southern Cameroons finally met in Foumban in July 1961 to 
discuss a framework for the Federal Republic of Cameroon under the so-called Foumban 
Constitution. 
 
3.3 Southern Cameroons Nationalism before Political Liberalization  
The Trusteeship over the British Southern Cameroons officially ended on 30 September 
1961, when the Union Jack was lowered throughout the territory and the British 
Commissioner, J.O. Field, left the territory.387 On 1 October 1961, the two Cameroons 
were united, giving birth to the Federal Republic of Cameroon under a two-state system 
made up of West Cameroon (the former Southern Cameroons) and East Cameroon (the 
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former Republic of Cameroon that had acquired independence from France). Some 
federal structures were put in place, the executive, the administrative and the security 
forces went immediately into operation. By July 1962, the federal legislature had come 
into being and Ahmadu Ahidjo became President, and Foncha the Vice-president of the 
Federation.388 The composition of the government, with John Ngu Foncha sitting in the 
largely ceremonial and powerless position of Vice-president, indicated that a 
marginalization of the Anglophones had begun.  
 
Between 1962 and early 1966, President Ahmadu Ahidjo lobbied for a one-party system. 
Impatient with events in West Cameroon, Ahidjo, on 11 June 1966, invited the prime 
ministers of the two federated states and the leaders of the three political parties in West 
Cameroon to a meeting in Yaounde. At the meeting he decried the continuance of 
multiparty politics in a young nation like Cameroon. He revealed that the Cameroon 
nation and its people could be better served and its limited human resources more 
effectively utilized, if the leaders agreed to work under the banner of a one-party 
system.389 During the meeting there was general agreement to dissolve all existing 
political organizations and to create a new party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU). 
The Anglophone leaders could not fight back to maintain the multiparty system in West 
Cameroon because of greed and hatred amongst themselves. 
 
The Cameroon federation survived for ten years (1962 - 1972). It was, in effect a step 
towards the establishment of a unitary system in the territory. Ahidjo’s political ambition 
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was, ultimately, to establish a unitary state. This explains why he started with the 
establishment of a strongly centralized system of government and the one-party 
system.390 The Cameroon federation was according to Ahidjo, too expensive to run. To 
him, Cameroon had to finance four assemblies namely: the federal assembly, the East and 
West Cameroons assemblies and the West Cameroon House of Chiefs. The Cameroon 
people had to finance three governments namely: the federal, East and West Cameroon 
governments. The end result was that the cost of maintaining the federal system to him 
drained the country’s coffers.391 A referendum was set for 20 May 1972, and the 
successful campaign for a “yes” vote in favour of the elimination of the federal system 
was facilitated by Francophones using their numerical strength to vote favourably for a 
unitary system.  
 
3.3.1 Action and Reaction: the Cameroon Government’s policies and 
the Pattern of Southern Cameroons Nationalism 
It appears that the Francophone-dominated government’s policies stimulated the rise of 
Southern Cameroons nationalism. The unconstitutional referendum of 20 May 1972 had 
as it sole aim the scrapping of the federation established in 1961. Considering that the 
federal nature of the Cameroonian state was the only viable assurance for the 
preservation of the identity of English speaking Cameroonians, one would have imagined 
that Anglophone political elites would have opposed this blatant violation of the 
constitution, but there was no resistance to the referendum.392 This can only be 
understood in the light of the failure of most Southern Cameroons politicians to put the 
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interest of Southern Cameroons above their narrow-minded personal interest. This 
paradox still exists today amongst Anglophone elites struggling for the liberation of 
Southern Cameroons. 
 
The assimilationist policies of the Francophone majority in Cameroon were both reactive 
and provocative. Twelve years after the dismantling of the federation, President Paul 
Biya, who had succeeded Ahidjo as president of the United Republic of Cameroon in 
February 1982, unilaterally and unconstitutionally decreed a change in the country’s 
name from “The United Republic of Cameroon” to “The Republic of Cameroon,” the 
name the French East Cameroon had adopted at independence from France in January 
1960.393 The Anglophones now argued that by changing the name, French Cameroon had 
chosen to secede from the union by going back to the name it had at independence. As 
such, Francophones lacked the constitutional base from which to continue ruling the 
former Southern Cameroons. The new name appeared to deny that the Cameroonian state 
was composed of two distinct entities. The Anglophone political elite did not take the 
name change passively, as it was seen as an attempt by the Francophone-led government 
to assimilate Anglophones. 
 
In 1985, a prominent Anglophone lawyer and activist Fon Gorji Dinka published “The 
New Social Order” in which he demanded the immediate proclamation of an independent 
Anglophone state, which he called the Republic of Ambazonia:394 
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… by reviving the old Republic of Cameroon, which the Foumban accord 
had submerged in order to create a Federation with Southern Cameroon-
on-Ambas, the Republic of Cameroon had irretrievably seceded from the 
union. So unless a new accord is included so as to create a basis for a 
Union between the two states, any claim, by the Republic of Cameroon to 
govern Southern Cameroons on-Ambas, would simply mean annexation 
pure and simple.395 
 
 
Many Anglophone political elites in Cameroon bought his idea for an independent 
Anglophone state, and secessionist demands re-emerged in Anglophone Cameroon in the 
mid-1980s. The Anglophone secessionist demand was strongly opposed by the 
Cameroonian government. Fon Gorji Dinka was arrested and imprisoned without trial 
until January 1986, earning him the status of a martyr for the Anglophone cause.396 
 
Reacting to the state of affairs in the mid 1980s, a number of memoranda were submitted 
to the Cameroon government by Anglophone political elites expressing Anglophone 
resentment about their region’s loss of autonomy. These memoranda were illustrated with 
a multitude of examples of the recolonisation of their region by the Francophone- 
dominated state: 
 
Once more, we respectfully seize this opportunity to draw your attention 
to our memorandum … concerning the humiliating and revolting colonial 
status that is gradually but systematically being imposed on the English 
speaking Cameroonians by the administration …397 
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The aim of the memoranda addressed to the Head of State and the international 
community was to draw attention to the injustices inflicted upon the minority English 
speaking Cameroonians by the ruling CPDM government. In the period 1985 to 1990, 
however, the number of Anglophone petitions and memoranda addressed to the 
government declined due to the fact that the Biya government stepped up repression 
because of the deteriorating economic and political situation in the country.398 
 
Shortly after reunification on 1 October 1961, many attempts were made to integrate the 
two basically different systems of education that the unified Cameroon inherited at 
independence. All these attempts failed because the French and English speaking 
Cameroonian believed that their various systems of education were the best. Integration 
to the French speaking Cameroonian was synonymous with the assimilation of the 
English speaking Cameroonian. Against this background, the Anglo-Saxon educational 
system inherited at independence was regarded as the last frontier by Anglophones.399 
Replacing it with the Francophone system inherited from France would have meant the 
complete assimilation of English speaking Cameroonians. For example, in 1983, a first 
attempt was made to introduce a new group certificate Cameroon GCE scheme for 
Anglophone schools nationwide by a National Education ministerial circular. The reasons 
according to the minister, were to make the GCE look a little more like the Baccalaureate 
(BACC),400 and to help Anglophones gain admission into the higher institutions of 
learning in Cameroon. Many English speaking Cameroonians became suspicious of the 
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government’s plan to modify the GCE. There was a general outcry and massive protest 
by Anglophone Cameroonians in all sectors of the society. 
 
The fight against the assimilation of the GCE became the peoples’ fight. Parents, 
teachers, students, churches, cultural, and political associations and the totality of the 
English private press all joined the fight, each in their own way and to the best of their 
ability.401 It was the fight for the survival of the English speaking minority in Cameroon’s 
educational system. Initially, the government thought it could outsmart the people and 
used all manner of tricks to break the concerted front. The government finally yielded to 
the Anglophones’ demand, the circular was dropped and the two systems of education 
maintained. It is clear from this point that a people united behind a just cause are 
unbeatable. The defence against the assimilation of the GCE was a lasting, emotionally 
compelling cause that every nationally conscious Anglophone ardently supported.402   
 
3.4 Southern Cameroons Nationalism after Political Liberalization in 
the 1990s. 
The wind of change that blew across Africa in the early 1990s also affected Cameroon.   
In 1990 President Paul Biya, under considerable internal and external pressure, 
introduced a limited degree of political liberalization. He announced the advent of 
multipartyism, as well as a certain degree of liberalization of mass communication and 
freedom of association, including the holding of public meetings and demonstrations.403 
As a result, several political parties, pressure groups and private newspapers were 
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established in Cameroon. Some began to express and represent Anglophone interests. 
This gave some impetus to the Anglophones to begin voicing their long-standing 
grievances by openly criticizing the Francophone domination of Anglophones.  
 
The Social Democratic Front (SDF), the first opposition political party, was launched in 
Anglophone Cameroon, during the growing economic and political crisis. It soon became 
the leading opposition party in Anglophone Cameroon and nationwide. “The leaders of 
the SDF helped to turn the Anglophone region into a veritable hotbed of rebellion, 
organizing several confrontations with the regime in power”.404 The impact of this on the 
Anglophone community was the development of Anglophone consciousness and action. 
Several pressure groups were created by Anglophone elites to defend their interests, such 
as Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), The Ambazonia Movement, Cameroon 
Anglophone Movement (CAM), Southern Cameroons People Congress (SCPC), All 
Anglophone Congress (AAC), The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) and the 
Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC). All these pressure groups were fighting 
for a common cause – that of defending the interest of Anglophones in a Francophone-
dominated state.  
 
The emergence of a new generation of political elites in Anglophone Cameroon in the 
1990s, helped to challenge policies and the strategies of the Cameroon Peoples 
Democratic Movement (CPDM), the ruling party. Chief among the new personalities 
were: Ni John Fru Ndi, Chairman of the SDF; Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad, former 
Chairman of the Southern Cameroons National Council;  Simon Munzu, Fon Gorji 
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Dinka, founder of the Republic of Ambazonia, and Carlson Anyangwe, one of the 
founding fathers of the SDF. These personalities were revered in Anglophone Cameroon 
but were hated within the ruling circles of the state.405 
 
Another important political element worthy of mention is that by the 1990s, a large 
Anglophone emigrant community had formed beyond the borders of Cameroon, chiefly 
in America and Europe. The Anglophone emigrants played a big role in the development 
of nationalist politics back home. The way the Anglophone Diaspora linked with 
members back home through their letters and return visits widened the horizon of their 
fellow comrades back home to continue with the struggle. Of equal importance was the 
financial support sent home from abroad, destined for the support of nationalist political 
activities. 
 
3.4.1 Anglophone Writers as another Voice in the Liberalization of 
Anglophones 
Cameroon writers of English expression only started writing about the marginality of the 
Anglophones in the 1990s; yet they have been instrumental in raising the Anglophone 
consciousness. Many reasons have been advanced for the absence of creative writers in 
Anglophone Cameroon, amongst which are the kind of education they received under the 
British.406 Because British Cameroons was administered as a mandatory and later as a 
trust territory under the British, the British colonial administration was in no hurry to 
establish schools.  The fact that elementary and secondary schools were so few and 
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parents asked to pay fees that many could not afford led to a high rate of illiteracy. 
Consequently, those who had any type of higher education were few indeed; and it is thus 
no surprise that none of them had any motivation for creative writing. There was also a 
complete absence of publishing opportunities in Southern Cameroons mainly because the 
territory was not thickly populated as was the rest of Nigeria. Publishers or printers 
preferred to establish their businesses where opportunities abounded.407 These are some 
of the reasons for the lack of literary creativity in Southern Cameroons between the 
sixties and eighties. 
 
The absence of social justice and equal opportunities for all in Cameroon and, more 
especially for Anglophone Cameroonians, gave birth to protest writing in Anglophone 
Cameroon in the 1990s. But one can argue that in spite of the injustices perpetrated 
against Anglophones by Ahidjo, few Anglophone writers protested, while the majority 
was blinded by financial reward.408 The bitterness exhibited in later Anglophone 
Cameroon writing was consequent upon the social injustices perpetrated against 
Anglophones by President Paul Biya’s new deal.409 Several Anglophone writers have 
articulated the Anglophone problem in their writing. The Anglophone writers chosen as 
an illustration are Babila Mutia, Epie Ngome and Bate Besong because their works 
articulate the aspirations of the Anglophones. 
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Babila Mutia’s Before this Time Yesterday is the recreation of the “before”, “yesterday” 
and “today” of the Republic of Cameroon. The play takes readers back to the time of the 
struggle for independence, and then comments on the evolution and the political 
imbalances that beset the actions and motives of its characters. Nothing has changed as 
Mutia asserts through one of his characters, Abassa: 
 
What was a flag and national anthem when our people had no political and 
economic freedom? ... The kind of independence the colonialists gave us 
was one without the right to control our destiny … Nothing has changed 
Sango. Look around the country, has anything changed? It is still the same 
men, the same partnerships collaborating with the imperialists … But this 
time the exploitation has become more vicious. Yesterday and today, it’s 
still the same faces … Ours is a lost generation.410 
 
Babila Mutia points out that the problem in Cameroon, especially as it concerns 
Anglophone Cameroon, has to do with government’s intolerance and the absence of 
political will to ignite some hope in Cameroonians. It is within such a background of 
marginalisation and deprivation that Babila Mutia laments that “Ours is a lost 
generation”.411 
 
Epie Ngome’s play, What God has Put Asunder412 chronicles and incorporates the 
political and economic manoeuvres, the betrayals, deceits and exploitation of the 
Anglophones in the union as he attempts to explain the past, which continues to affect the 
present state of Cameroon. The characters in the play are Weka (symbolically 
representing West Cameroon), her husband, Garba, whom she married reluctantly 
(representing East Cameroon), Louis, her husband’s mentor and chief consultant on all 
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issues (representing France), her guardian at the orphanage, Rev. Gordon (representing 
the British trusteeship over Southern Cameroons), and the officiating priest at the 
wedding, Rev. UNOR (representing the United Nations at the Plebiscite).413 Garba’s 
neglectful but exploitative attitude towards Weka represents the attitude of the 
Francophone leadership towards Anglophones. The author attacks the domineering 
Francophone influence over the minority Anglophone population of Cameroon. This play 
has contributed to educating the Anglophones about their situation in the unitary state. 
 
According to Koning and Nyamnjoh,414 Bate Besong’s Beast of No Nation is a bitter 
indictment of the Francophone exploitation of the Anglophones who are reduced to ‘night 
soil men’ (slaves). The major problem of the night soil men in Beast of No Nation415 is 
that they want professional identification papers which their leaders do not want to issue; 
yet these leaders grow fat out of the toil of the night soil men. They steal and embezzle 
money and transfer it into coded accounts overseas. The exploited Anglophones are 
demanding their civil rights or what the author calls their ‘identification papers’. The 
author believes that the Anglophones will have their freedom or perhaps a nation of their 
own, or death.416 From this premise, Anglophone Cameroon writers come across as 
another voice in the battle for political and economic liberalization of the Anglophones 
and through their works they have been able to create some awareness amongst the 
Anglophones. 
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3.4.2 State Policies and the Development of Anglophone Nationalism in 
the 90s 
State policies between 1990 and 2000 thus contributed substantially to the development 
of the Anglophone nationalist movement that had previously been small and elitist. In 
March 1993, Augustine Kontchou Kouomegni, the then Minister of State in Charge of 
Communications and also government spokesman, informed Cameroonians that a 
national forum on constitutional reform would be held from April to June 1993.417 In 
response to this announcement, some Anglophone elites, such as Simon Munzu, Barrister 
Sam Ekontang Elad and Carlson Anyangwe – convened an All Anglophone Conference 
(AAC) from 2-3 April 1993 in Buea, the former capital for Southern Cameroons, “For the 
purpose of adopting a common Anglophone stand on constitutional reform and of 
examining several matters relating to welfare of ourselves, our posterity, our territory and 
the entire Cameroon nation.”418 
 
The AAC turned out to be a landmark in the history of Anglophone Cameroon 
nationalism. It brought together over 5,000 members of the Anglophone elite and almost 
all Anglophone associations and organizations were represented.419 After two days of 
deliberation, the conference issued the Buea Declaration which stated that:  
 
In 1961 the people of Southern Cameroons through a UN supervised 
plebiscite decided to enter into a political union with the people of The 
Republic of Cameroon whom they consider as their brother. Their 
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aspiration was to establish a two states federation of equal status. In 1972, 
all this was disregarded. Not only did the Francophone majority impose 
their will, fraudulently, on the Anglophone minority, but they also brought 
to an end the equality of status between the two founding components of 
Cameroon. The imposition of the unitary state in Southern Cameroons in 
1972 was unconstitutional and illegal. 
 
The unconstitutional and illegal imposition of the Unitary form of 
government was aimed not only at dismantling the institutions of 
Anglophone State (legislature, Government, House of Chiefs, Judiciary, 
Police, etc), but also at exploiting their economy, within the years of the 
union between the Anglophones and Francophone in Cameroon. The 
Anglophones have been disenfranchised, marginalized and treated with 
suspicion and their participation in national life has been limited to non-
essential function. 
 
Anglophones are systematically discriminated against in the admission of 
students into profession schools and other institutions of higher learning, 
notably the National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM) 
where the Anglophone section has been abolished. Anglophones have 
virtually been excluded since its inception from such institutions as the 
Ecole Nationale Superieure Polytechnique, the Institute International des 
Assurances, the School of Survey and the Business Administration School 
in Douala. 
 
That the only redress adequate to right the wrongs done to Anglophone 
Cameroon and its people since the imposition of the Unitary state is a 
return to the original form of government of the reunified Cameroon. 
 
That to this end, all Cameroonians of Anglophone heritage are committed 
to working for the restoration of a federal constitutional and a federal form 
of government, which takes cognizance of the bicultural nature of 
Cameroon.420 
 
The Buea Declaration denounced many of the injustices suffered by Anglophones in the 
hands of the Cameroon government. Following the publication of the Buea Declaration, 
Anglophones were awakened from slumber. The AAC became the main Anglophone 
organization responsible for the defence and representation of general Anglophone 
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interests. On 26 May 1993, the Anglophone Standing Committee submitted a federal 
draft constitution to the technical committee appointed by the Head of State.421 The 
government’s silence on the AAC constitutional proposal led some Anglophone 
organizations like Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) and Free West Cameroon 
Movement (FWC) to adopt a secessionist agenda. The two major Anglophone options 
emerging in the process of constitutional reform were a choice between the demands for a 
return to the federal state or outright secession from the union with the Republic of 
Cameroon.422 
 
 As a follow up, a second All Anglophone Conference was held in Bamenda from 29 
April to 1 May 1994. The conference reviewed all the futile attempts of the Anglophone 
Standing Committee to enter into negotiations with the government about a return to the 
federal state. The Bamenda Proclamation insisted that the Anglophone Council should 
first “seek and secure constitutional talks between Anglophone and Francophone 
Cameroon on the basis of the federal draft constitution”.423 However, should the 
government persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful constitutional talks within a 
reasonable time, the Anglophone Council should “proclaim the revival of the 
independence and sovereignty of the Anglophone territory and take all measures 
necessary to secure, defend and preserve the independence”.424 Therefore, the adoption of 
the name Southern Cameroons National Council showed that the aim of the struggle had 
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always been and remained “to restore the autonomy of the Southern Cameroons territory 
and to put an end to their annexation by French Cameroon.”425  
 
3.5 The SCNC and the Struggle for Autonomy 
"Anglophone" identity is rooted in the shared experience of the British colonial 
administration. This is best expressed in the creation of the Southern Cameroons National 
Council (SCNC) in 1994. By appealing to the experience of British colonialism, 
Anglophone political activists have tried to construct a common identity which articulates 
their distinct colonial past. Their political agenda is also clear from the outset - regional 
separation. In this sense, the SCNC came to be the first organization with a mass 
following, focusing on the issue of injustices against Anglophones. By advocating 
political separation, it only adds a threatening overtone to current concerns about the 
future survival of Cameroon as a nation. 
 
In this light, the SCNC has created structures in most parts of Anglophone Cameroon and 
has succeeded in transforming Anglophone organizations from elitist to mass 
movements, by raising the consciousness of the Anglophone people about their region’s 
subordinate position within the Francophone-dominated unitary state, and by mobilizing 
them for action in its pursuit of secession.426 As part of its sensitization campaign, the 
SCNC organizes frequent meetings throughout the Anglophone territory to make the 
population aware of the activities of SCNC’s goals, programmes and strategies.  
 
                                                 
425
 Ibid. 
426
 Ibid, p. 99. 
  162  
In 1997, there was a spate of terrorist attacks in six towns in the North West Province of 
Cameroon. In Jakiri Kumbo,427 unidentified gunmen shot and killed a gendarme428 officer 
on duty. A similar attack in Kumbo resulted in the burning down of the residence of the 
District Officer. In Bamenda, the Gendarmerie Brigade commander was shot dead by 
unknown gunmen. Meanwhile, similar raids were carried out in Bafut, Mbengwi and 
Oku.429 In reaction to this unexplained spate of violence, the authorities slammed a dusk- 
to-dawn curfew on the whole province. The rural population was subjected to all sorts of 
inhumane treatment at the hands of soldiers. Men were arrested, tortured and thrown in 
jail, some were even shot, and for weeks the people were traumatized. While government 
struggled to assemble evidence that would incriminate the SCNC, a considerable number 
of SCNC activists were arrested and imprisoned in Yaoundé. Some died while in 
detention and others were not brought to trial until 1999, when they were charged with 
criminal offences rather than treated as political prisoners.430 
 
The SCNC chairman, Henry Fossung, who had gone into hiding after the terrorist attacks 
in the North West Province, publicly denied any SCNC involvement, but his denial came 
after hundreds of SCNC members had been arrested. His lack of commitment to the 
struggle cast a shadow of doubt on his leadership.431 It was under these circumstances 
that Justice Frederick Alobwede, who was then a member of the High Command Council 
of the SCNC, took over the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) station in Buea on 
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30 December 1999, proclaiming the restoration of the independence of the Federal 
Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC).432 Ebong was arrested and detained in 
Yaoundé. The SCNC rallied behind him and he was nominated chairman of the SCNC 
and first head of state of the FRSC. Having proclaimed the statehood of the FRSC, a 
constituent assembly met in Bamenda in May 2000 and adopted resolutions on the type 
of government for Southern Cameroons. They settled on a presidential and federal system 
of government, a coat of arms, a flag, a motto, anthem and the name of the nation. 
 
The flag has nine stripes, (white and blue) with a thirteen-star circle and a dove carrying a 
star in its bill. The white stripes stand for transparency, the blue represents fertility and 
agriculture, which is the backbone of the economy. The thirteen stars represent the 
thirteen counties of Southern Cameroons, or what the present government calls divisions. 
The dove stands for freedom because it is flying freely, and the star that the dove carries 
in its bill represents the possible creation of another county. 
 
The coat of arms has two birds with two spears tied in the middle. One of the birds is an 
eagle and the other is called Bonaventura turanka. The eagle is a unique bird and found 
in the Forest Zone of Southern Cameroons. The Bonaventura turanka is found in the 
Grass- fields Zone of Southern Cameroons. It is a unique bird because it produces the 
‘red feather’ which is a symbol of authority. The two spears with a scale of justice 
represent the fundamental aspects of freedom and justice. As the people of Southern 
Cameroons fight to gain freedom, they will not destroy the cardinal issue of human 
rights. 
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The motto of the SCNC is ‘the force of argument and not the argument of force’; it 
means that the SCNC is committed to resolving the Southern Cameroons case through 
peace. This has been exhibited through its numerous appeals to the government for 
dialogue since 1993, to which the government has a deaf ear. The national anthem is 
called ‘Freedom land’, and it calls on all Southern Cameroonians to defend their land.  
These new developments gave some impetus to the Anglophone struggle. 
 
3.5.1 Setbacks in the Anglophone Struggle 
From 1997 on, the SCNC appeared almost to dissolve into separate strains. The united 
front policies from AAC that had bound them together through the years came to a 
standstill as a direct consequence of the general loss of momentum of the Anglophone 
struggle.433 The resignation of the founding fathers from the SCNC was a big blow to the 
struggle as it created a forum for a power tussle within the organization. The first SCNC 
chairman, Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad, left for the US on the pretext that he was sick. 
He stayed in the US for one-and-a-half years, leaving the movement without a leader. 
Due to his nonchalant attitude towards the struggle, Augustine Ndangam, who was vice 
chairman, was made acting chairman until mid-1996, when a meeting was held in Buea 
to look for a replacement. In the elections, the two candidates contesting were Prof. 
Kofele Kale and Ambassador Henry Fossung. Prof. Kale won by a landslide. However, 
when he was about to be installed he said ‘having just returned to the country’ he did not 
want to be chairman of the SCNC, which was a pressure group. He chose to militate in 
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the SDF, to the disappointment of the SCNC members who had voted for him. The 
runner-up in the election was Henry Fossung, and the chairmanship was handed over to 
him.  
 
Ambassador Henry Fussong was to serve a one-year mandate to complete the term of 
Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad, which was initially four years (1993 to 1997) and to 
conduct fresh elections in April 1997 to obtain a complete mandate for himself. Some 
SCNC members claim he did not conduct the elections in 1997 because he was afraid that 
he would lose, since he had lost the first election.  
 
In 1997, following the terrorist attack in the North West Province by unidentified 
gunmen, Henry Fussong went into hiding.  In 1999, the South West Province, in 
accordance with the constitution of the SCNC, in an election in Tiko decided to pass a 
vote of no confidence on Henry Fossung. He was replaced by Ndoki Mukete, who was at 
that time the provincial coordinator of the SDF. Fussong’s removal was unconstitutional 
but he was removed all the same as SCNC chairman because he was allegedly not 
working for the interests of Southern Cameroonians. 
 
Ndoki Mukete became the new Chairman of the SCNC. He was acclaimed by everybody; 
he was active and vocal. Little did the other SCNC members know that he would soon be 
bought over by the government. When the program for the proclamation of the Southern 
Cameroons independence in December 1999 was drawn up, Ndoki Mukete had to 
proclaim it, but he had been bought over by the government and awarded a post at 
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Cameroon National Football Federation (FECAFOOT). He was given the budget to take 
the National Team to Ghana for the African Zones eliminatory for the World Cup in 
2002.434 He came out clearly and told the people that he would not make the 
proclamation. Out of desperation Justice Ebong went ahead and made the proclamation 
on Radio Buea. Ndoki Mukete resigned and the SCNC met in Bamenda and unanimously 
proclaimed Justice Ebong as the chairman of SCNC and the first president of Southern 
Cameroons, to prevent him from being tortured and killed by the government. While 
Ndoki Mukete was still chairman of SCNC, Henry Fussong created his own faction and 
kept calling himself the chairman. So now there were two factions in the SCNC. 
 
When Justice Ebong was arrested and imprisoned, Nfor Ngala Nfor, former chairman of 
the SDF Constitutional and Political Affairs Committee was made vice chairman of the 
SCNC and the acting president of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC). 
Martin Luma was voted as the new chairman of the SCNC, while Ebong was still in 
prison. Ebong’s followers continued to recognize him as the chairman of the SCNC. 
Thus, there were three factions in the SCNC. The government also created its own SCNC 
faction to work against the Southern Cameroons struggle. Currently, there are about four 
factions in the SCNC, with each faction claiming to be the authentic SCNC. The 
infighting and bickering within the SCNC and other Anglophone movements have 
greatly weakened the course of the Anglophone struggle for self-determination. However, 
in spite of the split within the SCNC, the nationalist movement is far from dead. The 
Southern Cameroons was admitted as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in The Hague. The SCNC and SCAPO also took the 
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Southern Cameroons case to the United Nations and to the Africa court in Banjul, the 
Gambia. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Political movements in Southern Cameroons in the mid 1940s appeared to mobilize the 
masses for political action against British colonial rule, but it was premature because 
national consciousness had not yet been sufficiently diffused to create a firm basis for 
such a movement.  The outcome of the 1961 reunification and the subordinate position 
accorded to Anglophones was a perfect time for the Anglophones to voice their 
dissatisfaction, but Anglophone elites did not protest – instead they were competing for 
power. In 1972 a referendum was carried out that dismantled the federal system of 
government adopted before reunification. Again no Anglophone voice was raised against 
the scrapping of the federation. In 1984, President Paul Biya single-handedly changed the 
name of the country from the United Republic to a Republic, without the consent of the 
citizens, thereby effectively seceding from the union with Southern Cameroons. This 
sparked some fear about a government plot to assimilate the Anglophones by denying the 
bi-cultural nature of the country.  
 
In the mid 1980s, Southern Cameroons nationalism had arisen out of the primordial 
impulse to preserve and defend the Anglo-Saxon educational system and the GCE 
examination, against being assimilated, and to create an Anglo-Saxon university for 
Anglophones. The new elites that fought for this had motives reaching beyond the 
defence of the educational system. This became more compelling when seen against the 
backdrop of economic and political marginalization of the Anglophones. The new elites 
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resurrected some awareness amongst the Anglophones against a government increasingly 
determined to crush any sub-national group. 
 
The early 1990s saw the birth of many Anglophone pressure groups fighting for the 
restoration of the state of Southern Cameroons. Running through all the facets of the 
Southern Cameroons movements by 2000 was a strong element of elite competition. The 
emerging Anglophone political elite, driven by different interests won the confidence of 
the masses. Unfortunately, due to their egoistic and selfish natures, they abandoned the 
people after raising some hopes in them that they would be liberated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ANGLOPHONE 
PROBLEM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As shown in Chapter three the Anglophone problem has been in the limelight since the 
mid 1980s. Among the many possible avenues available to Anglophone leaders to 
explore, in a bid to dialogue with the government on the problem, leaders of the 
Anglophone movements have privileged the following: petitions, motions, and 
memoranda, presentations in court, rational arguments, letters and even calls for open 
debate with the government on the Anglophone problem. The government’s 
unwillingness to dialogue with the leaders of the Anglophone movement, branding them 
as terrorist groups, made the Anglophone political elite seek other avenues to compel the 
government to act on the Anglophone question. In response to the government’s 
intransigence, the Anglophone elites decided to take their case beyond the boundaries of 
Cameroon. 
 
This chapter examines the different ways in which the Anglophone problem became 
internationalized. The first part, explores the mechanism through which the Anglophone 
movements tried to enter into dialogue with the government. The second part focuses on 
the responses from the government and lastly, the chapter examines the shift in an 
attempt to find a national solution to the Anglophone problem to a shift that goes beyond 
the question of national sovereignty in the following:  a) The Bakassi dispute, b) 
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Southern Cameroons People’s Organisation taking the Anglophone case to a High Court 
in Abuja, c) Southern Cameroons National Council and the United Nations, d) Southern 
Cameroons People’s Organization taking the Anglophone case to the African Court, e) 
Admission of Southern Cameroons as a member of Unrepresented Nations Peoples 
Organization, f) The Bakweri Land Claim Committee in the African Court, and g) the 
1992 Victims of the Post-presidential Election Violence in the African Court.  
 
Historically, it is not strange that the Anglophone elites in Cameroon took their case to 
the international community, because this was a strategy that they employed during the 
British colonial period. A number of petitions and constant visits were made to the UN by 
Anglophone elites concerning British neglect of their territory. These petitions were made 
in the form of presentations before United Nations in New York or whenever there was a 
visiting UN Mission to the Trust Territory. For example in 1946, the Richard 
constitution435 which replaced the Clifford constitution did not adequately cater for the 
aspirations of the leaders of the Cameroon Youth League (CYL). This led the CYL 
leaders joining Dr Azikiwe’s political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) in a visit to London in 1947, which aimed at criticizing the Richard 
Constitution.436 Three years later, the United Nations Visiting Mission arrived in 
Cameroon and Anglophone leaders immediately made several petitions to the Mission. 
Among these were a statement condemning the administration of Southern Cameroons as 
an appendage of Nigeria which was viewed as not being in the interest of Southern 
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Cameroons.437 In their presentation to the Mission, they made demands for the building 
of secondary schools and the expansion of trade and vocational schools in the Trust 
Territory and also called for independence from Nigeria, or direct United Nations Control 
of British Cameroons.438 In January 1959 the Kamerun National Democratic Party 
(KNDP) and the Cameroon Peoples National Congress (CPNC) appeared before the UN 
to present their case about the future of the Trust Territory.  
 
Since the early 1990s, the pattern of petitions has change drastically. Petitions against the 
new state are different from those earlier petitions against colonialism. The reason for this 
is that during colonialism the number of educated elites in Southern Cameroon was very 
few compared to the elites in the new state.  The aim of the petitions against the new state 
has been to draw the attention of the UN and the international community to the 
injustices inflicted upon the minority English speaking Cameroonians by the ruling 
government. Judging from history one can rightly say that the Anglophone elites believe 
that by making their plight known to the international community, it can intervene to 
restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons. 
 
4.2 Anglophone Movements’ Attempts to Dialogue with the 
Government.  
In March 1993 about 5,000 Anglophones met in Buea for the All Anglophone 
Conference, “for the purpose of adopting a common Anglophone position on 
constitutional reforms and of examining several other matters related to the welfare of 
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ourselves, our posterity, our territory and the entire Cameroon Nation”.439 The decisions 
arrived at during the congress became known as the ‘Buea Declaration’. The Buea 
Declaration called for a return to the federal state and pointed out some grievances 
against Francophone domination in the unitary state. Unfortunately, the Buea Declaration 
never received government attention. 
 
In May 1993 the Anglophone Standing Committee established by the All Anglophone 
Conference (AAC) submitted a draft constitution, which would provide for major 
political, financial and fiscal autonomy for the two federated states. This committee 
legislated that there would be the usual separation of powers between the executive, 
legislature, and judiciary, and a senate, as well as a national assembly for each federated 
state; and a rotating presidency for the Federal Republic.440 At the meeting of the 
technical committee on constitutional matters, the government rejected the Anglophones’ 
federal constitutional proposal. In expression of their anger, the Anglophone 
representative at the constitutional deliberation walked out of the consultation. Thereafter 
the Bamenda Conference in 1994441 which became known as the All Anglophone 
Conference II (AAC II) was convened. 
 
The Bamenda Conference reviewed all the futile attempts of the Anglophone Standing 
Committee to enter into negotiations with the government about a return to the federal 
state. The conference resulted in the Bamenda Proclamation which insisted that the 
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Anglophone leaders should first “seek and secure constitutional talks between 
Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon on the basis of the federal draft constitution 
which was submitted by the Anglophone Standing Committee in May 1993”.442 In line 
with the Bamenda Proclamation, the Anglophone leaders were committed to restoring the 
federation of the two states so that Cameroon should remain as an entity respecting the 
various colonial identities of the two Cameroons. The proposed federal constitution was 
translated into French so that there should be no problem in understanding the proposed 
constitution. Unfortunately, the government treated all their calls and appeals with 
disdain. There has been no acknowledgement from the government of the many petitions 
submitted by the Anglophones.443  This has led the Anglophones to resort to what is 
called the ‘zero option’, which states that: 
 
Should the government either persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful 
constitutional talks or fail to engage in such within a reasonable time, the 
Anglophone Council shall so inform the Anglophone people by all 
suitable means. It shall, thereupon, proclaim the revival of the 
independence and sovereignty of the Anglophone territory of the Southern 
Cameroons and take all measures necessary to secure, defend and preserve 
the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the Territory.444  
 
 
The zero option, adopted by the Anglophone leaders, means that they are determined to 
restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons. The Anglophone leaders are no longer 
prepared to dialogue with the government, as they claim that since 3 April 1993 the 
government has never responded to any of the correspondences, resolutions, petitions, 
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proposals, suggestions and pleas that have been addressed to them on the issue of 
constitutional reform by the people of Southern Cameroons.445 
 
4.3 Cameroon Government’s Response to the Anglophone Problem 
The Cameroon government has been indifferent to the Anglophone problem. Initially, the 
government said that there was no problem in Cameroon. Now the government has 
acknowledged a problem but claims that the problem can be solved “in-house”. However, 
instead of addressing the problem, it has resorted to intimidation, corruption, and 
repression as a way of forcing Anglophones to abandon their resistance and struggle for 
independence.446 
 
Members of Anglophone movements are frequent victims of government repression. For 
example, in 1993 the All Anglophone Conference was scheduled to be held at the 
University of Buea, but the government refused permission. The Catholic Church gave 
permission for the use of their hall at the Mount Mary Clinic in Buea.447 Also in 1994 the 
government attempted to obstruct the organization of the All Anglophone Conference in 
Bamenda (AAC II) by claiming that the Anglophones had come together to declare 
secession as an excuse for repression.448  
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In response to Anglophone demands, the government has used divide and rule tactics 
with considerable success splitting Anglophones by capitalising on the cultural and ethnic 
differences between the North West and South West provinces.449 It has succeeded to a 
large extent at playing them against each other. For example, in response to the South 
West complaint about the alleged North West domination, South Westerners were 
appointed into key positions in government.450 Furthermore, “the government has sought 
to use its allies among the Anglophone ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elites for the defence of 
the Unitary State, in exchange for rewards in the form of appointments”.451 These pro-
government Anglophones tend to blame leaders of various Anglophone movements for 
their calls for federalism or secession and for leading “hostile campaigns at home and 
abroad to foster division and hatred among Cameroonians”.452   
 
The government, in its attempt to neutralize Anglophones, hires Anglophones to fight 
their fellow Anglophones. The government has, therefore, used its cohorts within the 
Anglophone group to challenge claims of Anglophone marginalisation. These cohorts 
talk instead of “self-marginalisation”, and invite their fellow Anglophones to assert 
themselves as fully fledged Cameroonians with the same rights and responsibility as 
Francophones.453  
 
The government also campaigns against the Anglophone attempts to remember October 
1, the day they got their independence from Britain. Anglophone elites argue that every 
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year, French Cameroon celebrates January 1, the day they got their independence from 
France. During the celebration, epaulettes and medals are awarded to soldiers. But on 
October 1, the same soldiers are sent to oppress Southern Cameroonians and prevent 
them from celebrating their Independence Day. By celebrating January 1 and suppressing 
October 1, the government distorts history by implying that January 1 is the day both 
Cameroons became independent.454 In this light, since 1993, October 1 celebrations, 
organized by some Anglophone movements to mark their Independence, have often been 
met with violent disruption by the security forces. The government suspects that 
Anglophones would declare secession and independence. Furthermore, leaders of 
Anglophone movements are constantly being harassed and at times detained without trial 
for long periods. Some have been forced into exile.455 Rallies and demonstrations by 
Southern Cameroonians have been banned, press censorship by the administrative 
authorities, seizures of newspapers, intimidation and imprisonment of Anglophone 
journalists have all continued unabated.456  
 
The government also uses stigmatisation and criminalisation of the Anglophone 
movements as a means of countering them. The government does not only claim that the 
SCNC is illegal, it is also a terrorist organization, whose actions are provocative. 
According to Dion Ngute, Minister Delegate in the Ministry of External Affairs in 
Charge of Commonwealth: 
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The SCNC is an illegal entity, this is the reason why the government 
cannot initiate dialogue with it. For any group to be legal in Cameroon it 
must notify the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation 
and file for authorisation. SCNC did no do that. It is acting against the 
African Charter.457 
 
 
The argument given against the government’s view of the SCNC by the Anglophone 
leaders is that the SCNC is a nationalist movement and nationalist movements need no 
recognition from the state before they can operate. According to them what is illegal 
today, like the SCNC, will be legal tomorrow, like the African National Congress (ANC) 
in South Africa, Zimbawe National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) in Zimbabwe, 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army 
(SPLA) in Sudan. They argue that Kofi Anan's coming to Cameroon in 2001 where he 
urged the government to dialogue with the SCNC was ample recognition of the activities 
of the SCNC.458 What is interesting here is that in spite of the government branding the 
SCNC as a terrorist movement, it has gone ahead and created its own faction of SCNC 
with which the government purports to have a dialogue in connection with the Southern 
Cameroons Case.459 The pro-government SCNC faction was barred from the African 
Court because they went there to play down the case against the Cameroon government. 
Besides, the SCNC is in a no-win situation with the government. The government 
determines what is illegal or legal therefore, as long as the government wants it the 
SCNC will remain illegal. 
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Judging from the various mechanisms that the government has employed to undermine 
the activities of the various Anglophone movements, one can rightly say that it has not 
been a complete success because it has only succeeded in raising the anger and national 
consciousness of some Southern Cameroonians.  
 
4.4 Anglophone International Campaigns 
The Anglophone problem became internationalized when the Southern Cameroons 
National Council embarked on a diplomatic offensive, while the Southern Cameroons 
Peoples Organization (SCAPO) privileged the legal procedures in putting the 
Anglophone problem to the international community. The architects of reunification with 
French Cameroon (Foncha and Muna) and some prominent Anglophone leaders visited 
the United Nations and the United Kingdom in 1995 to publicise the Anglophone plight. 
The visit to the UN and UK by these leaders ignited some hope in the Anglophones that 
the international community would one day come to the aid of Anglophones. 
 
4.4.1 Bakassi Dispute 
In 1916 during World War I, Britain and France invaded German Kamerun. At the end of 
the war, some German territories were divided between France and Britain by the Treaty 
of Versailles. The League of Nations placed them under British and French mandate.460 
The boundary between British and French mandated Kamerun was defined by the 
Franco-British Declaration of 10 July 1919, drafted by Viscount Milner, the British 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Henry Simon, the French Minister for the 
Colonies.461 In this agreement Bakassi and the rest of what became known as "British 
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Cameroons" were placed under British mandate and administered as an appendage of 
Nigeria.  
 
In 1962 the government of Tafawa Balewa462 exchanged diplomatic notes with 
Cameroon acknowledging the fact that Bakassi was not Nigerian territory. In January 
1966 Major General Ironsi came to power in Nigeria. He committed his government to 
respecting all prior international agreements made by the Balewa government.463 In July 
1966 Lt. Col. Gowon464 came to power in Nigeria. He too committed his government to 
respecting all prior international agreements made by the Ironsi and Balewa governments. 
On 1 June 1975, Gowon and Ahmadou Ahidjo signed the Maroua Declaration for the 
partial extension of the 1971 maritime boundary. Maps from that period showed Bakassi 
Peninsula in Cameroon.465 
 
On 29 July 1975, General Gowon was overthrown by General Murtala Mohammed.466 
One of the first acts of Mohammed’s regime was to begin to question the foreign policy 
decisions made by General Gowon, including the offshore maritime border with 
Cameroon.467  What transpired in 1981, 1994 and 1996 created tension between 
Cameroon and Nigeria. General Sani Abacha's468 moves to formally create an 
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administrative setup in the Bakassi Peninsula and all the military clashes between Nigeria 
and Cameroon, forced the government of Cameroon to take the Bakassi dispute to the 
International Court of Justice. 
In 1994 the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) heard motions brought 
between the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon to adjudicate the land and maritime 
boundaries between the countries. The dispute has become known as the Bakassi dispute. 
It is so named because of the western maritime boundary which begins at lands-end on 
the Bakassi Peninsula, which is purportedly rich in natural resources and oil. The ICJ 
awarded the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon on 10 October 2002, basing its decision on a 
1913 document between the colonial powers, Britain and Germany.469 The Nigerian 
government was sceptical about the ICJ ruling and the then President Olusegun Obasanjo 
said “there is no victor and no vanquished in the Bakassi ruling and I never pledged to 
respect the ruling”.470 This implied a stalemate in the Bakassi dispute. Taking advantage 
of the situation in Bakassi, a group of Southern Cameroons elites filed an interpleader 
summons to the ICJ and the international community to have them intercede in the larger 
independence issue with the nation of Southern Cameroons. In a petition to the 
international community, Southern Cameroons elites wrote that, “following the ICJ ruling 
of October 2002, Bakassi does not belong to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. However, 
in stating that the sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula belongs to “Cameroon”, the 
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ruling fails to state which “Cameroon” it is referring to. This ambiguity lies at the core of 
the present stalemate which the commission has, so far, been facing”.471 
We the people of the former United Nations Trust Territory of Southern 
Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration have maintained that 
the tabling of the Bakassi dispute to the International Court of Justice by 
La République du Cameroun gave rise to the need to examine our long-
held position that there was never an agreement entered into between La 
République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons to form a union in 
accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 1608 (VX) of April 
1961. This failure was not due to any fault of the people of the Southern 
Cameroons. It was rather as a result of the mistaken view of the 
Government of President Ahmadou Ahidjo that there was no need to have 
such an agreement.472 
 
The argument raised above by Southern Cameroons elites is that failure to implement the 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1608 (VX)473 of April 1961, in the absence of a legally 
binding agreement between Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon, means 
that the Southern Cameroons is still, under international law, a separate legal entity from 
the Republic of Cameroon and, therefore, the legitimate interlocutor in the Bakassi 
dispute. As long as this basic fact is ignored, there can never be peace in the Bakassi 
Peninsula.474 
They argued further that Southern Cameroons had an internationally recognized border 
with French Cameroons, as defined by the Anglo-French boundary declaration signed on 
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10t July 1919. This was followed by an actual boundary treaty between British 
Cameroons and French Cameroons, signed on 9 January 1931, describing all the 
boundary pillars from Northern Cameroons to the last pillar No. 138, from which the line 
runs 35º west of true south to the Atlantic Ocean.475 Anglophone elites argue that such a 
union treaty between French Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons does not exist. 
This implies, therefore, that the Anglo-French Treaty of 9 January 1931 still defines a 
valid international boundary between the Southern Cameroons and Republic of 
Cameroon.  
These issues raised by Southern Cameroons elites concerning the Bakassi dispute are 
vital in the struggle for the restoration of the statehood of Southern Cameroon. The 
following proposals were tabled on behalf of the people of Southern Cameroons, by the 
elites, to the international community to serve as the basis for obtaining a permanent 
settlement of the Bakassi conflict: 
The Southern Cameroons should be accepted as a third party to any talks 
regarding the demarcation of the boundary between Nigeria and its eastern 
neighbour, starting from Kombon at the Southern border of Taraba State 
to the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun shall 
accept the independence and sovereignty of the Southern Cameroons 
(Republic of Ambazonia) as part of a tripartite arrangement to be signed 
by all parties under the United Nations. 
 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun shall 
both withdraw their respective troops to their borders inherited at the time 
of their independence; In the case of La République du Cameroun it shall 
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withdraw its troops to positions to the East of the Mungo River as defined 
in the Anglo-French demarcation agreement signed on 10 July 1919 by Mr 
Henry Simon the French Secretary of State for Colonies and Lord Milner 
the British Colonial Secretary which was followed by an actual boundary 
treaty between British Cameroons and French Cameroons, signed on 9 
January 1931; this is the international boundary of La République du 
Cameroun when it became independent on 1 January 1960. In the case of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria it shall withdraw its troops out of the 
Bakassi Peninsula.476 
 
Leaders of the Anglophone movements such as SCAPO and SCNC are trying to use the 
dispute between two sovereign nations (Nigeria and Cameroon) to achieve their aim of 
drawing the international community to intervene and restore the statehood of Southern 
Cameroons. 
 
4.4.2 Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization in the High Court of 
Abuja, Nigeria 
The Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO) was formed in 2001 in 
Bamenda, North West Province of Cameroon. The main aim of this organization was to 
examine the international legal representation of the Southern Cameroons’ case for 
secession.477 The Anglophone elite found that the situation in Southern Cameroon was 
such a legitimate case that they decided, as a state, to embark on international litigation 
for the restoration of the statehood of Southern Cameroons. In February 2002 twelve 
Southern Cameroonians, acting under the initiative of SCAPO filed a lawsuit against the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Attorney General of the 
Federation at the Federal High Court in Abuja, in a quest for self-determination.478  
                                                 
476
 Gumne, K. 2006 Jan 21, “Comprehensive Road Map for the Settlement of the Bakassi Conflict”, 3 
March 2006. Accessed at <http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/indexbakas.php3?nid=5614>  
 
477
 Mr Augustine Ndangan, Vice President of SCAPO, interviewed, 15 June 2005. 
478
 Ibid. 
  184  
 
A preliminary hearing of the case took place on 27 February 2002, during which the 
Federal Government of Nigeria raised preliminary objections to the lawsuit.  The 
preliminary objections were filed on the grounds that: the federal high court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs are foreigners; Barrister Bebu from the 
Attorney General’s office stated that the fact that the plaintiffs gave Bamenda as their 
address indicates that they are clearly non-Nigerians; the suite is an invitation to the 
Federal Government of Nigeria to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of 
Cameroon; the international Court of Justice is the right forum to hear cases of such 
magnitude.479 
 
Arguing the case on behalf of the Federal Government, Barrister Bebu questioned 
whether the Federal Government of Nigeria could be properly compelled by the court to 
take up the case of the Southern Cameroonians at the International Court of Justice and at 
the United Nations.  He argued that since the claim does not arise from any contractual 
obligations entered into by the Nigerian Government or its entities, the case should be 
thrown out. He further argued that the plaintiffs’ case raises a number of questions such 
as: why had the plaintiffs chosen Nigeria as the country to take up their case for self-
determination? Why had they not approached any other African country?480 
 
In reply Barrister Oyetibo, the Southern Cameroonians’ defence counsel, objected to the 
questioning of the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the plaintiffs were 
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foreigners.  He argued that a foreigner is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to 
obtain judicial relief if the relief is within the laws of Nigeria and the claims disclose the 
cause of action.  He further argued that article 20 of the Banjul Charter on Human 
Rights481 gives all peoples the right to self-determination and article 20(3) gives the right 
to all peoples to seek the assistance of the member states to obtain that self-
determination.482 
 
In her ruling, Justice Rosaline N. Ukeje, Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, stated 
that the Federal High Court had jurisdiction in the matter and that Section 251483 of the 
1999 constitution confers that jurisdiction.  She further stated that the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights, which was ratified by the Federal Government of Nigeria, 
strengthens the belief that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction.  On these grounds, the 
preliminary objections of the defendants were dismissed and the date for hearing the 
substance of the case was set for 4 March 2002.  
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When the hearings resumed on 4 March 2002, the defendants (the Federal Government of 
Nigeria and the Attorney General), having failed in their bid to throw out the case on the 
basis of the arguments presented during the preliminary objections, found themselves 
with a weak legal basis to argue against the substance and merit of the lawsuit.  
Consequently, negotiations between counsels to the plaintiffs and the defendants led to an 
agreement to pursue a course of action, which is summarized in the following schedule 
issued as the final ruling of the court by Justice Ukeje: 
 
a) Whether the union envisaged under the Southern Cameroons Plebiscite 
1961 between La République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons 
legally took effect as contemplated by the relevant United Nations 
Resolutions particularly United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
1352 (XIV) of 16th October 1959 and United Nations Trusteeship Council 
Resolution 2013(XXIV) of 31st May 1960; 
 
b) Whether the termination by the Government of the United Kingdom of 
its trusteeship over the Southern Cameroons on 30th September 1961 
without ensuring prior implementation of the Constitutional arrangements 
under which Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun were 
to unite as a federal state was not in breach of articles 3 and 6 of the 
Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Southern Cameroons under 
British Administration approved by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 13th December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions 1352 of 16th October 1959, 1608 of 21st April 1961, the 
United Nations Trusteeship Council  Resolution 2013(XXIV) of May 31 
1960 and Article 76(b) of the Charter of the United Nations; 
 
c) Was the assumption of sovereign powers on 1st October 1961 and the 
continued exercise of same by the Government of La République du 
Cameroun over the Southern Cameroons (after termination by the 
Government of the United Kingdom of its trusteeship over the territory) 
legal and valid when the Union between the Southern Cameroons and La 
République du Cameroun contemplated by the Southern Cameroons 
Plebiscite 1961 had not legally taken effect? 
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d) Whether the peoples of Southern Cameroons are not legally entitled to 
self-determination with their clearly defined territory separate from La 
République du Cameroun? 
 
e) Whether it is the Southern Cameroons and not La République du 
Cameroun that shares a maritime boundary with the Federal République of 
Nigeria; 
 
f) Whether the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall take any other measures 
as may be necessary to place the case of the peoples of the geographical 
territory known as Southern Cameroons for self-determination before the 
United Nations General Assembly and any other relevant international 
organizations.484 
 
When the Anglophone elites took the Southern Cameroons case to the High Court in 
Abuja, Nigeria, little did they know that the outcome of the litigation would redefine 
both local and international jurisprudence. This is a landmark case in African history 
because it shows that it is possible for non-Nigerians to file such a case in a Nigerian 
court and be given a fair hearing. What is interesting in this case is that the struggle for 
self-determination in Southern Cameroons is being fought in the law court instead of 
in an open battlefield. Some observers have argued that the position of SCAPO is an 
asset to the Nigerian government in her defense of Cameroon to lay claims to the oil-
rich Bakassi which is located in Southern Cameroons.  
4.4.3 Southern Cameroons National Council and UNPO 
Another body which has helped to internationalize the Anglophone case is the 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in The Hague. From inception 
in 1993 the Southern Cameroons National Council embarked on a mission to resolve the 
Anglophone problem through diplomacy. In December 2004 the Southern Cameroons 
                                                 
484
 Gumne K. 2006 Jan 21, “Comprehensive Road Map for the Settlement of the Bakassi Conflict”, 3 
March 2006. Accessed at <http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/indexbakas.php3?nid=5614> 
  188  
was admitted as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation 
(UNPO). The UNPO is an international organization of “Nations, Peoples and Minorities 
striving for recognition and protection of their identity, culture, human rights and their 
environment”.485 UNPO member nations and people are bound by the UNPO Covenant: 
 
to uphold the principles of self-determination of all nations, peoples, 
democracy and rejection of totalitarianism, internationally accepted human 
rights standards, promotion of non-violence and the rejection of terrorism 
as an instrument of policy, and the protection of the national environment. 
Its members are indigenous peoples, occupied nations, minorities and 
independent states of territories that have joined together to protect their 
human and cultural rights, preserve their environment and to find non-
violent solutions to conflicts which affect them.486  
 
UNPO provides a legitimate and established international forum for members to 
present their grievances at the international level. It was founded and designed to fill 
the gap left by today’s international system and institutions. The UNPO has proven to 
be a strong force for peace and understanding, justice and human rights in many parts 
of the world because founding members like Armenia, Estonia, Georgia and Latvia are 
today independent, and member nations of the United Nations, and are now supporting 
members of the UNPO. 
SCNC, leaders in presenting their case for the admission of Southern Cameroons as a 
member of UNPO, based their arguments on the fact that Southern Cameroons had a 
distinct colonial history. They argued that it existed firstly as a League of Nations 
Mandate and, secondly, as a Trust Territory of the United Nations under United 
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Kingdom administration. Thirdly, they argued that Southern Cameroons became self - 
governing with an elected executive government and legislature in 1954 and that 
through constitutional evolution, the Southern Cameroons attained a ministerial form 
of government and a bicameral legislature in 1957. By 1960, Southern Cameroons was 
gearing for full independence, but independence was granted by joining either Nigeria 
or French Cameroon. The two-state federation of (equal status) which the UN 
sponsored between Southern Cameroons and The Republic of Cameroon only resulted 
in the latter annexing of Southern Cameroons. The Republic of Cameroon’s initial 
acceptance of the federation was a mere political ploy to execute its hidden agenda of 
occupying the Southern Cameroons.487 
To qualify for membership of UNPO, people affected must share a common history 
and cultural heritage. The struggle of the people must be geared towards the protection 
of their basic human rights and the safeguarding of their environment. UNPO’s 
mission is:  
To empower the dispossessed, the disenfranchised to gain autonomy 
and participate in decision making within the nation-state to which they 
belong or in the case of a people, who through annexation and foreign 
occupation, have lost their nation, nationality, legal and legitimate place 
within the community of sovereign nations, to regain their sovereign 
independence.488  
 
Southern Cameroons’ application for membership into UNPO was granted on the basis 
that their territory had been annexed by The Republic of Cameroon. The admission of 
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Southern Cameroons as a member of UNPO has opened doors that were previously 
closed to them as an annexed and colonized people. Through UNPO, Southern 
Cameroons has been able to address certain organs of the UN concerning the plight of 
the peoples of Southern Cameroons by letting the international community know of 
the situation of Anglophones in Cameroon. 
4.4.4 Southern Cameroons National Council and the UNCHR 
The participation of leaders of the Southern Cameroons National Council at the 61st 
session of the UNCHR was made possible by their admission as a member of UNPO and 
the support they received from the International Federation for the Protection of the 
Rights of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Minorities (IFPRERLM), a New York 
based Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) enjoying observer status with the UN. 
Their mission to the UNCHR was to “create some awareness that a former United 
Nations Trust Territory, the Republic of Cameroon, in gross violation of international law 
and United Nations Resolutions, has annexed, colonized and occupied, the Southern 
Cameroons, another former United Nations Trust Territory”.489 In the submission made 
by IFPRERLM, on behalf of Southern Cameroons, they argue that the Mandate and 
Trusteeship Agreements were binding international instruments, which created objective 
border regimes. They argue that “it defined territory under international control”, and to 
define “a territory means to define its boundaries” and a boundary established by treaty 
acquires a permanent character.490 From the League of Nations’ perspective they argued 
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that it is a fact of history and international law that there were two separate Cameroons, 
with international boundaries, two separate cultures, two separate colonial histories, two 
separate Trusteeship Agreements and two separate peoples. According to them, the 
present exercise of sovereignty by The Republic of Cameroon over Southern Cameroons 
should be recognized as a form of colonial rule. Therefore, decolonisation of the 
Southern Cameroons is the central issue. The people of Southern Cameroons cannot lose 
their right to self-determination by virtue of the takeover of their territory by the Republic 
of Cameroon.491 
To justify their arguments they alluded to the fact that in Africa there are two Congos and 
three Guineas, which are different in background, historically, culturally and legally, 
because of their colonial heritage, have maintained their respective and distinct 
personalities. Therefore, they see no justification why the two Cameroons should be 
together for the mere reason of commonality of name when, in reality, they are different. 
They concluded by saying that the people of Southern Cameroons believe that their right 
to self-determination is to restore the Southern Cameroons which existed as a “UN Trust 
Territory under the British Administration, became a self-governing entity in 1954, 
adopted its constitution in 1960, attained independence on October 1, 1961 and went into 
a UN-sponsored federal union with The Republic of Cameroon as equal partners.”492 
Furthermore, they argued that what the Republic of Cameroon did to Southern 
Cameroons is what Ethiopia did to Eritrea, the consequences of which constitute part of 
the sad history of the abusive use of state sovereignty. The people of Southern 
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Cameroons seek international understanding, support, intervention and mediation to end 
the occupation of Southern Cameroons by The Republic of Cameroon.493 
The delegation representing the Cameroon government at the UNCHR was headed by 
Cameroon’s Ambassador to Switzerland. In exercising their right of defense, they 
registered their objections to the claims of the SCNC stating that Cameroon is a country 
in which many groups, ethnic, religious and linguistic cohabit, since its independence in 
January 1960.494 Historically, they argued, the referendum of 1961 consecrated the 
attachment of that Anglophone part under the mandate of Britain to the state of East 
Cameroon which is inhabited mostly by Francophones. This was organized under the 
supervision of the UN which recognized the results. The delegation added that, through 
consultation and consent, the political forces of the nation decided, after the referendum 
of 1972, to go from a federal to a unitary state, now made up of two Anglophone 
provinces and eight Francophone provinces.495  
Cameroon, as a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the 
African Union (AU), argued that   it, “holds firmly to the principles of the inviolability of 
borders as stipulated in the charter of the OAU, non-negotiable under any circumstances, 
over territorial integrity”.496  They argued that the Cameroon government intends to 
establish throughout the national territory, economic, social and cultural rights for all its 
citizens without exception. The Cameroonian law on decentralization, which is being 
executed with some rigour, throughout the entire national territory, would give a greater 
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degree of autonomy to the ten provinces. They concluded their argument by appealing to 
the commission not to open its doors to a “secessionist and terrorist” organization like the 
SCNC that wants to destabilize the peace that reigns in Cameroon. 
In reply to the submission made by the representative of the Cameroon government, the 
Southern Cameroons delegation, under the auspices of IFPRERLM, expressed 
amazement at the statement by the government delegation concerning “its commitment to 
respect human rights”, as well as “its declaration that the full realization of the civil and 
political rights of peoples are intimately linked to the enjoyment of economic and cultural 
rights, including the right to development”.497 On the contrary, as evidenced by the report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Sir Nigel Rodley, Cameroons’ track record 
includes gross human rights abuses and obstructions to social and economic development 
in Southern Cameroons.498 
Contrary to the government’s claim that all citizens enjoy the right to development, the 
Southern Cameroons delegation highlighted the fact that, prior to Southern Cameroons 
joining East Cameroon, it had three airports, two seaports and a river port.499 
Consequently, to ensure that Southern Cameroons continues to rely on East Cameroon 
for economic development, all have been closed. For example, Besongabang Airport has 
become a military barracks and Bamenda Airport is to become an air force base to keep 
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Anglophones in check.500 The SCNC leaders argue that Southern Cameroons, carved into 
two provinces of the Republic of Cameroon, does not even have a road linking the two 
provinces. Thus, to travel from one Anglophone province to the other, one must go 
through The Republic of Cameroon’s territory due to the abandonment of the roads that 
previously existed in the Anglophone territory.501 
To reduce Southern Cameroons to economic dependency on the Cameroon government, 
the government closed down several industries set up by successive governments of 
Southern Cameroons, such as Cameroon Bank, West Cameroon Development Agency 
and the West Cameroon National Produce Organization. Workers of these industries were 
retrenched without compensation.502 Furthermore, the Cameroon Development 
Corporation (CDC), whose profits, by the law of 1947, were to be used for the 
development of Southern Cameroons, is in terrible decline and has been listed for 
privatization. Already, the tea estates of Ndu and Tole have been sold at a give away 
price to a baron of the CPDM ruling party.503 The consequences of this sale, both to the 
workers and their families, have been devastating. Many have been retrenched without 
due compensation and salaries have arbitrarily been reduced. Despite the fact that 
Southern Cameroons accounts for 70 percent of the GDP, due to the presence petroleum, 
it does not enjoy more than four percent of the investment budget, and foreign investors 
are discouraged from investing in Southern Cameroons.504 Southern Cameroons leaders 
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ask how, given this picture of underdevelopment, it can be said that the government is 
committed to the respect of the economic rights of their people and their rights to 
development?505 
In trying to dismiss the argument of the Southern Cameroons delegation to the UNCHR 
in English, the Cameroon government’s representative made his presentation in French. 
This confirmed the existence of two Cameroons – one Anglo-Saxon in nature, and the 
other Francophone in nature, and that the Francophone-led government with its 
assimilationist tendencies has always presented Cameroon within the international 
community as a French-speaking African nation, to the disadvantage of the minority 
English-speaking people. By putting the Anglophone problem in the international arena, 
the Anglophone leaders were pushing for the recognition of the injustices to the 
Anglophones. 
4.4.5 Southern Cameroons at the African Court 
The African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights are handling three vital cases 
from Anglophone Cameroon against the government of Cameroon. First is the Southern 
Cameroons case for self-determination, second; the victims of 1992 post-presidential 
election violence, and lastly, the Bakweri Land Claim Committee, demanding 
compensation from the government. 
 In 2003 a group of Southern Cameroonians, acting under the umbrella of the SCNC and 
SCAPO, took the Southern Cameroons case to the African Commission of Human and 
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Peoples’ Rights. The complainants were represented by Prof. Carlson Anyangwe, as Lead 
Counsel, and the law firm of Akinlawon & Ajomo of Lagos, Nigeria, as plaintiff. In their 
submission to the African Commission they complained that the rights accorded to 
peoples under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights have, for the people of 
the Southern Cameroons, been suppressed by The Republic of Cameroon (the 
Respondent State) through domination and colonization in violation of the Charter.506  
Southern Cameroons’ submission was presented in two parts. The first part was titled 
“The Facts” in which they drew heavily on history as their departure point. They started 
their argument by describing the territory of Southern Cameroons and locating it within 
the context of Africa and the world: 
The Southern Cameroons has a surface area of 43,000 sq. km and a 
current population of about 6 million people. It is thus demographically 
bigger than at least 60 UN and 18 AU Member States, and spatially bigger 
than at least 30 UN and 12 AU Member States. Located in the ‘armpit’ of 
Africa, it is sandwiched between Nigeria and Republique du Cameroun 
like a wedge between West Africa and what in effect is still French 
Equatorial Africa. It has frontiers to the West and North with Nigeria, to 
the East with Republique du Cameroun, and to the “South with the 
Equatorial Guinean Island of Bioko. The borders are well attested by 
international boundary treaties. The natural resources of the Southern 
Cameroons include oil, gas, timber, coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas, oil palm, 
rubber, wildlife, fish, medicinal plants, waterfalls and a wide variety of 
fruit and agricultural produce.507 
 
From this premise, they claimed that the territory later identified as Southern Cameroons 
was originally British from 1858-1887. It was ceded to Germany and subsequently 
incorporated into the German protectorate of Kamerun, which had been acquired earlier 
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in 1884. The same territory that had been ceded in 1887 by Britain to Germany was 
captured by British forces in September 1914 soon after the outbreak of World War I. It 
later became known as the British Cameroons, consisting of two separate parts, the 
Southern Cameroons and the Northern Cameroons.508 
 
As concerns the boundary of Southern Cameroons, the Lead Counsel for Southern 
Cameroons argued that an Anglo-French treaty of 1916 (the Milner-Simon Declaration) 
defined the international boundary between the British Cameroons and French 
Cameroon. This territorial delimitation was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922 
when the two territories were separately placed under the Mandates System.509 The 
territorial alignment was further confirmed by the Anglo-French Treaty of 9 January 
1931, signed by the Governor-General of Nigeria and the Governor of French Cameroon. 
The Southern Cameroons was thus under British rule from 1858 to 1887, and then from 
1915 to 1961, a total period of nearly 80 years. British rule left an indelible mark on the 
territory of Southern Cameroons, leaving to it an Anglo-Saxon heritage. That is, the 
language, educational, legal, administrative, political, governance and institutional 
culture and value systems are all English-derived.510 
 
The Southern Cameroons was under international tutelage with the status of a class ‘B’ 
territory,511 first as a British-Mandated Territory of the League of Nations from 1922-
1945, and then as a British-administered United Nations Trust Territory from 1945 to 
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1961.512 One of the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system, as stated in 
Article 76 (b) of the UN Charter: 
 
To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement 
of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development 
towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely 
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the 
terms of each trusteeship agreement.513 
 
Anglophone elites argue that, according to the trusteeship agreement, Southern 
Cameroons was to be prepared for self-government by the British, but up to 1960 the 
Southern Cameroons, though under international tutelage, was administered by Britain as 
part of her nearby colonial territory of Nigeria. But its distinct identity and personality, 
separate from Nigeria, remained unquestionable. UN Resolution 224 (III) of 18 
November 1948 protected the Trust Territory from annexation by any colonially-minded 
neighbour.514  
 
In 1954 Southern Cameroons became a self-governing region within Nigeria and 
gradually asserted its distinct identity and its aspiration to statehood through increased 
political and institutional autonomy. The people of Southern Cameroons therefore 
legitimately expected to be granted full independence in 1960, given the fact that this 
region had been self-governing since 1954. The Anglophone leaders argued that: 
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Basic self-government institutions were in place: a Government headed by 
the Premier as Leader of Government business; a bicameral parliament 
consisting of a House of Assembly and a House of Chiefs; an Official 
Opposition in parliament; a Judiciary headed by a Chief Justice; a Civil 
Service; and a police force. The system in place was a democratic and 
accountable dispensation; a Westminster-type parliamentary democracy. 
In 1959 when the term of office of the incumbent Premier came to an end 
peaceful free, fair and transparent elections were organized. The 
opposition won and there was an orderly transfer of power to the in-
coming Premier. Consistently with the parliamentary system of 
government the out-going Premier became Leader of the government.515 
 
From these premises Southern Cameroons seemed to be heading towards independence 
with functionary government apparatus in place, but on  13 March 1959 the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 1350 (XIII), recommending the holding of a plebiscite in 
the Southern Cameroons instead of the granting of independence. This was followed by 
another General Assembly resolution, 1352 (XIV) of 16 October 1959, ordering a 
plebiscite to be held in the Southern Cameroons “not later than March 1961”.516 The 
people of the Southern Cameroons had to chose to ‘achieve independence’ by the two 
dead-end alternatives of ‘joining’ Nigeria or Republic of Cameroon.517 
 
A signed and published agreement between the Southern Cameroons and Republic of 
Cameroon provided that in the event of the plebiscite vote going in favour of “achieving 
independence by joining” Republic of Cameroon, the following would be the broad terms 
of joining: 
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a) The Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon would unite to 
create a Federal State to be called the ‘Federal United Cameroon 
Republic’, outside the British Commonwealth and the French Community; 
b) The component states of the Federation would be the Southern 
Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon, legally equal in status; 
c) Each federated state would continue to conduct its affairs consistently 
with its colonially-inherited state-culture, with only a limited number of 
subject matters conceded to the Union government; 
d) The Federation would have a bicameral Parliament consisting of a 
Federal Senate and a Federal National Assembly; and 
c) Federal laws will only be enacted in such a way that no measures 
contrary to the interests of one state will be imposed upon it by the 
majority.518 
 
 
Judging from the above, the agreement between Southern Cameroons and the Republic of 
Cameroon was just window dressing, as most of the terms of the agreement were not 
implemented. If the terms of the agreement had been implemented as signed by both 
parties, it is unlikely that the Anglophones would have had a case against the 
government.  
 
On 25 September 1961 the Queen of England issued a proclamation declaring that the 
British Government “shall as from the first day of October 1961 cease to be responsible 
for the administration of the Southern Cameroons.”519 The British Government withdrew 
its personnel from Southern Cameroons, and the territory was left defenceless, as it had 
no military force of its own. The Republic of Cameroon moved in its military forces 
without the agreement of the Government of the Southern Cameroons. On that same day 
the Cameroon Federation came into existence.520 
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The Cameroon Federation lasted a mere ten years. During those years the people of the 
Republic of Cameroon systematically increased their domination of the people of 
Southern Cameroons. This domination manifested itself in several ways: The Southern 
Cameroons had only a small presence in all three branches of government – executive, 
legislative, judicial – and therefore could not take or influence any policy decision; the 
military and police have always been entirely French in training and language of 
command and have always been a Republic of Cameroons’ institution.521 
 
Twelve years after the dismantling of the federation, President Paul Biya, who succeeded 
Ahmadou Ahidjo as president of the United Republic of Cameroon in February 1982, 
unilaterally and unconstitutionally decreed the change of the country’s name, “The 
United Republic of Cameroon” to “The Republic of Cameroon”, (The name the French 
East Cameroon adopted at independence from France in January 1960).522 The new name 
appeared to deny that the Cameroonian state was composed of two distinct entities 
(English and French). The Anglophone political elite did not passively accept the name 
change, as it was seen as an attempt by the Francophone-led government to assimilate 
them. 
 
The second part of their submission to the African Commission was titled “the human 
rights violated by the respondent state”.523 In this submission, they argued that a people 
dominated by another people are necessarily a colonised people. Domination means 
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control, power or authority over somebody or something.  The domination of the people 
of Southern Cameroons by the people of The Republic of Cameroon violated article 19 of 
the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ rights.524 Evidence of that domination of the 
people of Southern Cameroons includes the armed occupation of the territory for over 
forty years; the total control of its economy and resources; the imposition of a foreign 
administration; the imposition of foreign administrators; the imposition of an alien law 
and legal system; the abolition of the Southern Cameroons parliament and government; 
the confiscation of all means of expression from the people and the imposition of direct 
rule from the colonising state.525 
 
The Anglophone leaders argued in their submission that Southern Cameroons lies in 
ruins: fragmented, underdeveloped and under the complete political, economic and 
military control of The Republic of Cameroon. The people of Southern Cameroons have 
been dispossessed of their wealth and natural resources. Furthermore, natural resources 
from Southern Cameroons such as oil, gas, tea and oil palm are exploited by the 
government for its exclusive benefit, without any significant benefit accruing to the 
Southern Cameroons.526 Its people are banned from holding any meeting to discuss 
matters that affect them as a people. Individual human rights abuses committed by The 
Republic of Cameroon in the territory of Southern Cameroons are gross, massive, 
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extensive and unremitting.527 This is reliably attested to by victims, the press, local 
human rights NGOs, international human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, US State Department reports and documentation of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, especially Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture.528 
 
They concluded their argument at the African Commission by saying that Southern 
Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon have always been two separate countries with 
firmly established international boundaries. Each has always had a separate state, culture 
(law, language, education and administrative system); a separate colonial history; a 
separate Mandate/Trusteeship agreement; a separate independence day; a separate people 
with a separate vision; a separate people with a separate way of life; a separate people 
with no common or similar cultural heritage; and a separate people with a separate 
aspiration. The Southern Cameroons is legally not a part of The Republic of Cameroon 
because The Republic of Cameroon did not attain independence with Southern 
Cameroons comprised within its territory.529 
 
4.4.6 1992 Victims of the Post Presidential Election Violence at the 
African Court. 
The “Bamenda victims of democracy” whose properties were burnt have never been 
compensated nor cared for. The government’s lack of concern for the victims led them to 
drag the government to Court. When the case first went to court in 1996, the victims sued 
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the government as the organizer of the election.530 According to court proceedings, the 
victims and the government made their submissions and the government apparently 
claimed innocence as to who destroyed their properties. In their submission, the victims 
established that their properties were destroyed by militants of the Social Democratic 
Front Party, who were angry that the ruling party had rigged the election. As a result, the 
SDF militants targeted those who supported the ruling party in the opposition stronghold 
and burnt their properties. Before the victims took their case to the African Commission 
of Human and Peoples Rights, the case had been at the Supreme Court in Yaoundé for 
five years and the government had been tight-lipped about the case. The implication of 
taking their case to the Africa Court was to show that, as Anglophones, the government 
of Cameroon discriminates against them. 
 
The rule that “a state should be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong within 
the framework of its own domestic legal system before its international responsibility can 
be called into question at the international level”531 has been assumed to exist as a 
principle of customary or general international law in such conventions as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. Frustrated by the government’s 
inability to look into their plight, the 1992 victims of the post-presidential election 
violence took their case to the African Court. The victims argued at the African 
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Commission that all efforts to invoke available internal remedies had failed, that all 
domestic remedies had been exhausted, and therefore that the case was admissible. 
 In their oral submission before the African Court they argued that it was because they 
were from Anglophone Cameroon and specifically from the North West Province that the 
government did not want to compensate them.532 The North West Province, with its 
capital in Bamenda, is a stronghold of the main opposition party, the SDF. Part of their 
submission was that the government did not really care much about Bamenda because it 
is controlled by the opposition. The victims quoted three instances to demonstrate the 
government’s lack of care for the people in Bamenda. First, the Lake Nyos gas disaster 
that killed thousands of people in 1986. The survivors are yet to be fully resettled and 
provided with appropriate socio-economic amenities. The Lake Nyos survivors are living 
in abject poverty because they are from Bamenda.533 
 
The second instance referred to victims of the Nsam fire disaster that happened in 
February 1997 in Yaoundé. These people went to fetch petrol after a train derailed and 
were burnt to death. The state has continued to look after their children and has even built 
houses for some of the victims. Besides, the Nsam disaster is observed on national 
television every year. The argument here is that the government compensated the Nsam 
victims because they were Francophones.  But the political victims of the 1990 post- 
presidential elections violence whose properties were destroyed because of democracy, 
who died defending the ruling party and the nation, were never compensated. The victims 
argue that, for the party to allow them to go to court to reclaim their rights is 
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marginalization of the Anglophones.534  The victims argued that they were soldiers in the 
battlefield in support of the government, so they should not be the people complaining. 
But the government has abandoned them in their misery because they are from 
Anglophone Cameroon.535 
 
Third, to support the contention that the government does not care about the 
Anglophones, the victims argued that the Head of State Paul Biya donated food aid to the 
Northern Province of Cameroon because of drought, hunger and some destruction by 
elephants. The government responded quickly because it happened in the Francophone 
part of Cameroon. If the drought and hunger had happened in Anglophone Cameroon the 
government would not have reacted, because the Anglophones are a forgotten people.536  
 
When the victims made their submission at the African Court the government was 
apparently contacted, and it responded that the case was unfounded, because they had 
paid the victims. But the court insisted that the government prove that it had paid the 
victims. However, the government could not come out with any evidence to show that the 
victims had been paid. The primary judgment was that the government was guilty of 
organizing elections, and not providing any security to its citizens, and that it was their 
responsibility to make sure that lives and properties were not destroyed. The government 
was ordered to compensate the victims of the 1992 post-presidential election violence.  
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4.4.7 The Bakweri Land Claims Commission at the African Court 
The Bakweri Land Claims Commission (BLCC) was created in 1946 to fight for the 
restitution of, and compensation for, indigenous lands of the Bakweri ethnic group of 
Cameroon, forcefully expropriated by the Germans in the late 19th century for the 
purpose of large-scale plantation agriculture. In 1947 these plantations were leased to the 
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) by the British colonial government, over the 
objections of the Bakweri Land Claims Commission, which felt that the Bakweri had not 
been sufficiently involved in the creation of the CDC, and that in the process, their needs 
had simply been ignored by the British. Today, the BLCC is continuing its struggle, this 
time against the Government of Cameroon, which is currently privatizing the CDC 
without taking into account long-standing Bakweri claims to CDC-controlled land.537 
 
When the Bakweri became aware, at the end of World War Two, that the British 
Government intended to sell off previously-owned German lands, they created the 
Bakweri Land claims Commission. The main purpose of the Commission was to reclaim 
all the lands that had been expropriated by the Germans. In the very first letter from the 
BLCC (Letter No. BLC/2/1 of 18 June 1946), Chief Gervacius Endeley of Buea informed 
the residents in Buea of the creation of the Commission, which he promised "shall 
continue to  fight as long as the Bakweri people live".538 This was the first in a long series 
of petitions that were sent to the colonial authorities in Enugu and Lagos, Nigeria, the 
                                                 
537
 Mola Njoh Litumbe, Secretary-General of the Bakweri Land Claims Commission, interviewed 5 July 
2005. 
538
 “Bakweri Chiefs: At the Forefront of the BLCC Struggles; 50 years of BLCC Protest”, 1 Feb. 2006. 
Accessed at <htt/www.bakwerilands.org/50years_protest.htm> 
 
  208  
British Government in London, and the Trusteeship Council in New York. After the 
independence and reunification of the Cameroons, the Bakweri Land Claims Commission 
continued its campaign for restitution and compensation through an impressive number 
of memos, position papers, and petitions to successive Cameroonian governments.539  
Almost 110 years after the brave people of Buea, led by their fearless leader Kuva 
Likenye, stood up to the German army,540 over half a century since the BLCC began its 
campaign to reclaim Bakweri ancestral lands, another generation of the Bakweri has 
taken up the mantle for justice and historical rectification in Fako Division. Led by a 
revived and more determined BLCC, the people of Fako division are today taking their 
case for land compensation and restitution to the Cameroonian people, and the 
international community. They are insisting that at a time when the Cameroon 
government is determined to sell off the Cameroon Development Corporation (which 
controls practically all of the German expropriated lands), the hundred-year-old claims 
of the Bakweri, which began to be expressed in an organized and coherent manner after 
the Second World War now, be taken into account.541  
 
Frustrated by the Cameroon government’s ongoing plan to privatize the CDC, the 
BLCC leaders decided to take their case to the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. In September 2002, the BLCC filed a complaint under Articles 55, 56 
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and 58 of the African Charter542 on Human and Peoples’ Rights concerning the 
violation of the land rights of the indigenous people of the Fako division, and it is 
registered as Communication 260/2002. The Bakweri people feel that the government 
does not want to compensate them for their land because they are Anglophones. 
 
The BLCC in their submission to the African Commission drew a lot from history. 
They argued that more than 300 square miles of land currently occupied by the CDC, 
virtually all of Fako’s division’s most fertile land, was forcefully and brutally 
expropriated from the Bakweri people without compensation by the German colonizers. 
In 1947 these plantations were leased to the CDC by the British colonial government. 
In 1960 the British colonial administration ceded power to the government of Southern 
Cameroons, which has now been succeeded by the government of the Republic of 
Cameroon.543 The Bakweri people are angry because under the terms of the lease of 
these lands to the CDC, the latter was required to pay annual ground rent for the benefit 
of the disposed indigenous natives. The native Bakweri have never been paid any part 
of these rents, and with privatization looming on the horizon, the Bakweri resolutely 
refuse to recognize any privatization of the CDC that does not take into account the 
just, long-standing and legitimate rights of the Bakweri over their land. 
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In response, the Government of Cameroon argued that the BLCC case be thrown out of 
court because the BLCC has no right to speak on behalf of the Bakweri. The Government 
of Cameroon further argued that the BLCC did not exhaust local remedies, as all the 
actions the BLCC took certainly did not correspond to remedies mentioned by the 
African Charter.544 
 
In his oral submission, the head of the Cameroon government’s delegation, Dr Dione 
Ngute,545 wondered why the Bakweri wanted to be treated differently from other 
Cameroonians. He was referring to the Bakweri and BLCC demands that land rents and 
royalties be paid to the indigenes of Fako for the exploitation of their indigenous lands. In 
asking the question the minister was simply expressing the government’s view that the 
CDC lands were “government land” and that consequently, local communities could not 
lay claims to the revenue generated from the exploitation of the land in question. The 
government of Cameroon seems to be claiming, via its resistance to Bakweri land claims, 
that it neither recognizes nor applies the Universal Principle of Derivation whereby a 
“percentage of the revenue accruing from the exploitation of natural resources in a given 
region is shared among the communities from which this revenue accrues”.546 Hence Dr 
Ngute’s statement about the Bakweri wanting to be treated differently from other 
Cameroonians 
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In order to disprove the minister that the government is playing a double standard game 
when it comes to the compensation of indigenous natives whose lands are being exploited 
for national purpose. Allusion was made to the fact that on 20 January 1994, the 
Cameroon Parliament passed Law No 94-1, which regulates Cameroons’ forestry 
activities. This law was followed by decree No. 95/531/PM, which detailed the 
implementation of forestry regulations.547 The 1994 law incorporated the Principle of 
Derivation (the same principle which the government has refused to apply in the case of 
the CDC) and instituted the Annual Forestry Royalty (AFR) which is an area tax paid by 
logging companies. According to the law, 40 per cent of logging royalties go to the local 
councils where the logging is taking place, 10 per cent to the village communities 
adjacent to the exploited area and 50 per cent to the state. According to the government, 
the portion of the AFR allocated to local communities is supposed to be used to build 
roads, hospitals and schools, provide other social amenities, alleviate poverty and raise 
living standards.548 
 
So, contrary to the claims of the head of the Cameroons’ delegation to the African Court 
to defend the government against the BLCC, the Principle of Derivation is alive and well 
in Cameroon, but is only applied in selected regions of the country. While some 
communities deserve to be paid royalties for the exploitation of national lands and 
resources, others do not. One can argue that the Bakweri people are being denied basic 
rights because they are Anglophones that other communities, particularly those of the 
South, Centre and Eastern provinces enjoy because they are Francophones. This explains 
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why only a handful of favoured local councils and communities  received royalties, while 
in close to 50 years of protest and activism, the people of Fako have not received a single 
penny from the billions of Francs that the CDC has been paying annually to the national 
treasury as land rents. 
 
However, after examining the written and oral submissions of both parties, the 
Commission concluded that the government’s argument had no historical or legal basis 
and then rejected the government’s call that the case be thrown out for insulting the 
Cameroon judiciary. The commission’s findings were again at odds with the 
government’s position that the UN had already resolved the matter, and concluded that 
the “BLCC had presented compelling evidence with regards to the lack of 
independence of the Cameroon judiciary”.549 As a result, the Commission referred the 
matter to mediation, as the next phase, and recommended that the BLCC and the 
Government of Cameroon “settle the matter amicably”.550 The Bakweri Land case is 
used in a broader context to show how the Anglophones are being marginalized in the 
unitary state. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The Anglophone problem in Cameroon is championed by the SCNC and SCAPO, who 
have taken up the Anglophone issue not only with the Cameroon government but with 
the international community. In their attempt to internationalize the Anglophone 
problem, the elites appealed to different juridical arena. They appealed to a court in 
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Nigeria, which is a national court, The African Commission of Human and Peoples’ 
Right and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In the various appeals 
Anglophone leaders are making use of national and international law to make a case for 
secession, which the state does not want to grant. However, their main aim is to have 
their problem put on the international agenda 
 
As this chapter has shown, the various courts that Anglophone leaders approached in 
the international arena to garner moral support for claims that Anglophones in 
Cameroon are a victimized minority community granted admissibility of their case. The 
judgment in the case against the government of Nigeria was a major victory for the 
people of Southern Cameroon as the Nigerian Federal High Court ruled that the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria shall be compelled to place before the ICJ and the UN General 
Assembly and ensure diligent persecution to the conclusion the claims of the peoples of 
Southern Cameroons to self-determination and their declaration of independence. The 
outcomes of the various Anglophone cases have boosted the Anglophone movements 
and the Anglophone national sentiments.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CYBER NATIONALISM: THE IMAGINED ANGLOPHONE 
COMMUNITY IN CYBERSPACE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides working information and definitions of “cyberspace”, “virtual 
communities” and “nationalism”. The review consists of an in-depth discussion of the 
Anglophone nation and national activities on the Internet. It focuses on all the 
Anglophone pressure groups found online, paying particular attention to their activities, 
their goals and their achievements. The chapter argues that, though silenced within 
Cameroon, Anglophone voices can still be heard virtually on the Internet. Perhaps due to 
the Cameroon government’s restrictions on public protest and a state-controlled media, 
only a few Anglophone voices, critical of government policies, can be heard in the 
country.  
 
Today, with the help of technology, the new global economy dominated by information 
and communication technology has created opportunities for these previously suppressed 
voices to emerge. These swiftly evolving information and communication technologies 
and networking infrastructures are playing an expanding role in supporting emergent 
nations in cyberspace.551 This chapter investigates how Anglophone Cameroonians have 
penetrated and utilized cyberspace as an alternative means for their communally based 
identity as Anglophones. Cyberspace now abounds with web pages portraying the flag 
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and emblem of the Anglophone state, and proclaiming their mission to serve its citizens. 
The succeeding section critically examines the following aspects of cyber-nationalism: 
 
5.2.1 Conceptualizing Cyberspace 
A major question one needs to consider is what constitutes cyberspace. One of the 
problems which beset analysis of cyberspace is the difficulty of clarifying what exactly is 
described as cyberspace. The term ‘cyberspace’ itself hints at a ‘space’ being created 
where none previously existed.552 There are many competing definitions of cyberspace. 
Some view it as a “fictional construct; others as imaginary, but in development; yet 
others as real and present. Some equate cyberspace with virtual reality, others with 
electronic storage and transmission of information, or with computer-mediated 
communication, or with communication over computer networks”.553 Some see 
cyberspace as an individual conceptual space, others as a product of social interaction. 
Some describe cyberspace as in no sense a physical entity: “It isn’t a thing; it isn’t an 
entity; it isn’t an organization. No one runs it. It is simply Everyone’s Computers, 
connected”.554  
 
Beniger argues that cyberspace does not consist only of material things like people and 
their computers connected to the internet. To him, cyberspace has “two major 
nonmaterial components: relationships among individuals and the cyber cultural contents 
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of their heads, that is, the sense of belonging to cyberspace”.555  Rheingold on his part 
defines cyberspace as “the conceptual space where words, human relationships, data, 
wealth, and power are manifested by people using CMCs (computer mediated 
communications) technologies”.556 Beniger and Rheingold’s definitions of cyberspace fit 
the context of this research in the sense that cyberspace has been used by Anglophones in 
Cameroon to strengthen their relationship and sense of belonging as a cultural, political 
entity and to create a sense of consciousness among its members in the Diaspora and at 
home. 
 
As the development of cyber culture breaks through the physical boundaries of all 
information in all places and at all times, cyberspace will become a more embracing 
culture. Thus Barlow’s557 notion of cyberspace is nothing less than; 
  
… the promise of a new social space, global and sovereign, within which 
anybody, anywhere can express to the rest of humanity whatever, he or 
she believes without fear. There is in this new media a foreshadowing of 
the intellectual and economic liberty that might undo all the authoritarian 
powers on earth.558 
 
Barlow fights to defend free speech in cyberspace. According to him, all Internet users 
are “free to roam, establish their own virtual communities, are all equal and unimpeded 
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by the agents of the states”.559 Anglophone elites in the Diaspora have established a 
number of virtual communities and discussion forums in cyberspace wherein its members 
are free to chat and share ideas about their struggle. It is because of this easy access to 
cyberspace that Benedikt describes it as:  
 
a place, one place, limitless; entered equally from a basement in 
Vancouver, a boat in Port-au-Prince, a cab in New York, a garage in Texas 
City, an apartment in Rome, an office in Hong Kong, a bar in Tyoto, a 
café in Kinshasa, a laboratory on the moon.560 
 
 In effect no one controls cyberspace, and it is regarded as the medium through which 
concepts of emancipation, empowerment and the transcendence of physical subjugation 
are explored.561  This chapter shows how new technology such as the Internet may be 
used as an effective agency of political resistance.  
 
5.2.1a Internet 
The Internet is a worldwide network of large and small interconnected computer 
networks around the globe. The Internet began in 1962 as a computer network for the US 
military and, over time, has grown into a global communication tool of many thousands 
of computer networks that share a common addressing scheme.562 Unlike online services, 
which are centrally controlled, the Internet is decentralized by design. Each Internet 
computer, called a host, is independent.563 Its operators can choose which Internet 
services to use and which local services to make available to the global Internet 
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community. There are a variety of ways to access the Internet. Most online services, such 
as America Online, offer access to some Internet services.564 
 
The Internet is a strategic research site which enables the study of fundamental social 
interaction in cyberspace. It provides a level of access to the details of social life through 
online interaction,565 such as electronic mail (email) and discussion lists, Text chat, 
World Wide Websites. For the purpose of this study, use will be made only of the email 
and discussion lists, because they are the most popular forms of interaction among 
Anglophone Cameroonians at home and abroad. 
 
5.2.1b Email and Discussion Lists 
Email and discussion lists are the oldest and most popular forms of interaction on the 
Internet.566 Email allows one to send a message directly to another person or, in an email 
discussion list a message sent to a group address is then copied and sent to all the email 
addresses on a list. When people direct a series of messages and responses to the list, a 
discussion group develops. This is the most common form of interaction on the Internet, 
and a discussion group contains thousands of members. Internet politics have taken many 
new forms, from cyber-nationalism, where groups around the globe advocate self-
determination for their brothers and sisters567, to cyber-democracy where various forms 
of direct representation and advocacy of people’s interests can occur.568  
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5.2.1c Virtual Communities 
One of the most promising types of new cyber communities is the “virtual national 
community”.569 This section investigates how Anglophone Cameroonians at home and in 
the Diaspora have penetrated this new virtual social space of cyberspace. It looks at 
virtual communities in general, and focuses on online political activities of virtual ethnic 
and national communities of Anglophone Cameroonians at home and in the Diaspora. 
 
Jones defines a community as “a bounded territory of sorts (whether physical or 
ideological); but it can also refer to a sense of common character, identity, or interests as 
with the ‘virtual community’.570  Howard Rheingold defines “virtual community” as 
“social aggregations that emerge from the Internet when enough people carry those 
public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal 
relationships in cyberspace”.571 Rheingold sees virtual community as a folksy place 
where anyone can drop in, have a friendly chat, receive some advice about a problem, 
argue politics, and interact with other people who might otherwise remain strangers.572 In 
the discussion forum of The Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons, 
Anglophones all over the world discuss issues about their struggle and how to further 
their cause.  
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In trying to answer the question, ‘what is the real interest driving a virtual community? 
Jones writes that Rheingold wants people to believe that “the need for human association 
and a sense of belonging are so strong that people will seek to build communities of 
interest in cyberspace because they might not be able to build them elsewhere”.573 
However, it appears this is not the only reason. The Anglophone situation in Cameroon 
for example, is being reinforced by the government’s silence over the Anglophone 
problem. Virtual communities serve as models for future efforts of physical community 
and ideological building.574 How true this is to the Anglophone situation is a major focus 
of this chapter. In addition, communities within cyberspace appear to emphasize a shared 
belief in the principles of free speech, individualism, equality, and open access – the 
same symbolic interests that define the character of American democracy.575 Some of 
these communities can be purely instrumental in nature, that is, they may never extend 
beyond talking to one other; or they may promote action, manifesting themselves in real 
political action, such as educational or political causes. The virtual communities of 
Anglophone Cameroonians in the Diaspora are instrumental in the sense that they do not 
only manifest themselves in political action but they also offer scholarship to aspirant 
Anglophones to further their education in the hope that they will be the leaders of the 
Anglophone nation in future. For instance, on the web page of the US-Southern 
Cameroons Foundation, it is stated that: 
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The Foundation also encourages Southern Cameroonians to train in 
diverse areas because we believe that the new country would undoubtedly 
benefit from such training. In a few selected cases, we have offered 
scholarships to Southern Cameroonians, especially the children of victims 
of oppression by the Cameroon government.576 
 
There are also other websites that recognize the importance of education and encourage 
Southern Cameroonians to study. The Formujoh’s Foundation, www.tffcam.org, based in 
the United States of America is maintained By Dr Formujoh Christopher. This foundation 
also offers scholarships to Anglophones both at home and in the Diaspora, to further their 
education. Another prominent scholarship site for Anglophones is www.Fonlon-
nicols.org. This website is maintained in honour of a prominent Anglophone intellectual, 
Dr Bernard Fonlon. Anglophone virtual communities are instrumental in promoting the 
Anglophone identity. 
 
5.3 Nationalism 
 Benedict Anderson has argued that the print language laid the bases for national 
consciousness, which created the possibility of a new form of imagined community – the 
“nation”.577 Firstly, language created unified fields of exchange and communication. 
Secondly, language creates a power different from the older administrative 
vernaculars.578  Anderson argues that the end result was a fundamental re-organization of 
the way the world’s peoples were divided. And thus began a global transition to an era of 
nationalism and increasing internal homogeneity within a global system of nation states. 
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Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign”.579 According to him, a nation is “imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion”.580 Anderson writes that people are ready to die for their nation because 
“nations inspire love and often profoundly self-sacrificing love”.581 He explained further 
that poetry, prose, fiction, music and arts, which are the cultural products of nationalism, 
clearly show this love in thousands of different forms and styles. Examples of these are 
the national anthems sung on public holidays or theme songs of struggle sung during 
periods of struggle. In such singing there is an experience of simultaneity, and people 
wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses to the same melody.582 Therefore 
“nationalism” is an ideology as well as loyalty to or action on behalf of the nation.583 
Under nationalism, this chapter discusses online Anglophone nationalist groups whose 
primary mission is pertinent to the political and national development of the Anglophone 
State. 
 
5.4 Cyber Nationalism: Virtual Voices of Opposition in Anglophone 
Cameroon 
Anglophone Cameroonian elites in the Diaspora and at home maintain a plethora of 
websites and online activities that take a primarily negative view of the Cameroon 
government’s policy in the region. Although not all of the pressure groups advocate 
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independence or separatism, a vast majority of them do press for radical change in the 
region. In general, these websites can be divided roughly into those that are mainly 
informational-based and others that are politically active advocacy sites. However, 
whether informational or advocacy, nearly all the websites of the pressure groups are 
critical of the government policies in Anglophone Cameroon. 
 
The situation of the Anglophone elites involved with the struggle is often one of 
dispersion, having been forced away from their homeland for military, political or 
economic reasons. Anglophone elites in the Diaspora have created institutions in 
cyberspace that will help sustain the Anglophone nation. Examples are the home pages of 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons, The Republic of Ambazonia, 
and the Southern Cameroons Youth League. These are the most hyperlinked sites in the 
virtual Anglophone state that include documents, articles, maps, anthem, emblems, 
geography, coat of arms and the history of the Anglophones in Cameroon. They also have 
the names of an interim government in exile and the daily running of the state. 
Anglophone Cameroonians in the Diaspora involved in the struggles for independence 
have benefited from the ability to form 'virtual communities.'  
 
Kurt Mills in a Listserv discussion on International Relations and National Sovereignty 
writes that: 
 
The most obvious impact of communications technology is that it makes 
possible new kinds of communities, or at least provides the possibilities 
for a certain level of cohesion among a dispersed community which may 
be necessary for any kind of movement to form and assert itself. 
Alongside this, it creates new centers of authority, relocating authority 
away from traditional authority structures that is the state toward more  
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ambiguous and fluid confluences and loci of authority. Thus, dispersed 
communities can form and remain cohesive a lot easier with the advent of 
telephones, the Internet, e-mail, communications satellites.584  
 
Therefore it is these dispersed communities and such communications capabilities that 
might aid emergent nations in various ways to seek independence, by being able to 
exchange information and strategize. By doing so the number of people capable of 
participating in the struggle may be expanded through communications technology, such 
as discussion groups. Southern Cameroons forms a clear example of a situation where, 
both economically and technically, access to the Internet from within Cameroon itself is 
extremely limited, but through the Anglophone elites in the Diaspora working in 
partnership with Southern Cameroonians at home and various supporters around the 
world, a vital cyberspace community is being established to further the purposes of the 
people of Southern Cameroons.  
 
There are a number of organizations and websites working for the independence of 
Southern Cameroons based in Paris, Washington DC, Munich, Abuja, London, 
Johannesburg and New York. Below are the most hyperlinked sites of the home pages in 
the virtual Anglophone Cameroon nation. These advocacy sites openly promote 
international support for Anglophone Cameroon. These sites and the Southern 
Cameroons National Council (SCNC) take a strong and critical stance against the 
Government of Cameroon. They try to put the plight of the Anglophone Cameroonians 
before the international community, and their goal is to advocate outright independence 
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for Southern Cameroons.  The interim Government of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Southern Cameroons is found on http://www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info. The 
following is the representation of the name, the flag and the coat of arms of the interim 
government of Southern Cameroon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This online nation of Southern Cameroons585 offers a wide variety of services and 
activities to its people. One service of significance is the access to informational 
resources, which are invaluable for those people engaged in the struggle. The data storage 
function of the web allows the user to select from among a variety of articles, documents, 
and documentary videos, the constitution of Southern Cameroons, and links to other 
websites carrying information on Southern Cameroons. It creates a high degree of 
awareness amongst Anglophone Cameroonians and focuses on action against the 
Cameroon government. 
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Judging from the influence of the Internet one can argue that it has transformed the nature 
of community and identity amongst Cameroonians. The new medium has affected the 
peaceful coexistence between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians. The 
Cameroon government finds itself challenged by the sub-nationalism of Anglophones in 
Cameroon. Through the Internet, Anglophone nationalists have found a means of 
propagating their message to the Anglophones and sympathizers at home and in the 
Diaspora using the Radio Free Southern Cameroons broadcast over the internet. 
 
The people of Southern Cameroons have a number of grievances against the Cameroon 
government. Some of the grievances range from discriminatory state policies, to uneven 
development and attempts to erase their distinctive identity as Anglophones in favour of 
forced French assimilation. In 1999 Anglophone nationalists declared independence after 
seizing the provincial radio station in Buea, but this secession attempt was ultimately 
suppressed and the leaders fled in exile.  
. 
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It is important to point 
out that this site helps to create an online  
Southern Cameroons community and it is actively engaged in 
the construction of an Anglophone national identity based on 
a distinctive colonial history. 
 
This site includes news about the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Southern Cameroons and the interim government 
that oversees the affairs of the Anglophone state. It has links 
to the United Nations Human Rights Commission website, 
which contains links to several articles and websites 
concerning Southern Cameroons (www. 
Southerncameroons.org,) that contain links to articles 
concerning issues of human rights and territorial freedom of 
Southern Cameroons.   
 
The host of the Southern Cameroons website is interested in 
recruiting concerned Anglophones to their cause and in 
providing resources and support to their ideological allies. The 
owners of this site have invested in building collectivity, in 
bringing Anglophones together to try and effect change. In 
their attempts to inspire Anglophones to action, this site 
frequently gives information about human rights abuses in 
Southern Cameroons. 
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Victoria County 
 
Victoria Beach 
  
 
Fako Mountain 
(Chariot of Gods) 
  
 
Prime Minister's Lodge, 
Buea  
 
Touristic Lake Oku and 
Attractions in Bamenda 
 
Southern Cameroon’s 
Patriotism 
 
The Southern Cameroons website attempts to represent a 
whole country. It gives information about the political and 
economic situation of the country and it displays a map of 
Southern Cameroons. There are a number of tourist attractions 
in Southern Cameroons that are found on this web page. It 
carries visuals of the Victoria Beach, a tourist site in Southern 
Cameroons that attracts a lot of tourists to that part of the 
country. There is also Mount Fako, which is the tallest 
mountain in West Africa and the Prime Minister’s lodge in 
Buea and Lake Oku in Bamenda. 
 
What is interesting on this site is the combination of text and 
images that lead the reader to information about a particular 
location. 
 
This site provides a history of the Southern Cameroons 
National Council and its activities, a review of its social and 
political background, accounts of its notable exploits and 
goals, as well as information on its political and ideological 
aims. 
 
The mountainous and coastal terrain of Southern Cameroons 
is graced with waterfalls, fast flowing streams and thick 
forests. Southern Cameroons has a lot of attractions to 
actualize the dream of an adventurer or tourist. Besides the 
scenery, the hospitality of the people of Southern Cameroons 
is appreciated by many visitors to that part of the country.  
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Map 4  
 Southern Cameroons 
Educational System: Anglo-Saxon 
Population: 6 million (approx.) 
Landed Area: 43,000 sq. km. 
Natural Resources: Crude Oil, Timber, Coffee, Cocoa, Tea, Bananas, Oil Palm, 
Wildlife, Fishing, Medicinal Plants, Tropical Forests, & Waterfalls 
  
 
On this web page found on the home page of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Southern Cameroons, different perspectives and strategies are employed in this heated 
and vibrant representational battle in the cyber texts about Southern Cameroons. This 
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web page represents a microcosmic view of the political and economic situation in 
Southern Cameroons. By giving distinction to the Southern Cameroons map on the 
homepage, the Anglophone elites attempts to demarcate the struggle along territorial 
lines. According to some Anglophone elites, they would like to see a clear boundary for 
Southern Cameroons as it existed in the 1960s. 
 
 
5.4.1 The Content of the Southern Cameroons Website 
The Southern Cameroons website has information about Southern Cameroons public 
symbols such as Code of independence, history, the UN and Southern Cameroons, 
National songs and the international boundary between Southern Cameroons and the 
Republic of Cameroon. 
 
5.4.1a Code of Independence 
The Independence Code of Southern Cameroons lays down the checks and balances for 
the smooth running of the country. It anticipates and defines principles, attitudes and 
conduct for guaranteeing and protecting the people's full rights to pursue life, liberty and 
justice. The Code poses and answers such questions as ‘How does the Interim 
Government work?’, ‘What is its mission?’, ‘How does it differ from other previous 
independence efforts?’  And it also explains what every single Southern Cameroonian 
can do for his or her country's independence.  
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5.4.1b Coat of Arms 
 On the Southern Cameroons’ Coat of Arms, one finds two birds. One 
is the eagle found in the forest zone, a bird unique to the region. The other is the 
Bonaventure Turaka which is found in the grass field region of Southern Cameroons –a 
bird unique to the region, which is now becoming extinct. So Southern Cameroonians are 
going to make it a duty to protect the birds which produce the ‘red feather’ which is used 
to recognize prominent elders in the society. Between the two birds are two spears held 
together by a scale of justice. This implies that, while they are fighting to gain 
independence from the shackles of annexation, they will not destroy the fundamental 
issue of human rights. 
 
5.4.1c The Flag of Southern Cameroons 
  The Flag of the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern 
Cameroons consists of thirteen stars, which represent the thirteen counties that make up 
Southern Cameroons, which the present government calls divisions. The dove represents 
freedom, and it carries a star in its bill representing the possible creation of another 
county. The white stripes on the flag stand for transparency, while the blue represents 
agriculture and fertility, which is the backbone of the economy of Southern Cameroons. 
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5.4.1d Historical Evolution 
The historical evolution traces the history of Southern Cameroons from 1916 when 
German Kamerun was partitioned, between Britain and France. In 1922 these two regions 
became mandates of the League of Nations and, after the Second World War they 
became United Nations Trust Territories. The French sphere, was administered in 
association with the French Equatorial African colonies.586 The British sphere was 
divided into Northern and Southern Cameroons. The former was administered as an 
integral part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, while the latter was administered as an 
integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria until 1954, when it became a quasi-
autonomous Region of Nigeria, which was transformed into a full Region of the 
Federation of Nigeria in 1959. Thus, in political and administrative terms, the two British 
sectors and the French sphere had little in common with each other.587  
 
5.4.1e National Songs  
The wording of the song below is significant in the struggle. It calls upon God Almighty 
to defend their sovereign land and to break every shackle of fear and give them the 
courage to fight for their rights. The following excerpt from the Southern Cameroons 
Anthem portrays the patriotic nature of the song,  
 
O’er the vales from shore to Ako 
From the surging waves of Ambas Bay,  
from the rocks and hills of Buea,  
to the heights of Kilum Mountain 
Let Africa’s voice, in freedom song,  
Rise to sublime heights and magnify 
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Thee our God and great defender. 
Grant us in the end to bequeath 
in peace and unity 
a heritage whole and undefiled.588 
 
 
The song covers the entire Southern Cameroons region as it praises the values of the 
region from the shores of Ako to the Waves of Ambas Bay, and the grass field and forest 
regions of the country. They imagine that one day Southern Cameroons would be among 
the nations that are proud and free of their heritage. 
 
5.4.1f The UN and Southern Cameroons 
The Southern Cameroons are arguing a case before the United Nations regarding the non-
execution of the UNO Resolution 1608 (XV), & 5 of 21/04/1961, on the Future of the 
Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration. 
According to Southern Cameroons leaders, no Treaty of the Union between the then 
Government of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon was worked out.589  
The UN resolution required that a Treaty of the Union between the Governments of 
Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon with the United Kingdom, as the 
Administering Authority of Southern Cameroons Trust Territory, be worked out before 1 
October 1961.590  The Treaty was to protect the interests of both Southern Cameroons 
and the Republic of Cameroon.  The Southern Cameroons territorial assembly and the 
parliament of the Republic of Cameroon should have ratified the worked-out Treaty; and 
the Treaty should have been registered and a copy deposited with the Secretariat of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, in application of Article 102 (1) of 
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the United Nations Charter. They argue that this was never done, and it is for this reason 
that Anglophones feel that their territory is being recolonised by French Cameroon.591 
 
 
Map 5 
 
5.5 The Republic of Ambazonia Sovereignty Society  
 
    (AMBASOS) 
 
Source www.ambazonia.org 
 
The Ambazonian Sovereign Society website592 is another advocacy website in which 
Anglophone Cameroonians propagate the idea of secession. The members maintaining 
this website are more radical in their approach to the struggle than those of The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons. They have adopted a new name 
Ambazonia – for the Ex-British Southern Cameroons. Members of Ambazonia Sovereign 
Society point out that where the West African coastline meets the Southern African 
coastline, is a bay of the Atlantic Ocean called Ambas Bay. They argue further that 
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Geography identifies the territorial zone around Ambas Bay as Ambas Zone.593 From the 
appellation Ambas Zone, they derived the name ‘Ambazonia’. They do not want to have 
anything to do with Cameroon, because the successive governments in Cameroon have 
always played down the Anglophone problem. They want a society in which 
Anglophones will determine their own destiny. 
 
According to the website, the Ambazonia Sovereign Society seeks nothing but justice, 
peace, and happiness for Anglophones in Cameroon. They argue that “the people of 
Ambazonia are not Cameroonians, have never been Cameroonians, nor shall they ever be 
Cameroonians”.594 They propagate the idea that Anglophones should work hard to adopt 
their pre-independence identity of Ambazonians. 
 
Ambasos595 argue that though the change of name is expensive, it is imperative to let 
people identify Anglophone Cameroonians as Ambazonians. Ambazonia, according to 
them, will enforce their patriotism. They argue that “should one expect Bangladesh to 
still be called East Pakistan because they were once part of East Pakistan when the 
British were ruling them? Should it have been proper for Eritrea Republic to call itself 
North Eastern Ethiopia at the height of its struggle”?596 It is for these reasons that the 
name Ambazonia, created a long time ago, was accepted by a group of Anglophones at 
home and abroad way back in September 1988 as the name designating the former British 
Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons.  
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In the virtual space of the Republic of Ambazonia, members in the Diaspora have formed 
a political party, Ambazonia Liberation Party (ALIP) to fight and restore their 
sovereignty, dignity and independence from what they refer to as “the occupation and 
subjugation of Anglophones in Cameroon by the government”.597 Many Ambazonians 
welcome the formation of the Ambazonia Liberation Party. One concerned Anglophone 
in the Ambasos discussion forum remarked, regarding the formation of the party, that he 
hopes the leaders: 
                
… have made the leap from the "force of argument" they started in 1985, 
and which has yielded no fruits for our people, and do what other 
liberation movements in history have demonstrated. Freedom is won on 
the battlefield, first and foremost. That is the greatest recognition and 
identity we can give ourselves - to fight for what we know is right, just 
and the truth!598 
 
 
Anglophone Cameroonians in the struggle for self-determination are beginning to realize 
that freedom is never handed over on a plate of gold but fought for.  Pioneers in the 
Anglophone struggle have always used the slogan “force of argument,” meaning they 
have been trying to solve the Anglophone problem in Cameroon through peaceful means, 
which has yielded no fruits. The present generation has decided to change the slogan and 
has adopted “argument of force” which implies they are prepared to use force to achieve 
their freedom. 
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5.6 The Discussion Forums of Anglophone Communities in Cyberspace 
The electronic communities produced by the diasporic people are indeed imagined 
connections that are articulated over the medium of the Internet, a tool to imagine the 
group affiliation. For the purpose of this study a discussion of some of the postings on the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Ambazonia 
sites will be observed on a random basis to explore some of the emergent issues that 
appear in cyberspace. This section discusses the way in which the community deals with 
the issues that are important to its members. The postings are those of members of the 
community who are actively participating in producing discourse by reading and 
responding to texts that appear in the Internet space.  The postings in the discussion 
forums also become an indicator of the community of the people who are active users of 
this network. The majority of Anglophone Cameroonians who use this newsgroup are in 
the United States, with a handful in Europe and other parts of Africa, including a few in 
Cameroon. Those in the Diaspora have been forced to move to a new geographic space 
either for political or economic reasons. 
 
It is important to note that each message sent to the discussion forum contains the 
author’s information and a subject line that summarizes the theme of the posting. Based 
on this, it is possible to identify how the discussions proceed through a discursive process 
in which members interact with each other, contributing opinions about issues, and 
collectively imagining their virtual community. The subject line of each message helps to 
identify the themes of the discussion. This has made it possible to classify the messages 
into four main categories namely: general, independence, federalism and the best name to 
adopt for Anglophone Cameroon. 
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5.6.1a General Posting 
 This category of messages is primarily informational. A majority of the messages are of 
an introductory nature, whereby a member informs the others that he/she has just joined 
the community. Another general posting is when members use the network to try and 
locate someone who they expect is also a member of the community. Some members use 
this network to announce the birth of a child to the community and others to announce the 
death of a member. Although these messages do not address specific issues, they affirm 
the communal spirit that gives an indication of the way in which the community has 
evolved. While on the Internet, when one encounters a message that relates to a college 
association back in Southern Cameroons like Bali Old Boys Association or Ex-Bishop 
Rogan College, there will be an effort to re-establish contacts in the virtual community 
with former class or schoolmates. This particular use of the network is common practice 
across a large number of groups in virtual space. 
 
5.6.1b Independence 
 In this category, members raise an array of opinions. A good number of members in the 
virtual community advocate independence. To them, it is only independence that can 
solve the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. Justice Ebong, one of the leaders of the 
SCNC factions, posted the following: 
 
The International Community may seem to believe that before a people 
are emancipated there must be bloodshed, the peoples of the Southern 
Cameroons are now not for appeasement but should put on their armours 
for good or for bad in the self-defence of their territory, patrimony and 
peoples; because everyday we live in bondage, complicates further the 
dignity of our future generations. The deviant actions of La République du 
Cameroun cannot consume our identities. They will only strengthen and 
harden the resolve of our peoples for a good fight. Let us harness our 
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energies and resources as we stride forward in unison to victory, freedom 
and independence.599 
 
This message calls on Anglophones in Cameroon to fight for the self-defence of their 
territory that has been recolonised by French Cameroon. The recolonisation of 
Anglophones by French Cameroon is said to have produced a nightmare of 
authoritarianism, corruption, and the gross abuse of power.  Similar messages permeate 
the discussion forum. 
 
5.6.1c Federalism 
 In the Anglophone struggle in Cameroon, while the majority advocate independence, 
some Anglophones still feel that federalism is the answer to the Anglophone problem. 
One Nsoh Christopher posted the following in the discussion forum: 
 
As an immediate reaction this morning, I just want to reiterate the fact that I stand very 
firm for a federation. Just to give a rough overview of the Mount Mary Conference, 
speaker after speaker stood up for a federation which was acclaimed by almost 
everybody who was there. Even Dr Foncha and Dr Endeley did not change their 
prophecy. They still supported the federation strategy. 
 
 
Innocent Nyabekong responded with the following: 
 
I'd like to say the rhetoric about "federation" and "all Cameroon is suffering" has been 
heard from the likes of Mr Nsoh for nearly a decade. Mr Nsoh and his kind of people live 
in this illusion of "federation"; terminology that La République du Cameroun never uses. 
Nsoh and Co. probably know the concept a lot better than the regime of La République. I 
want to draw Mr Nsoh’s attention to the Cameroon Constitution of 1996 that does not 
even recognize/mention the Southern Cameroons.   
 
I did not study history but you did. However, whereas you anchor your 
call for federation on the "marginalization or domination of the English-
speaking Cameroonians", I understand the conflict differently. I conceive 
it in terms of righting a wrong done to a people; a people with a history 
and a territory unjustly treated at independence to accede to 
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“independence by joining”. What does this concept mean for you? The 
1961 federation was only a step in the wrong direction.600 
 
 
 
Nsoh Christopher responded with the following posting: 
 
Dear Prof. and others, 
After a long reflection yesterday and a meeting that ended this morning at 
3 am in Berlin, we have decided to support the cause for independence of 
the Southern Cameroons and no more a federation. We realized, a divided 
front can never win a struggle. Since everything about federation was 
pushed away by the government of La République, We should use our 
energy to sensitize each and every English speaking Cameroonian to see 
the need for independence.601 
 
 
This exchange illustrates the way in which opinions are developed and disseminated on 
the discussion forum as claims are made, refuted and substantiated by members of the 
group. Interestingly, one realises that the initial position taken by Mr Nsoh on federation 
changed, as other members of the group challenged him. He became an advocate of 
independence for Southern Cameroons. 
 
5.6.1d What Name to Adopt for Anglophone Cameroon 
There are two schools of thought whenever it comes to what name to adopt for 
Anglophone Cameroon. One thought strongly believes that Southern Cameroons is the 
right name to adopt, while the other advocates a name change to Ambazonia.  Below are 
some of the points advanced by each school to support its claim:  
 
One school of thought, the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) believes the 
name Southern Cameroon is the right name to be used in identifying Anglophone 
Cameroon. They posted the following:  
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… Anglophone Cameroon case is based on truth, found in documented 
evidence, available at the United Nations and on all previous bilateral 
agreements which they signed with the United Nations, the government of 
Cameroon and foreign partners. Changing the name only adds confusion 
and frustration to those willing to understand the Anglophone problem. It 
is absolutely unnecessary to change the name at this point in time. The 
name Ambazonia, I don’t know where it comes from and only a 
referendum would create a legal base if need be, which I don’t see to 
change the name of our country.602 
 
A member of the Ambazonia group responded with the following posting: 
 
Please note that SCNC cannot be an emancipationist entity as clearly defined by its own 
activities where it has as of this morning more than 6 factions. Also, note that what all 
our people back in the colony want is their freedom, and this can not happen when 
confusion reigns through pan-Cameroonism. 
 
Reason why we must insist on the Republic of Ambazonia becoming the beacon of hope 
for our abused people. Ambazonia has a well-documented track record on how we can 
recover our lost independence. It starts when we know that we have rights. It starts when 
we believe in these RIGHTS. 
 
Please do not reject the powers of a people knowing their RIGHTS. Can we say that our 
people know that they are not and have never been Cameroonians? If so, how can we 
best symbolize this act of rebellion against our Cameroonian colonizers? Does the act of 
calling ourselves ‘Southern Cameroonians’ the best tactical action we can afford given 
that there exist alternatives if not, the chance to seek better symbols of differentiation? 
 
 
A member of the SCNC discussion forum responded with the following: 
 
I wish to assure you that the People of Southern Cameroons feel more intimately related 
to the SCNC (politically and diplomatically) than they do with Ambazonia. This is a fact, 
and should serve as a fertile reminder to you that the Ambazonia movement still has to 
win the hearts of the people of Southern Cameroons. In fact, I would want to be the 
first in Europe to have a Southern Cameroonian National ID. 
 
Keberry John of Ambazonia Sovereign Society posted the following: 
 
Having the name Ambazonia does not necessarily mean that conservative 
persons cannot use the old names, for their own purposes, academic 
research or for sentimental reasons, so long as they are in inverted 
commas or explained as a footnote. The Cameroons … are confusing and 
démodé. If one were to insist on calling Zimbabwe today Southern 
Rhodesia even at the time of Chimurenga it would have been considered 
by activists as an insult. Further, one would need the attention of a 
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psychiatrist if one were to call Germany nowadays Prussia, Sri Lanka- 
Ceylon, France - Gaul, Gulf of Guinea - Slave Coast.603 
 
 
This exchange demonstrates the way in which each group believes strongly in its 
position. The Southern Cameroons National Council claims that Anglophone 
Cameroon is better called Southern Cameroons, the name used by the architect of 
reunification, while the Ambazonians offer a more pragmatic analysis of the 
change of name, judging from history. The differences between the two schools of 
thought often lead to some antagonism between their various members.  
Louis Egbe posted the following to the forerunners of Ambazonia:  
 
What is the difference between an Anglophone and a Francophone? As a 
Black person, you continue to preach colonial ideas and hate. Were you in 
Versailles or Berlin? Besides, nationality is not by force. If a person 
prefers to Uncameroonise/de-africanise, he/she can take up a new 
nationality rather than spread false stories about Ghanaians being 
“expelle” from Cameroon. Or go to Cameroon, take up arms and fight an 
aimless war. And what is this colonial "Ambazonia" all about?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice Mbuh, an Ambazonian, responded by posting the following: 
 
Louis, 
Sorry to disappoint you very badly and you can take it any way you want. 
Yes, it is colonial mentality when it serves your sterile version of 
“Cameroun” well and there is no difference between an 'Anglophone' and 
‘Francophone’ when it comes to you attempting to deny our people their 
rights to be free of oppression worse than what they experienced under 
colonial mentality? That is why you guys of whatever origins in 
Cameroon who now wear the Anglophone mask would never ever get it 
until it finally surfaces one day in your eyes like bright sun shine, before 
you will get it. Does it dawn on you that Southern Cameroons has virtually 
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been destroyed by Cameroun? Or you want to deny that too, so as to say 
there is no difference between an Anglophone and/or Francophone?604 
 
This exchange indicates the animosity that exists between the members. The intensity of 
the first posting and the ridicule in the response show that this type of exchange is 
commonplace in the discussion forum. Often the argument is taken to a personal level 
and others are being labelled as blacklegs if the moderators do not support their ideas. In 
the forum, when one comes up with a contrary idea, that person is seen as a government 
agent and his posting is not disseminated to the other members 
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5.7 The Southern Cameroons Youth League Website 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the homepage of the Southern Cameroons Youth League.605 The author, Akwanga 
Ebenezer, puts his picture on the homepage in a military uniform. The author does not 
only share his views of liberating Southern Cameroons, he presents a fascinating 
imagined community of Anglophone Cameroon, with a map and some sensational 
information on Anglophones. This is an advocacy website for the liberation of Southern 
Cameroons as the author states: 
 
The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) was created with the 
unique mission of using all available civilised means, including force, to 
bring freedom to the suffering and persecuted people of the Southern 
Cameroons. To act as a forum where the voices of the stakeholders in the 
struggle for freedom and the vision of their country of tomorrow can be 
properly represented.606 
 
 
The message is clear: the Southern Cameroons Youth League was created “to bring 
freedom to the suffering and persecuted people of Southern Cameroons”.607 Their 
argument for independence is based on the fact that “The Southern Cameroonians are 
being recolonised and deprived of their rights to function as full citizens in the Republic 
of Cameroon.”608 This does not go down well with the Youth League, who are more 
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militant in their approach to the Anglophone problem in Cameroon than the SCNC, and 
are calling for total and unconditional independence for Southern Cameroons. 
 
Looking at the online activities of the Southern Cameroons Youth League, its nationalism 
is clearly visible on the Internet. The Youth League’s web pages abound with graphic 
materials that are often gruesome; pictures of shooting, torture, Anglophone activists in 
jail, and Anglophone martyrs and corpses are prominently displayed. Freedom songs are 
heard on some of its web pages, especially those with pictures of those who have died 
fighting for the liberation of Southern Cameroons.  
 
5.7.1 Contents of the Southern Cameroons Youth League Website 
The contents of the Southern Cameroons Youth League website include; the Flag, coat of 
arms, anthem, map, history, news and politics.  
5.7.1a The Flag 
The Southern Cameroons Youth League Flag is made up of four distinct 
colours with the following signification: 
Black - Signifies the remembrance of the Martyrs of the Struggle. 
Green - Signifies the growth and maturity of The Youth League in the 
Southern Cameroons struggle. 
White - Signifies the search for a permanent positive peace (PPP). 
 Red - Signifies the ultimate sacrifice (freedom at all cost). 
 
5.7.1bThe Logo 
The Southern Cameroons Youth League Logo contains two chained 
hands signifying bondage, with a divine scissors to break the chains 
of annexation by French Cameroon. According to the Youth League 
leaders, Anglophones have been living under bondage for four 
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decades and the time has come for the chain to be cut. This chain would only be cut 
through blood and fire, not by speeches as it is claimed by others. 
 
 
The Southern Cameroons Defence Force (SOCADEF) is the military 
wing of the Youth League. SOCADEF’s objective is to defend the 
people and territory of the Southern Cameroons, which have been 
marginalised since 1961. Accordingly, taking up arms is the only path 
of the brave, the only true answer to many years of suffering and agony, to decades of 
barbaric and brutal persecution and hardship from successive French governments in 
Cameroon. 
 
 
5.7.1c The Anthem 
The anthem of the Southern Cameroons Youth League calls on the youth to rise up and 
act now, because  Anglophone political elites have failed them. Below is the wording of 
the anthem: 
 
Arise! Oh Youths of the Southern Cameroons, 
The time to act is now. 
Awake to serve your Fatherland, 
Awake to Service true. 
 
Not a call to betrayal, 
Nor a call to treason, 
But a call to true Nationalism. 
 
Refrain: 
For those who will give all; 
To fight a Cause for freedom. 
The Southern Cameroons Youth League; 
For TRUTH and FREEDOM.609 
 
The wording of the anthem is directed specifically at the youth, and is aimed at creating a 
kind of awareness in them to rise and defend their nation.  
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5.8 Informational Websites on Southern Cameroons 
Having discussed the various advocacy websites on Southern Cameroons, the rest of the 
chapter focuses on websites that provide information and analyses of Southern 
Cameroons. These include: www.ambazonia.indymedia.org, which is maintained by 
Valentine, a prominent Anglophone activist. The owners of this site state clearly that 
Ambazonia is non-hierarchical and consensus-based. Ambazonia is a collection of 
persons and groups interested in reporting news and information about issues in 
Ambazonia (Ex-British Southern Cameroons), Africa and the world as a whole: 
 
We think that when all humanity is informed and has access to news it will 
be easier to deal with the problem of demagogy. Demagogy has made it 
possible for oppressions to go on in lots of places around the world 
without opposition. We are against hate of any sort, which includes hate 
based on; ethnicity, skin colour, country of origin, religious background, 
sex, and political opinion. We are open to all. You can join Ambazonia 
and participate in making decisions or you could simply just use our 
facility to bring your information to the public. You can join our mailing 
lists.610 
     
This site also includes useful articles on Southern Cameroons history and culture, and 
directs readers to other links to the region. There are many websites linked to Southern 
Cameroons, human rights issues: www.nationbynation.com/Cameroon/Human.html,  
www.state.gov, www.ambazonia.indymedia.org and www.usci.gov/text. These sites 
publish articles and images of subjugation, persecution, wanton arrest, detention, and 
extra-judicial execution of Southern Cameroonians. A number of Anglophone organic 
intellectuals are building websites that feature their works in general and articles on 
Southern Cameroons. The following websites are maintained by Anglophone 
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intellectuals: www.gobata.com, www.batebesong.com, www.gagwane.com, 
www.martinjumbam.com, www.nyamnjoh.com, and www.fonlon.org. The growing 
demand for independence by some Southern Cameroonians has translated into a 
proliferation of separatist literature, numerous protests and riots. In response to this trend, 
the Cameroon government has exercised widespread tactics of repression, stifling public 
expression and most forms of political dissent in Southern Cameroons. Many Southern 
Cameroons activists or militants have been jailed, and some executed.611  
 
Besides the Internet sites providing information on Southern Cameroons, there are  also 
civil society organizations like the US-Southern Cameroons Foundation, the Human 
Rights Defense Group and Formujoh’s Foundation. Despite government efforts to 
regulate them, civil society organizations in Anglophone Cameroon engaged in advocacy 
have created networks of resistance to government policies and practice and have used 
the Internet as a means to promote a counter-discourse on human rights, economic 
development and democracy. These organizations provide resistance to government by 
providing alternative sources of information counter to the government position, by using 
the Internet to avoid government control and also to mobilize citizens for collective 
action. These NGOs maintain Internet websites to keep their readers informed of 
developments and protest in Southern Cameroons. For instance, the US-Southern 
Cameroons Foundation can be found on www. Us-scf.org, its mission is to serve as a 
source of ideas, projects and strategies to finalize the restoration of independence of the 
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Southern Cameroons, preferably those that utilize civic and legal strategies and as a 
nursery for institution-building.612  
 
The US-Southern Cameroons website is maintained by a group of Anglophone 
Cameroonians based in America. It is non-profit making, dedicated to promoting 
relations between the United States and Southern Cameroons, as well as facilitating the 
emancipation of the people of Southern Cameroons. The US-Southern Cameroons 
Foundation welcomes members irrespective of national origin, race, creed or political 
ideology, as long as they share the goal of liberating the Southern Cameroons.613  This 
site also has links to other websites about Southern Cameroons. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter highlights the various activities of Anglophone online imagined virtual 
communities. These communities provide elements of complete representation of the 
Anglophone state including symbols, map, history, news and politics. The webmasters of 
these imaginary Anglophone states try to cover every aspect of life on their websites. 
Symbols like the flag, coat of arms, anthem, history and tourist sites are visible. 
Important issues like atrocities committed by the government against innocent citizens 
are given prominence. The Southern Cameroons map is used to show what belongs to 
their country and what does not belong to them, and it clearly marks out the boundary 
between the Republic of Cameroon and the Southern Cameroons before reunification in 
1961. The aim of these imaginary Anglophone communities is to reconstruct a true nation 
and to preserve the identity of Anglophone Cameroonians. 
                                                 
612
 “The US-Southern Cameroons Foundation” 5 Feb. 2005. Accessed at <www. Us-scf.org> 
613
 Ibid. 
  250 
 
Most Internet sites about Southern Cameroons get their funding from advertisements, 
subscriptions and small donations from concerned Anglophones supporting the 
Anglophone struggle. Many of the sites use the Pay Pal System. Although these sites 
have limited funding, those maintaining the sites make sacrifices to keep the struggle 
going. The Anglophone online nations have gone a long way to creating a substantial 
impact on events in Southern Cameroons, by serving as an important source of 
information to the Anglophone people. Therefore it has helped to link like-minded 
individuals and raise consciousness about issues that were often inaccessible to the 
general Anglophone public. It is clear that there are more than just Internet organizations 
involved in separatist activities in Southern Cameroons, as seen in the previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE LIMITS OF THE DISCOURSE ON ANGLOPHONE 
NATIONALISM IN CAMEROON 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Over the decades Anglophone nationalism has been built on the premise that Anglophone 
and Francophone Cameroonians are different linguistically, culturally, politically and 
socially. Anglophone nationalist leaders have based their arguments on the fact that, 
because of a failed integration, Anglophone Cameroon should become a separate entity 
from Francophone Cameroon. However, Anglophone nationalist leaders have failed to 
realize that since the reunification of the two Cameroons, so much more has taken place 
between the communities in terms of intermarriage, investment, migration, and lifestyle 
issues that the dichotomy between the two has become blurred. This chapter explores the 
limits of the discourse of Anglophone nationalism, by showing that Anglophones and 
Francophones have more in common than they can acknowledge. The focus is on life-
style issues such as Cameroon music, media, food, dress and fashion, language and 
sports, and finally Anglophone and Francophone views on the Anglophone question. 
 
This chapter focuses on students’ data in four state universities in Cameroon and 
interviews of some prominent Anglophone elites. The questionnaires and interviews 
attempted to gather information about the respondents’ general attitude towards lifestyle 
issues. The questionnaires administered to Francophone students were translated into 
French, to ensure that they understood what the researcher wanted. The first section of 
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this chapter deals with data from the questionnaires that provided responses to specific 
research questions. The second section deals with data from interviews. The total number 
of respondents was officially 435.  However, some students did not respond to some 
questions, hence the total number of responses would range from 435 to 395. 
 
6.2.1 Music 
Cameroon’s strategic position in Africa is boosted by the perception that it is a centre for 
the production, consumption and dissemination of African popular music.614 Its musical 
landscape is diverse, with many different local genres; Bikutsi and Makossa being the 
most popular in urban areas. Makossa originates from a Douala dance called Kossa. 
Bikutsi emanates from Yaoundé. It is the traditional dance of the Beti people. Besides 
Makossa and Bikutsi, local musical genres from other ethnic groups like the Bamiléké 
and Foulbé have also developed.615 Anglophone Cameroon has not succeeded in 
producing any popular music genre. However, local genres like “Bottle Dance”616 and 
“Moninkim”617 respectively are popular among Anglophones, because it is their 
indigenous music heritage.  
 
Under the music category open-ended questionnaires were designed to gather information 
from respondents about the type of Cameroonian music they liked to listen to and why. 
Interestingly, many respondents chose Makossa, Bikutsi and Bendskin. Anglophone 
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respondents chose Makossa more than their Francophone counterparts, though Makossa 
is a music genre from Francophone Cameroon.  Anglophones gave reasons for liking 
Makasso such as its rhythm and the dancing style. Moreover, Anglophones chose 
Makossa because they do not have any popular music from their area which is recognized 
nationally and abroad. Analysis of the questionnaires suggests that Francophones tended 
to choose between Makossa, Bikutsi and Bendskin, giving their reasons based on the fact 
that it is music from where they come from (village of origin). For instance, most 
respondents in Yaoundé chose Bikutsi because it is indigenous to the area, likewise 
Bendskin from Western province and Makossa from Douala. Although Makossa is sung 
in Douala, it is often punctuated with Pidgin English and French. Observing Anglophones 
in nightclubs and parties proved that, although most Anglophones do not understand the 
Douala language, they are able to appreciate Makossa. This shows that music in 
Cameroon serves as a tool that blurs the difference between Anglophone and 
Francophone, because when it comes to dancing and enjoying Makossa, one cannot 
distinguish between an Anglophone and a Francophone. At variance were a few 
respondents from Anglophone Cameroon who chose “Bottle Dance” and “Njang”, 
because it helps to promote their culture. 
 
6.2.2 Influence of Western Culture  
What kinds of things do fashion and clothing say about the youths in Cameroon? Are 
there any real differences between the youths in Cameroon, when it comes to the way in 
which they appreciate western cultures?  Respondents were asked to name and explain 
the western culture that has impacted most on Cameroonian youths. Most of the 
respondents said it was the American culture. Today American culture often sets the pace 
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in modern style because new technologies, such as motion-pictures and television, and 
the mass media have revolutionized American culture by making it available to the 
masses.618 As such, Europe and the world are essentially consumers of American popular 
culture. At present, America is the dominant cultural source for entertainment and 
popular fashion, “from the jeans and T-shirts young people wear to the music groups and 
rock stars they listen to and the movies they watch”.619 The American lifestyle is often 
associated with clothing,  electronic  gadgets, and  other  products,  as  well  as  with  
leisure  time.620 The media exemplify this success with the most glamorous models of 
consumption: Hollywood actors, sports figures, or   music celebrities. This dependence 
on products and on constant consumption defines modern consumer society everywhere. 
Americans have set the pace for this consumer ideal, especially among young people, 
who have helped fuel this consumer culture in the United States and the world.621 
American entertainment is probably one of the strongest means by which American 
culture influences the world.  
 
Today in Cameroon one observes that many people have access to relatively inexpensive 
satellite dishes to view American Cable News Networks and MTV, the 24-hour US music 
video channel. Youths in Cameroon are not left behind, as they are also gripped by the 
influence of the American hip hop culture. This can be seen from their style of dressing, 
the music they listen to and the manner in which they walk and talk. Hip hop culture 
includes verbal language, body language, attitude style and fashion, and increasingly 
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political activism.622 Hip hop artists comment on numerous subjects such as AIDS, 
unemployment, crime and social change in America, the Caribbean and Africa.623 In so 
doing, the youths learn how these issues play out in their countries and the realities of the 
situation. Many youths like hip hop because it is the music of need, arising out of the 
streets, reflecting the hard core realities of urban ghettoes.624  
 
Amongst other things, Anglophone and Francophone youths in Cameroon have in 
common a love for rap and hip hop style. They mimic the fashion and style in which hip 
hop artists’ dress, by wearing oversized trousers which display the waistband of one’s 
underwear, and they often walk as if they were limping. Judging from the students’ 
response, Cameroonian youths are imitating hip hop artists, to the extent of injecting 
Black slang into their conversations. Most of them idolize rap artists such as the late 
Tupac Shakur and the Notorious B.I.G., Ice Cube, and Will Smith. Some said they would 
like to be like the megastar entertainer Michael Jackson. 
 
6.2.3 Food  
Situated in Central Africa, Cameroon has an area of 475,440 square kilometres (183,568 
square miles). It has four geographical regions: the western lowlands, the north-western 
highlands, the central region, and the northern region.625 
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The colonial masters came to Africa with foodstuffs. Their influences are reflected in the 
presence of some foods, as well as in the preparation of some dishes. The Portuguese 
arrived in Cameroon in 1472, and brought with them such crops as hot peppers, maize 
(corn), cassava (a root crop), and tomatoes.626 The Germans (1884) and, later, British and 
French (1916), also came with foodstuffs. However, for the most part, Cameroonians 
continue to prepare their own traditional foods.627 The staple foods eaten by the people of 
Cameroon vary from region to region, depending on the climate, and what is grown 
locally.  
Staple foods eaten in the north are corn, millet, and peanuts. In the south, people eat more 
of root crops such as yams and cassava, as well as plantains. In both north and south 
regions, the foods are cooked, then pounded with a pestle until they form a sticky mass 
called fufu, which is then formed into balls and dipped into tasty sauces.628 The sauces are 
made of ingredients such as cassava leaves, okra, and tomatoes. The vegetable most 
typical in the southern region of Cameroon is ndole, which is made of boiled, shredded 
bitterleaf and peanuts, and can be cooked with fish or meat. Bobolo, made of fermented 
cassava shaped in a loaf, is popular in both the south and central regions.629 
Cultural contact between the inhabitants of the various regions in Cameroon has made it 
possible for Cameroonians to eat a variety of dishes irrespective of where they are 
located. Visiting a restaurant in the city of Douala or Yaoundé for example, one is likely 
to find major dishes like plantains and ndole, fufu corn and vegetables, Achu and 
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kanda,630 waterfufu and eru, koki and ripe plantains and cocoyam and vegetables. Dishes 
such as waterfufu and eru,631 koki and ripe plantains, Achu and kanda and ekwang are 
staple foods from Anglophone Cameroon. They have gradually become very popular 
amongst Francophones. From Francophone Cameroon, dishes like roast fish and bobolo, 
plantains and ndole, mbongo chobi, and nkwi are household names in Anglophone 
Cameroon. When it comes to food in Cameroon, one can hardly distinguish an 
Anglophone from a Francophone.  
Students were further asked what types of Cameroonian foods they like to eat and why. 
In response, most of them chose waterfufu and eru, plantains and ndole, ekwang, mbongo 
chobi and roasted fish and bobolo, not because these are meals coming from their region 
but because these dishes are delicious and they taste good. In effect, some of the students 
were not influenced by the fact that the dish was a staple meal from their village but 
because of the nutritional value of the food. Interestingly, many Anglophones chose 
dishes like plantain and ndole, mbongo chobi, and roasted fish and bobolo, which are 
meals from Francophone Cameroon. Likewise Francophone respondents also chose 
dishes like waterfufu and eru, koki and plantains and ekwang, which are staple food in 
Anglophone Cameroon. This shows that Cameroon is blessed with a variety of dishes that 
Cameroonians can choose from, irrespective of where they come from. 
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6.2.4 Football 
Football in Cameroon is regarded as a source of national pride, unity, peace and stability. 
Consequently, the government invests a lot of resources to foster the game. Over the 
years, the Cameroon government has given immense support to the national football 
team.632 The reasons for this support include passion for the game and the need to see the 
national team succeed. The existence of four football schools in Buea, Douala, Maroua 
and Yaoundé has undoubtedly contributed to the development and progress of 
Cameroon’s football.633 
 
Cameroon has an impressive record of five appearances at the World Cup finals. It was 
the first African country to reach the quarter finals in Italy in 1990. Cameroon is four 
times African champions and the leading football nation in Africa. Cameroon’s football 
success in particular has served as a major unifying factor for an often divided country.634 
Adding his voice to the unifying power of football, FIFA President Joseph Blatter said 
“Football is more than just kicking a ball. In a vicious, crazy world, football can 
contribute towards restoring a positive atmosphere and positive energy.”635 The following 
discussion about Cameroon football appeared on the Cameroon football forum 
(Camfoot): 
 
Football is one of the few things that truly unite Cameroonians. When the 
players are on the pitch, nobody thinks of where they come from, but only 
how well they do on the pitch. 
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Soccer brings the feel-good factor in a country like Cameroon with hardly 
anything going right, only soccer is there to talk about. Treating a soccer 
player who dies on duty as a hero could bring a lot political gain to the 
person in power. 
 
The national team is the only thing that Cameroonians can be proud of. 
The Indomitable Lions are a source of national identity and pride. 
Cameroon today is seen as a football nation and hence Foe’s death, live on 
TV and defending the national colours affected us a lot more than those 
killed in Bakassi. All of these are used by politician for their own end. 
 
Football is one of the few good things our country has now. Even if it is 
just for one or two hours, people can sit together and forget about any 
differences they might have.636 
 
 
This shows that, while football acts as a unifying factor all over the world, football in 
Africa, particularly in Cameroon, is a personal and social healing factor, which is deeply 
ingrained in the psyche of the nation and individuals.637 According to Simon Mol, a 
Cameroonian soccer analyst, “Football is a fundamental cultural element in 
Cameroon”.638 Above all, many Cameroonians have realized that a career can be made in 
the game, and hundreds have left the country to play professionally abroad. 
 
Questions were put to students about their idol in the national team, what sports they 
practise or watch on TV and the club that they support in the Cameroon league. More 
than three quarters of the students chose the Barcelona (Spain) forward, Samuel Eto’o as 
their favourite player in the national team. Consequently, one discovers that Anglophones 
and Francophones share the same passion when it comes to supporting the national team. 
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But some patterns of ethnicity and regionalism emerged when the respondents had to 
choose the local club that they supported. Competition between football clubs at the 
national or local level is frequently seen as a dispute between ethnic groups or clans. The 
reasons the respondents gave for supporting particular clubs are that these local soccer 
clubs are based in their provinces and they know some of the players in person. 
 
6.2.5 Language 
Cameroon has about 250 indigenous languages639 and colonialism only added two, that 
is, English and French. The unification of the two Cameroons and the adoption of an 
official French and English bilingual policy in 1961 gave rise to the main distinguishing 
linguistic markers: Francophone and Anglophone Cameroonians. This distinction has 
helped to create, more than solve the linguistic deadlock in which many Cameroonians 
find themselves today.  In the area of education, two systems exist in Cameroon: the 
Anglophone system of education based on the Anglo-Saxon model and the Francophone 
system based on the French model. The policy of bilingualism has been more on paper 
than in practice because the demographic distribution of Cameroonians along the lines of 
the official languages put in place by colonialism resulted in more French speakers.640 
French basically became the source of cultural capital, to the disadvantage of English. 
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Although the coexistence of Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon has not 
produced any significant sociolinguistic conflicts, it is clear that each of these 
communities builds identity boundaries around them that exclude the other.641 The 
residential patterns in Yaoundé also show a tendency for these groups to stick together. 
For instance; Melen, Obili, Biyem Assi, and Mendong are occupied predominantly by 
Anglophones. In Douala, Bonaberi is predominantly occupied by Anglophones. The 
tendency to regroup around one of the official languages has spread among the 
Anglophones and spurred them to the creation of certain religious, cultural, and 
educational projects.642 The Anglophone community has therefore constructed churches 
and schools in which English is the medium of interaction. For instance, in Yaoundé one 
finds the Presbyterian Churches of Bastos, Etoug Ebe, Nsimeyong, Ekounou, and Soa; 
the Roman Catholic Churches of Mvog Ada and Nsimbog; the Baptist Churches of Etoug 
Ebe and Nkondengui.643 The Anglophone Community is not, however, homogenous 
because within it emerges some trends of cultural and ethnic regroupings among the 
diverse ethnic groups that make up the community. This results in the organization of 
monthly meetings, which have a profound impact on the coexistence of these groups. The 
monthly meetings, for instance, provides Anglophones with the chance to sustain their 
culture and identity and also the unique opportunity to improve on their economic well-
being. This kind of regrouping further strengthens the Anglophone-Francophone 
dichotomy and makes each group more conscious of the differences that exist between 
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them. The English language is a powerful tool that unites Anglophones in spite of the 
cultural diversity and political animosity that exist between Anglophones. 
Students were asked what languages they speak at home, school, market and with friends. 
Most of the respondents, both Anglophones and Francophones, said they speak French 
and English while at school and at home they speak indigenous languages with their 
parents. Discussions in market situations and with friends are informal and most of the 
respondents said they speak either French, English, Pidgin English or Francanglais (a 
mixture of French and English), depending on the person they are interacting with. What 
was most interesting was that Pidgin English and Francanglais are used more widely in 
informal settings. Cameroon Pidgin English is widely used, not only in the Anglophone 
provinces but in several major towns and cities of the Francophone provinces. In short, 
Pidgin is not just a lingua franca of the English-speaking population, but a language that 
has a national dimension. Pidgin is used in churches, in market-places, in motor parks, in 
railway stations, in the street, as well as in other informal situations. In fact, this 'no man's 
language' is very present in the daily socio-economic lives of the people, a role it began 
to play as far back as the colonial period. Besides, Francanglais is also becoming very 
common amongst youths in Cameroon. In spite of the fact that language is one of the 
factors that Anglophone nationalism is built on, the wide use of Pidgin English and 
Francanglais tends to blur the difference between an Anglophone and a Francophone. 
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6.2.6 Media 
For decades the Cameroon media has been under tight government control, until 1990, 
when the government introduced a law on the “Freedom of Social Communication”.644 
The new law facilitated the process of starting a newspaper and led to the proliferation of 
private newspapers in Cameroon. However, broadcasting was still a state monopoly until 
April 2000 when the government authorised private radios and television stations to 
operate.645 In spite of the relaxed media law, the government still reserved the right to 
censor and even suspend or seize newspapers that were deemed “radical”. Arbitrary 
arrest and detention of journalists without trial continued unabated. The relationship 
between the government and the private press is marked by mutual distrust. This shows 
that the government is still intolerant of dissident views.646 Cameroon Tribune, the 
bilingual daily, is the official newspaper and is the voice of the government. Major 
regular private papers include: Le Messager, LaNouvelle Expression, L’effort 
Cameroonais and Mutations; and in English, The Herald, The Post, The Guardian, The 
Weekly Post, The Sun and The Eden. These private newspapers are often sympathetic 
with the opposition. The media in Cameroon, both audio-virtual and print, has a powerful 
influence on the perception of the hermetic divide between English and French. An 
attempt was made to find out if youths in Cameroon read certain newspaper and why. 
Questionnaires were administered to Anglophone and Francophone students to find out 
what newspapers they liked to read and why. The researchers’ interest was to establish if 
Anglophone and Francophone students are interested in reading the same papers and 
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why. Most Anglophone students chose English newspapers and the Francophones chose 
French papers. This shows that in spite of some common grounds in language, language 
divides Cameroonians to a large extent. This is a reflection of the linguistic heritage of 
both communities and the Herculean task is to transcend these divides. 
The liberalization of the audio-visual media less than six years ago, like the print media, 
resulted in an upsurge of private radio and televisions stations all over Cameroon. 
Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) has been the sole audio-visual medium in 
Cameroon for decades and has often been seen as the mouthpiece of the government.647 
This led to some ill feelings towards CRTV among progressive Cameroonians. 
Anglophones are even more frustrated with CRTV because 80% of the programmes are 
devoted to the French language and only 20% to the English language.648 This is because 
it is presumed that French has a bigger audience than English. By opening up the audio- 
visual media to competition, thus bringing to an end the state monopoly, Cameroonians 
were given the choice to watch as many TV stations as they liked. For instance, Bamenda 
has five private radio stations: Afrique Nouvelle, Abakwa FM, Hot Coffee, Community 
Radio, and Cameroon Baptist Convention, and it has two private TV stations, Afrique 
Nouvelle and Abakwa TV. They also receive signals of other private TV stations from 
Yaoundé and Douala. 
The popularity of CRTV has greatly declined amongst youths in Cameroon as most of 
them choose to listen or watch stations other than CRTV. Students were asked the type of 
programmes they liked to watch on CRTV. Anglophone and Francophone students said 
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they liked watching soapies and news on CRTV. An example was given of soapies like 
Passions though broadcast in English and Monica Bavaria in French. Francophones and 
Anglophones liked watching both soapies. This shows that in spite of the language barrier 
some Francophones watch programmes in English and vice versa. As concerns 
international television and radio stations that they like to watch and listen to, most of 
them chose: BBC, CNN, VOA, BBC Africa, RFI and Channel ‘O’, because these stations 
are objective in their reports on global issues and they play good music. 
6.3 Anglophone Divide on the Anglophone Problem 
Anglophone Cameroonians are divided over the path to follow in resolving the 
Anglophone problem. They are at a crossroads as to what they really want. There are 
factions that advocate outright secession with an agreement as to the sharing of assets 
belonging to each side. Another group stands for federation. Within this group that 
supports federalism, there are those that support Federation with two States, two Prime 
Ministers and two governments/ legislatures, as it was before unification in 1972. There 
are also those who support federation with ten autonomous States with elected 
Governors, State Assemblies and a Central Federal Government. Lately, the Cameroon 
government has been talking about decentralization. A group of pro-government 
Anglophone elites is strongly in favour of decentralization. Anglophones do not seem to 
have a clear platform for their struggle; there is too much in-fighting and definitely no 
strategy.  
 
A major weakness in the discourse of Anglophone nationalism is that Anglophones are 
not united. There is little unity and solidarity between the North West and South West.  
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The divide is fuelled by competition between Anglophones for appointment. This leads 
them to discredit their fellow Anglophones. For instance “a minister or general manager 
from the North West or South West is made to understand that he owes his appointment 
to the disappointment of another Anglophone and that he must derail all signs of 
solidarity among Anglophones”.649 In the “South West there is the worst form of 
tribalism that is going on, worse than the divide between the North West and South West. 
The South West, for example, suffers from tribal tribalism and the North West suffers 
from tribal regionalism”650 and, because of this, each one wants to stay in his own 
camp.651 According to former Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu, Anglophones should 
stop having a complex: when an Anglophone is appointed, that Anglophone should target 
a post in the Republic, not a post to be occupied by a South Westerner or a North 
Westerner. According to him, it is envy, egotism and position that blind Anglophones. He 
has always blamed the Anglophones for being short-sighted when the government 
appoints a North Westerner, or a South Westerner. He advised that Anglophones should 
use the Republic as their yardstick and not fellow Anglophones.652  The lack of solidarity 
among Anglophones has not helped in putting the Anglophone problem on the national 
agenda because those who are supposed to speak out on the Anglophone problem do not 
do so. The moment Anglophone elites are co-opted into the system, they start thinking 
that they are part of the system and to them discussing issues affecting the Anglophones 
make them feel that they are being disloyal and unpatriotic.  
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Anglophone nationalist movements are also divided. If Anglophone nationalist 
movements stop their divisive attitudes and learn to work as one people, they will make a 
significant impact in presenting their case. However, there are about six Anglophone 
nationalist groups fighting for the independence of Southern Cameroons.  As such, the 
debate over who will be president ignites a new war amongst the Anglophones. The 
Southern Cameroons National Council is the worst thing that ever happened to the 
Anglophone struggle, wherein everyone fights to be a leader of a faction.653 There is 
always a hidden agenda, and any group recognizes only their own people that they would 
want to form a government with. If not, why do they not have a united front for the 
Anglophones? And because of these internal divisions their case is greatly weakened. 
 
6.3.1a Independence for Anglophone Cameroon 
The Cameroon constitution clearly states that Cameroon is “one and indivisible”.654 
Politicians in their discourse on national integration constantly remind the people that 
Cameroon is one. When one hears politicians claim Cameroon is indivisible, it is obvious 
that they would not tolerate any separatist tendencies. In attempts to defend the 
indivisible state of Cameroon, the government has been cracking down on the leaders of 
the Southern Cameroons National Council and the Southern Cameroons Youth League. 
Some Southern Cameroons activists have died in solitary confinement in Kondengui 
prison in Yaoundé. Anglophones involved in the struggle have been stigmatized and 
given all sorts of names: terrorist, secessionist and enemies in the house. However, the 
leaders of the Anglophone struggle argue that they are not terrorists. According to them, 
terrorists do not go to the courts to look for justice, but they go looking for ammunition to 
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fight.655 I think the Anglophone leaders choose the courts as a most preferred way to fight 
for their course rather than going to war because of the consequences of war. But some 
Anglophone elites in government argue that those who think of going to war are 
dreaming. If Anglophone leaders want war: Who will fight the war? Where will they get 
money? Where are the experts and where will they begin? Do they know what a war is? 
Where will they run to? First of all Anglophones are poor, they do not even have the 
resources and the people are suffering. The wealth of the Anglophone people is their land 
and that is why the people do not think of going to war, because they can afford to put 
food on the table. So thinking of going to war would destroy the little resources and 
further impart hardship on the people. 
Besides, some hope that by going to war the United Nations would intervene to aid the 
Southern Cameroons and restore their sovereign national independence. The following 
Resolution was adopted by the VII General Assembly of the UNPO on 26 June 2005: 
… calls on the UN Security Council and the General Assembly to, as a 
matter of urgency and prevention of violent conflict, adopt a resolution on 
appointment of a peace keeping mission for the former British Southern 
Cameroons with a UN administrator and peace keeping force to effect the 
peaceful withdrawal of the Republic of Cameroons’ colonial 
administrators and occupation forces and the organization of democratic 
elections for the Southern Cameroonian people to freely elect their 
leaders; an act which should lead the admission of Southern Cameroons 
into full membership of the UN.656 
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This position is strongly supported by the Southern Cameroons National Council and the 
Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization leaders who have opted to use non violent 
means to solve the Anglophone problem, by engaging in diplomacy, political action and a 
legal battle with the government. But these Anglophone leaders fail to understand that the 
UN had closed the Southern Cameroons case long ago, and that it would not be possible 
for the UN to revisit the issue. 
6.3.1b Federalism 
Some Anglophone elites argue that it would be unrealistic now for Southern 
Cameroonians to accept federation, because federation was what they opted for during 
the Buea All Anglophone Conference in 1993. During the conference they called for the 
restoration of the two-state federation, which was the initial option that brought the two 
Cameroons together. However, the government rejected their proposal. Anglophones 
were committed to restoring the two-state federation so that the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon would remain an entity, respecting the two colonial identities of the 
Cameroons; but the Cameroon government did not listen to their appeals.657 Furthermore, 
many submissions were made and Anglophone elites even went to the extent of 
proposing a federal constitution and translating it into French so that the government 
would not have a problem understanding what they wanted. But they were treated as 
inconsequential people and, since then, it has been a question of repression. The 
government’s failure to respond to demands inviting them for dialogue led them to adopt 
what is called the “zero option”,658 to restore the statehood of Southern Cameroon. Some 
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Anglophones argue that it was a golden opportunity for the government to take them at 
their word. But since the government was silent and the struggle has moved to a point 
where the idea of sovereign independence for Southern Cameroonians is uppermost in the 
minds of the Anglophones, that position is irreversible.659 However, a group of 
Anglophone Cameroonians believe that federalism can solve the Anglophone problem, 
be it a two-state or ten-state-federation. According to them, a federal system of 
government in Cameroon will ease the pain of English-speaking Cameroonians because 
Anglophones will be autonomous, and they will not have to worry about marginalization 
through a centralised form of government.660 
 
In a federal system, each state will have its own government and that 
government would have its own budget and would take responsibility for 
the development of its own area and would employ its own civil servants. 
Then the federal government would have its own functions by taking care 
of federal subjects like custom officers, foreign affairs, currency, defence 
and higher education. The rest of the ministries would be carried out by 
the various states at their own level. It is the hope that the road map can 
help solve the problems the Anglophones are facing today. Because if you 
have your own physical and developmental policies and you carry them 
out the way you think your own state should be, you will have no cause to 
grumble.661 
Federalism is a concept that, to a large extent can solve the Anglophone problem because 
it is what was in place from 1962 to 1972, before the Cameroon government dismantled it 
under the pretext that it was too costly to manage. But today the government views 
federalism as being synonymous with secession, which is why the government would 
prefer decentralization to federation. 
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6.3.1c Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is enshrined in the January 1996 Constitution. It states that “The 
Republic of Cameroon shall be a decentralized state … the ten provinces shall become 
regions”.662 But it has taken the president more than six years to start talking about it 
because, to him, decentralisation is a delicate process fraught with risks to national 
security and so it must be approached slowly and carefully.663 The argument the 
Anglophones are making is that President Paul Biya is just playing for time, and that he 
would likely come up with a decentralization project that is not decentralization at all. 
This happened with democratisation and human rights where the President promised, 
delayed, and raised high expectations of Cameroonians. Then what he offered at the end 
was contrary to the people’s expectations. Some Anglophones, especially those of the 
opposition, argue that decentralisation will not solve the Anglophone problem; it will 
rather make the situation more complex because, with decentralisation, there is the 
possibility that regions will be merged and this will surely ignite the situation. 
Concerning fears surrounding the merging of regions, pro-government Anglophone elites 
argue that, though the law gives the President the upper hand to merge regions, he cannot 
merge regions without consulting the people of the regions. However, if the law on 
decentralisation is applied properly, it is going to benefit all Cameroonians and will 
greatly help in the development of the country. 
 
Pro-government Anglophone elites believe that decentralization can help solve the 
Anglophone problem. According to them, Anglophones should fight to have the 
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government implement the 1996 constitution, instead of fighting for secession.  They 
argue that decentralization will be good for the Anglophones because there will be 
regions, where Anglophones will do things their own way. There will be healthy 
competition, such as, the cleanest and most well organized region. And which is best 
governed? In such a situation there will be “Anglophonism” in the South West and North 
West and nobody would take away their various judiciary and educational systems. On 
the contrary, the leaders of some Anglophone movements see decentralization as a 
desperate attempt by the government to silence the Anglophones in the face of mounting 
pressures from Southern Cameroons nationalist movements for independence. 
 
6.4 Anglophone and Francophone Views on the Anglophone Problem 
As already shown in the previous chapters, most Anglophones claimed to be 
marginalized in the unitary state. They tend to blame the Francophone-dominated 
government for their predicament. Besides, there are some Anglophones who believe that 
Anglophones should fight hard to assert themselves in the unitary state rather than 
complain. On the part of Francophones, some of them do not seem to understand why 
Anglophones are crying out about being marginalized. To them, the Anglophone problem 
is just one of the problems facing Cameroon today.  
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6.4.1a Anglophone View 
The Anglophone views expressed here are mostly those of the people who support the 
status quo, because those of the opposition have been documented earlier. Prominent 
Anglophone Cameroonians such as the former Prime Minister Achidi Achu, Chief 
Samuel Liffafa Endeley, paramount chief of Buea, and Fon Angwafo III of Mankon, have 
acknowledged that there is an Anglophone problem, but to them what Cameroon needs at 
the moment is peace, justice and democracy. They urge all Anglophones to fight and 
assert themselves in the Republic. According to Simon Achidi Achu: 
 
The situation of the Anglophone is not so bad that they would want to 
separate. It is not what you are that matters but where you are because 
where you are you make your environment.664 
 
To him, it would not be possible for Anglophones to go back to their identity as Southern 
Cameroonians after so many years of cohabitation in the unitary state. He further 
questions what is wrong with Anglophones exerting their ability by going to the heights. 
If Anglophones are lazy the Francophones will beat them at their own game. Some 
Francophones have come to realize that Anglophones have a good system of education 
and many of them are sending their children to study in Anglophone schools. What does 
that say about the inferiority complex of the Anglophones, if Francophones are sending 
their children to study in English? Looking at the student population in the University of 
Buea, an Anglo-Saxon university, the Francophone population is steadily increasing, so 
Anglophones should sit up and face the reality of the situation rather than resigning 
themselves to fate and complaining. 
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Interview results suggest that some pro-government Anglophone elites want to maintain 
the status quo. They argue that in the age of globalization, they need a big market to 
succeed in business. And to be able to have a big market they must come together. They 
argue that looking at the world today: 
 
Asia is coming together, South America is coming together, Europe is 
coming together and Africa is still trying to come together. They believe 
that they are better off asserting themselves in a bigger society than just in 
Southern Cameroons.665 
 
To them, the time for micro states has long gone by; Anglophones should fight to assert 
themselves in the unitary state. They argue that even in Southern Cameroons the people 
are not united, for instance, in the South West, a Bayangi man does not want to see a 
Bakweri man. In the North West a Bali man hates a Mbatu man. So within the 
Anglophone community there is a split between the Anglophones. So there is no situation 
where one is going to have a perfect harmony amongst people, so long as people are 
human beings. 
 
Anglophones and Francophones have lived together since the reunification in 1961, and a 
lot has happened in terms of mixing between them. There has been much intermarriage of 
Francophones and Anglophones; exogamy, endogamy, and meetings in church, there has 
been such interaction that to split the community would be difficult. Another major 
problem is that many Anglophone elites, who have worked in cities like Yaoundé and 
Douala, have made these places their home and have built houses there. They only return 
to their place of origin to visit their families. For instance, if all Anglophones are asked to 
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leave French Cameroon and many Anglophones have invested there and vice versa, 
imagine the chaos that this would cause.  
 
According to Professor Bole Butake, a prominent Anglophone writer and critic of the 
government “the problem that Anglophones have is a singular problem which other most 
Cameroonians are facing today”.666 He further says that when one looks at it closely, one 
will find that it is a general situation that is facing the entire country. For instance, if one 
looks at the South Province where President Paul Biya comes from, one will find that it is 
much more disadvantaged than the South West, which is a province in Anglophone 
Cameroon. To him, “the problems that Anglophones are facing are basically due to 
mismanagement of the whole economy and the wealth of Cameroon to the disadvantage 
of everybody”.667  
 
According to Bole Butake, Anglophones are complaining a lot more for the simple reason 
that they had known better days, when they compare their situation today with the 
glorious days of Southern Cameroons. Butake believes that if the government was 
managing things properly the Anglophones would have no reason to complain.  He 
further asks why is it that the Anglophone problem became so acute when Paul Biya 
came to office. When Ahidjo was president, although he was repressive, he tried to 
maintain some balance in terms of regions. But if one looks at the situation now one will 
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find that most of the new recruits in the public service are from the Beti clan or village 
where the president comes from.668  
 
Butake insinuated that if President Paul Biya had a vision for Cameroon,  
I do not think Cameroon would be where it is today. The government does not 
want to democratize because it knows that if its does it would never win a single 
election in Cameroon. If it decentralizes, all the powers at the centre would no 
longer be there.669   
 
As such, Bole Butake believes that it is not separation that would solve the Anglophone 
problem in Cameroon but democratization and decentralization. 
 
6.4.1b Francophone View 
Like some Anglophone elites in government, some Francophones feel that there is no 
Anglophone problem in Cameroon. They try to equate the Anglophone problem with that 
of any problem that Cameroon is facing. This shows how ignorant some Francophones 
are of the history of the political union between Southern Cameroons and the Republic of 
Cameroon.670 According to Celestin Monga, a Francophone intellectual: 
 
There is an Anglophone problem in Cameroon. But let me say that there is 
also a kirdi problem in the north, a pygmy problem in the east, those are 
some of the forgotten people of our country.671 
 
He further says that there is general hardship in Cameroon and everybody is feeling the 
pinch. 
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What difference is there between a cocoa farmer from Sangmelima, a 
coffee farmer from Bamenda and a cotton farmer from Maroua? The 
Betis, as a group, have reaped no particular benefit from the Biya regime! 
Twenty kilometres outside Yaoundé and you have no tarred road, no 
school, and no dispensary. The money stolen from our treasury does not 
serve to finance public investment where Biya comes from. It is stolen and 
stashed away in a Swiss bank account.672  
 
 
To him, the acute problem facing Cameroon today is one of mismanagement and 
embezzlement. He believes that a well thought out federal or decentralized system could 
go a long way to resolving many of the major problems Cameroon is facing today, and 
the Anglophone problem is certainly one of them.  
 
From questionnaires administered to Anglophone and Francophone students about the 
Anglophone problem, it was found that some Anglophone students were ignorant about 
the Anglophone problem. This was similar to findings from Francophone students. Some 
Francophone students were very angry in their response when asked about the 
Anglophone problem. For instance, one student wrote: 
 
There is no rubbish as the Anglophone case. What they claim is what 
nearly all Cameroonians claim, even some Beti people. The problem is 
who is an Anglophone? Once you provide the meaning of that word then 
we will proceed. Are we Anglophones because we speak English? You 
should be very cautious when handling a linguistic problem.  Do you want 
to solve the so called Anglophone problem or you want to find out how we 
behave when confronted with English and French in our society. 
 
This student appears to be appropriating the discourse of the government on the 
Anglophone problem. His response necessitates a follow up. It was found that the student 
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was from the Central Province (Yaoundé). He was a master’s student in English language 
at the University of Yaoundé I. His response opened up a whole new discourse on the 
Anglophone problem, about what will become of Francophones who have done all their 
studies in English. For instance, there are many Francophones from Western Province 
who have settled in Anglophone Cameroon for decades and their children are more 
comfortable with English than French. These people consider themselves as Anglophone, 
but they will oppose the Anglophone independence in spite of the fact that Anglophone 
leaders promised to give them Anglophone nationality. Some of them even said that if the 
Anglophone problem is to be decided through a referendum they will vote against it 
because they will neither be Anglophones or Francophones. This is a very complex 
situation that needs some careful planning on how to deal with it.  
 
According to a Francophone student “Anglophones are the cause of their marginalization 
because they are the ones who chose to join us.” Another student said “How can the 
Anglophones say that they are being marginalized when they have the Prime Minister 
and other ministerial posts in the government?” According to another respondent, “the 
Anglophones are the ones marginalizing themselves, no anybody is marginalizing them”. 
Another student wrote: 
  
The Anglophones do not have a case. Their struggle is a manipulation of 
some selfish Anglophone leaders who are preoccupied by their vested 
interests than the well-being of the Anglophones. As a patriotic 
Cameroonian, I could not agree with the independence of Anglophones 
but if they want war in our beloved country, I would prefer them to be 
independent. 
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This student is from Douala and she is reading Journalism and Mass Communication in 
the University of Buea. Her response suggests that she has been reading about the 
Anglophone struggle. Like any other Francophone, she dismisses the Anglophone 
problem and accuses Anglophone leaders of selfish interests, as does the government. 
Responses from the questionnaires suggest that most of the Francophone students believe 
that Cameroon is one and indivisible. As such, they would not like to see an independent 
Anglophone Cameroon. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with students’ data and interviews with some prominent Anglophone 
and Francophone elites. Data analysis revealed that, in spite of some minor differences 
between Anglophones and Francophones, similarities between the two far outweigh their 
differences. Besides, Anglophones are not united as one people in the fight for their 
recognition as an autonomous state. That enmity is not there, where an Anglophone 
would say “I would rather die than mix with a Francophone”. Anglophones and 
Francophones live like brothers and sisters. Furthermore, the Francophones are not 
prepared to see an independent Anglophone Cameroon. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the correlation between minority 
rights and political liberalization. The study also aimed at showing how liberalization has 
triggered renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon. The reunification of the 
two Cameroons in 1961 brought together peoples whose separate colonial experiences 
provided clear contrast in language, law, administration, education and political style. A 
policy of national integration was put in place that went a long way to reducing the 
Anglophones into a political and cultural minority. Though the Anglophone elites do not 
see the Anglophones as a minority, it is clear that they have been reduced to a minority 
status as the Anglophone question clearly fits within the context of minority 
consideration in international law. Today, Anglophone leaders argue that they are not a 
minority but a people that have been annexed and recolonized by the majority 
Francophones. Anglophones say that the situation they are experiencing now is not what 
they anticipated when they decided to join their French brothers in East Cameroon.  
 
The hypotheses made in the introduction are as follows: 
1. During periods of political liberalization, identity claims aim not only at the 
acquisition of political rights, but also at increased access to resources. 
2. In national communities which have undergone different experiences of colonial 
rule but which have nevertheless been brought under the umbrella of a single 
state, there is a strong correlation between minority rights and claims to the right 
to self-determination. 
3. Different kinds of civic identity are the result of different forms of colonialism. 
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How political liberalization triggered renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon 
was one central focus of this research. The research found that liberalization ushered in 
more claims to rights for Anglophones, and some of these rights were articulated around 
minority rights that can be accommodated within the framework of a single state form, 
while others were articulated around the right to self-determination. The research found 
that those Anglophones who articulate their rights to be accommodated within a single 
state have tended to stress increased political participation and better access to the state’s 
economic goods and opportunities. This can be achieved through a federal system of 
government or a well implemented system of decentralization and democratization. 
Those who articulate around the right to self-determination argue that because of a 
distinct history, and the second class citizenship accorded to them, they pressed for more 
radical demands, which went unheeded, and this has developed into separatism.  
 
The research indicates that the Francophone dominated government in its attempt to erase 
the bi-cultural and bi-jural nature of Cameroon and claiming that Cameroon is one 
triggered fear amongst the Anglophones about the government’s intention of assimilating 
them. The research found that there is a strong correlation between minority rights and 
the claims to the rights to self-determination because Anglophones are being treated as a 
minority by the majority Francophone in the unitary state, as opposed to when Cameroon 
was a two state federation with equal rights to both states. As a result, Anglophones are 
fighting for self-determination because of a failed policy of integration that was only put 
in place to reduce them to a minority. 
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The study indicates that Cameroon was a German creation and under the Germans 
Cameroon was “one”, that is, there were no Anglophones or Francophones. The present 
day conflict in Cameroon came about when the Germans were defeated during World 
War I and Cameroon was partitioned between Britain and France. Each colonial power 
undertook to administer their portion of Cameroon according to their colonial policies. 
Today, there are two kinds of civic identities existing in Cameroon as a result of the 
separate forms of colonial administration implemented by Britain and France. The 
portion of Cameroon that was colonised by France believe in their French identity as 
French speaking Cameroonians (Francophones), while the other portion colonised by 
Britain also holds strongly to their identity as English-speaking Cameroonians 
(Anglophones). The distinction between the majority French and minority English 
Cameroonians plays itself in the daily running of the country to the disadvantage of the 
minority Anglophones. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the research has shown that 
Anglophone and Francophones have more in Common than they can acknowledge, each 
group still believes that their colonial heritage is better than the other. The research found 
that this attitude of each group sticking to their colonial heritage as the best has led some 
Cameroonians not wanting to implement policies that would benefit all Cameroonians. 
 
Frustrated with the treatment that Anglophones have been receiving from the 
government, attempts were made by some Anglophone movements to dialogue with the 
government. As a consequence of the government’s silence over the Anglophone request, 
leaders of the Anglophone movement adopted some radical approaches to fight for the 
autonomy of Anglophone Cameroon. To understand the frustrations of the Anglophones, 
the study has examined the circumstances that made them vote in favour of reunification, 
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and the ways in which they were subsequently marginalized in the union. It has also been 
appropriate to examine and analyze the various ways Anglophone leaders have privileged 
putting the Anglophone problem on the national and international scene. The concluding 
section of this thesis provides a summary of the major findings. 
 
This research reveals that a range of factors both internal and external influenced 
Southern Cameroons to vote in favour of a union with East Cameroon. Internally, the 
British neglect of their territory played a greater part in pushing the Southern 
Cameroonians towards reunification. First, their territory was joined to Nigeria in an 
administrative union. The British concentrated their interest more in Nigeria than in 
Southern Cameroons, and this led to the gross neglect of the British Cameroons.673  
Second, the pace of social advancement in British Cameroons was slow. In the field of 
education, the British established few primary and Native Authority schools, which fell 
short in meeting the educational demand of the territory. Besides education, health was 
another aspect that the British neglected in Southern Cameroons. The health situation of 
the plantation workers was horrible, and many of them died as a result of dysentery, 
pneumonia, typhoid and malaria, but the British administration did nothing to ameliorate 
the situation.  
 
The precarious economic situation of the British Cameroons affected the living standards 
of the people and the refusal by the British to initiate an industrialized programme and 
their attachment only to agricultural development led many to accuse them of seeking to 
reduce Southern Cameroons to a permanent plantation colony. The road network in 
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Southern Cameroons was deplorable; the British administration did very little with 
regards to the development of road infrastructure. There were a few graded roads, often 
disconnected by streams with bad bridges. The economic legacy of the British rule in 
Southern Cameroons was the phenomenon of poverty and underdevelopment. The result 
was disillusionment on the part of Southern Cameroonians, compared to French 
Cameroon that was well developed by the French colonizers. When the opportunity came 
in 1961 the Southern Cameroonians voted to secede from Nigeria and join East 
Cameroon. 
 
The Ibo factor also played a major role in influencing the Southern Cameroonians to vote 
in favour of reunification with East Cameroon. After 1945, there was an influx of Ibos to 
Southern Cameroons. They occupied important positions in the civil service, such as 
teachers, clerks, postmasters, administrators and nurses. They also controlled the business 
sector, buses and taxis. Their dominant position in the Southern Cameroonian economy 
was strongly resented by the local population.674 The injustices suffered by Cameroonians 
at the hands of the Ibos contributed to their hatred for Nigeria in general. Some 
politicians capitalized on the growing dislike and fear of the Ibos to influence the people 
to join East Cameroon. Arguably, had the attitude of the Nigerians, especially the Ibos 
been generally friendly, Southern Cameroonians would not have voted massively for 
unification with East Cameroon. 
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Another factor that encouraged the idea of unification was the formation of a radical 
national party in French Cameroon in 1848, the Union des Populations du Cameroun 
(UPC). This party stood for immediate independence and reunification of the two 
Cameroons. Furthermore, the appearance of the UPC’s members in Southern Cameroons 
following the party’s abortive revolt in the French Cameroon675 simply boosted the 
political ideas of reunification and independence of a united Cameroon in Southern 
Cameroons. 
 
Externally, the United Nations did not offer the Southern Cameroonians a third option in 
the UN-organized plebiscite. The UN was faced with three options from the Southern 
Cameroons regarding the status of the territory. Firstly, there was a strong desire among 
the people of Southern Cameroons to reunite with French Cameroon, though there was 
some opposition to this view. Secondly, some of them stood for independence within the 
Federation of Nigeria and thirdly, others opted for an independent Southern Cameroons. 
But unfortunately, the UN overlooked the stand of the third option and selected the two 
alternatives, which gave Southern Cameroonians the choice of achieving independence 
by either joining the independent Federation of Nigeria or Republic of Cameroon. In the 
UN-organized plebiscite the Southern Cameroons voted to join the independent Republic 
of Cameroon. To some Southern Cameroonians, the UN’s failure to take into 
consideration the aspiration of the people to become independent was an error on their 
part, and that was when things started going wrong for the Southern Cameroonians. 
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The research findings showed that Anglophone Cameroonians have been subjected to 
varying degrees of discrimination because of their minority status. The dominant French 
language has been used as a power tool to achieve cultural capital to the disadvantage of 
the Anglophones who could not speak French. These research findings raise the question 
of unfairness suffered by virtue of not knowing how to speak the dominant or politically 
preferred language. In most instances, Anglophones are forced to speak a language that 
undermines their social mobility and disables their participation in public institutions.676  
 
The research also established that having exhausted all the local remedies to dialogue 
with the government over the Anglophone problem, leaders of Anglophone movements 
decided to take their case to the international community in an attempt to find a solution 
to the Anglophone problem. The thesis found out that various Anglophone movements 
fighting for the liberation of Anglophones are committed to resolving the problem 
through peaceful means. A movement such as SCNC is involved in a diplomatic 
offensive in presenting the Anglophone case before the international community. SCAPO 
is involve in a legal battle by making presentations in court, especially at the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, about the legality of the Anglophone case in 
international law. 
 
The research findings show that the government has used various strategies to neutralize 
the Anglophone movements. Some of these strategies include: stigmatization, 
criminalization, arrest, torture and detention without trial. The government often arrests 
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(eds.) Language Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Anglophone leaders, detains and releases them without charge, undermining the judicial 
system in Cameroon. In a country governed by law, citizens cannot be arrested and then 
released without being charged. Moreover, the government has created its own SCNC 
faction which which it purports to be engaged in dialogue. 
 
This research also showed that new technologies of persuasion have helped to reinforce 
the claims of a sovereign Anglophone nation. It found that due to the Cameroon 
government’s restrictions on public protest and a state controlled media, Anglophone 
voices critical of the government can still be heard over the Internet. Anglophone 
Cameroonians at home and in the Diaspora have penetrated this new virtual social space 
of cyberspace and have created institutions in cyberspace that sustain the Anglophone 
nation. The various virtual imagined communities maintained by Anglophone activists 
take a primarily negative view of the Cameroon government’s policy in the region. 
 
The researcher observed that the online nation of Southern Cameroons677 offers a wide 
variety of services and activities to its people. One service of significance is the access to 
informational resources, which are invaluable for those people engaged in the struggle. 
The most hyperlinked sites in the virtual Anglophone state are The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Southern Cameroons, The Republic of Ambazonia and the Southern 
Cameroons Youth League. These websites present an imagined Anglophone nation in 
cyberspace with documents, articles, maps, anthem, emblems, geography, coat of arms 
and the history of the Anglophones in Cameroon. It also has the names of an interim 
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 “Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons”, 16 March 2004. Accessed at 
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government in exile and the daily running of the imagined Anglophone state. These 
websites on the Anglophone struggle openly promote international support for the 
Anglophones in Cameroon. 
 
The thesis has argued that in spite of the fact that Anglophone nationalism has been built 
on the differences that exist between the Anglophones and Francophones, the researcher 
observed that they have more in common than they can acknowledge. Since the 
reunification of the two Cameroons, so much more has taken place between the 
Anglophone and Francophone in terms of intermarriages, investments, migration, and 
lifestyle issues that the dichotomy between the two has become blurred. The findings 
show that Anglophone and Francophone youths tend to enjoy the same music and food, 
and they are influenced by the American culture of hip hop. The thesis found that, in spite 
of the fact that language is one of the factors that Anglophone nationalism is built on, the 
wide use of Pidgin English and Francanglais tends to blur the difference between an 
Anglophone and a Francophone. Language use in Cameroon functions as a tool to divide 
as well as unite the people. Again Anglophones and Francophones tend to watch the 
same programmes on television, irrespective of the language in which the series is 
broadcast.  
 
The thesis also found that the government always presents Cameroon to the international 
community as a French-speaking country because of its penchant for Francophone 
countries. It is argued that, in spite of the fact that in the constitution of Cameroon French 
takes precedence over English, Cameroon is neither a French speaking nor an English 
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speaking country, Cameroon is a bilingual country. Britain and France were their colonial 
masters, so Cameroon must exploit this dual colonial heritage to its advantage.  
 
A further observation of the research was that the Anglophones are not united in the path 
to follow to achieve their aim of fighting for Anglophone autonomy. There are factions 
that advocate outright secession for Anglophones, while other groups stand for 
federation, and within these groups that support federalism, there are those that support 
federation with two states and others want ten states federation. Pro-government 
Anglophone elites are in favour of the government’s policy on decentralization. The 
analysis of the data has revealed that in spite of some minor differences between 
Anglophones and Francophones, the similarities between the two far outweigh their 
differences. 
 
The thesis has argued that the Anglophones are not being marginalized by the majority 
Francophone but by the ruling CPDM oligarchy, though it can be argued that the CPDM 
oligarchy has a Francophone majority, with most of them being from the Beti clan. It was 
observed that many Francophones are not happy with the way the present government is 
managing the affairs of the country. Even in the South province, where President Paul 
Biya comes from, not everyone is happy, because the government is only favouring 
people who are from the Beti clan. There is a general discontent because of 
mismanagement of the economy and the wealth of Cameroon to the disadvantage of 
everybody.  It was noted during the research that Francophones are even more critical of 
the Biya’s regime, and they want a change. 
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Appendix One 
 
Student Questionnaires 
 
 
Name (optional)_________________________ University _______________________ 
 
Town__________________ Gender _____________________ Age ____________ 
 
1. What kind of Cameroonian music do you like to listen and why. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Which Two Cameroonian artists do you admire the most and say why. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Name two types of foreign music you like and say why. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Which Western culture has an influence on the Cameroonian youth? Explain. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Mention two foreign artists you admire the most and say why. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. What languages do you speak at home  (mark an X) 
a) Pidgin English  
b) English 
c) French 
d) Indigenous languages 
 
7. What are the languages you speak at school? _____________________________ 
  
8. What are the languages you speak in the market place. _____________________ 
___________________________ 
 
9. What languages do you speak with your friends and say why. 
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_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Why do you study English?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Why do you study French?     
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
    
12. Which of the two official languages in Cameroon do you like to speak and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Why do some Francophone parents want their children to study in English? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Do you know of some Anglophone parents who want their children to study in  
 French and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. What kind of traditional dress are the most used in Cameroon? Describe briefly. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Do you like to dress in traditional regalia (clothes) and say why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Under what circumstances do you dress in traditional clothes? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Do you like to dress in a modern fashion and say why. 
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. If you had enough money what would you wish to wear and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. What brands of shoes do you like the most and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Which brands of clothes do you like the most and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. What sports do you practise and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. What sports do you watch on TV and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. What soccer team in the Cameroon league do you support and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Who is your idol in the Cameroon national team and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. What Cameroon newspapers do you read and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. What CRTV programs do you like to watch and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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28. Which private TV stations in Cameroon do you like to watch and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
29. What Cameroon radio programs do you like to listen to and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. Which private radio stations do you like to listen and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. What other international TV and radio stations do you like and say why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. What type of Cameroonian dishes do you like to eat and say why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Which other local Cameroonian dish do you like and why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Are there any cultural differences between Anglophone and Francophone  
Cameroonians? Mention three. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. When and where did you first learn about the Anglophone problem in Cameroon? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Do you think the Anglophones have got a case for their struggle and say why. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
37. Do you like Anglophone Cameroon to be independent and why? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix Two 
 
 
Questionnaires destinés aux élèves 
 
 
Nom _________________________________ Ecole____ _______________________ 
 
Ville__________________ Sexe _____________________ Age ___________________ 
 
1 Quel type de music camerounaise préférez vous? Pourquoi?  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2 Nommer deux musiciens ou artistes camerounais que vous aimez beaucoup et 
dites pourquoi.  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  Donner deux genres musicaux étrangers que vous aimez et dites pourquoi.  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4 Quelle est la culture étrangère qui influence les jeunes ? Expliquer.  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5 Nommer deux artistes étrangers que vous admirez. Pourquoi?  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6 En quelle langue exprimez-vous à la maison?  
a. Le pidgin  
b. L’anglais  
c. Le français  
d. Les langues vernaculaires  
 
7 En quelle langue exprimez-vous à l’école? _____________________________ 
  
8  En quelle langue exprimez-vous au marché? ____________________________ 
___________________________ 
 
9 Quelle langue utilisez-vous pour causer avec vos amis? Pourquoi? 
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_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10 Pourquoi apprenez vous l’Anglais?   
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
11. Pourquoi apprenez vous le Français     
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
    
12  deux langues officielles en usage au Cameroun, quelle est celle que vous 
préférez? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
13 uelle est la raison pour laquelle certains parents francophones veulent que leurs 
enfants fréquentent l’école anglophone?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
14 Y a-t-il des parents Anglophones qui souhaitent que leurs enfants fréquentent 
l’école francophone? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
15 Quelle est la tenue traditionnelle que l’on porte beaucoup au Cameroun? Décrire 
brièvement.  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
16 Aimez-vous vous habillez en tenue traditionnelle? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
17 A quelle occasion vous-vous habillez en tenue traditionnelle?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
18 Aimez-vous vous habillez en tenue moderne? Pourquoi?  
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
19 Si vous en avez les moyens que souhaitez vous mettre comme vêtements? 
Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
20 Quelles marques de chaussures préférez-vous le plus? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
21 Quelles marques de vêtements préférez-vous le plus? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
22 Quels sports pratiquez-vous? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
23 Quels sports regardez-vous à la télévision? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
24 Quelle équipe de football supportez-vous dans le championnat camerounais?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
25 Quelle est votre idole dans l’équipe nationale du Cameroun? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
26 Quel journal camerounais lisez-vous? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
27 Qu’est-ce que vous aimez regarder à la CRTV? Pourquoi?  
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
28 Quelle chaîne de télévision privée du Cameroun aimez-vous regardez? Pourquoi? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
29 Quels programmes de la radio camerounaise aimez-vous suivre? Pourquoi? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
30 Quelle chaîne de radio privée aimez-vous suivre? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
31 Quelles autres télévisions et radio international aimez-vous? Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
32 Quels mets camerounais aimez-vous manger et Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
33 Quel autre met camerounais aimez-vous, Pourquoi?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
34 Existent-ils des différences au niveau culturel entre Anglophones et francophones 
du Cameroun? citez trois. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
35 Quand et où avez-vous entendu parler du problème des Anglophones au 
Cameroun?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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36 Est-ce que les Anglophones ont raison de protester contre la marginalisation? 
Pourquoi ?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
37 Souhaiterez-vous que les Anglophones du Cameroun soient indépendants? 
Pourquoi ?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
38 Quel est l’effet de la protestation des Anglophones dans votre vie?  
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix Three 
 
Life History Questionnaires 
 
 Early Life History 
 
Let's go back to your early life and some background questions. 
1. What is your earliest memory as a Southern Cameroonian?  
2. Can you tell me about your mother? Let's start with her name.  
3. When was your mother born and where?  
4. If you inherited a characteristic from your mother, what do you think it would     
be?  
5. Now let's talk a little bit about your father. What's his name?  
6. When was your father born and where?  
7. If you have a characteristic from your father, what would that be?  
8. How did your parents meet?  
9. How many children are there in your family? Can you tell me a little about your 
siblings?  
10. When's your birthday?  
11. What are your siblings doing with their lives?  
12. Tell me about your parents' schooling.  
13. What opinions did your parents have about work?  
 
Questions Related to your Educational Experiences 
1. Tell me about your schooling. What schools did you attend?  
2. How would you describe yourself as a student in your early life?  
3. If you were recognized for one strength in your early education, what was that 
strength?  
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4. During your school years was there any adult who gave you any special 
encouragement?  
5. How do you think your identity as an Anglophone Cameroonian affected your 
educational experiences?  
6. What were you interested in studying at the beginning of your undergraduate 
years?  
 
Questions Related to your Work History 
1. Can you tell me something about your work experience? When did you start 
working for pay? What sort of work did you do?  
2. How do you think your cultural background affected your work experience?  
3. How did you hear about the Anglophone problem in Cameroon? 
 
 
Summary Questions 
1. What would you say is your strongest personal attribute?  
2. What have you done that has given you the greatest sense of accomplishment?  
3. What one thing would you do differently in your life?  
4. Is there anything else you would like to add?  
Thank you!  
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APPENDIX FOUR 
 
Interview Questionnaires 
 
1. What demands have been made by the Anglophone minority to the 
government? 
2. How does the Cameroon government deal with the Anglophone minority 
problem? 
3. What are the processes by which the Anglophones have been subjected to 
varying degrees of discrimination? 
4. What are some of the problems in the struggle? 
5. Why is that the Anglophones are divided? 
6. The Anglophone problem has been in the limelight for some time now, 
what have they achieved? 
7. How did the Anglophone come to be constituted as a minority? 
8. What is the context of the Anglophone minority struggle, is it only 
language or what other cultural factors are taken into consideration? 
9. What are the internal variations in Anglophone Cameroon after 
reunification in terms of development? 
10. How do Anglophone Cameroonians measure themselves as a group? 
11. How do the Anglophones articulate their rights claims? 
12. How are the Anglophone elites organized? What are the intra-elite 
competitions? 
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13. Do you often travel abroad? Where do you go to and why? 
14. How did the British succeed in constructing the civil identity of British 
Cameroon as Anglophones? 
15. Do you have any idea how the Anglophone problem can be resolved? 
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